Everyday Nationhood

Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after *Banal Nationalism*

Edited by Michael Skey *and* Marco Antonsich



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Michael Skey · Marco Antonsich
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In memory of Harry Michael Parsons
"This power is the thing I fought against and if it be crushed out of existence as a result of my fighting and that of all my contemporaries I shall have done a good job of work. Above everything I have wished for peace and goodwill" (24 June 1942)

Alla cara memoria di Gigi Antoni

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Introduction: The Persistence of Banal Nationalism

Marco Antonsich and Michael Skey

There is a great irony surrounding *Banal Nationalism*, the book written by Michael Billig in 1995. It is the fourth most cited work on nationalism ever published; yet, the author cannot be labelled as a scholar of nationalism. Before and after writing this book, Billig barely engaged with the idea of the nation. His interest has always been in social psychology, exploring issues of rhetoric, ideology and language. As Billig explained in a recent interview (Dodds 2016), his interest in nationalism emerged out of a previous study on people's attitudes towards the British royal family (Billig 1991). Nationalism was indeed one of the themes which emerged when talking to people. He then decided to explore this theme further, asking himself why students of nationalism have focused so much on the emergence of the nation and so little on what happened once the nation was established. Hence, his focus on how established nations are reproduced. After finding the answer in

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the banal omnipresence, both spatially and temporally, of discursive and material national repertoires, he decided to move on … to rock & roll, laughter and ridicule, among others. Too much an eclectic mind to stay put where he had already found an answer to his curiosity. Apart from a very few exceptions, Billig never went back to the study of nationalism.

What then made *Banal Nationalism* so successful and its legacy so enduring? Billig's book should be located in the so-called discursive turn, initiated by Anderson's seminal study of *Imagined Communities* (1983), which opened a new terrain of investigation in nationalism studies. After a vast and rich scholarship exploring the question of 'what' and 'when' is a nation, the discursive turn brought the attention to the 'how' of the nation, i.e. the ways nations are discursively narrated and reproduced (Antonsich 2016; Özkirimli 2003). In this sense, along with *Imagined Communities* (still today the most cited book in nationalism which, incidentally, was also not written by a nationalism studies' scholar), *Banal Nationalism* changed the kind of questions that were asked about the nation.

Moving the focus away from the political, economic and social conditions which allowed for the emergence of the nation state, Billig focused on the reproduction of nationalism in the established nations of the Western world. What made nationalism there so pervasive and persisting? Those were not nations that were under threat, nations that were calling people to arms, to defend the homeland en masse. For Billig, the answer lay in the 'banal' ways people in the established nations experienced nationalism. In those societies, national symbols and discourses linger indeed 'underground' (Fox 2016), remaining visible, but unnoticed. For example, the unwaved flag hanging limply on the public building we pass every day on our way to work; or the numerous forms of deixis ('we', 'our', 'here', 'the') which populate our daily conversations and the news we read, watch or listen to; or, again, the weather map which accompanies this news. All are signs which make the nation an unreflexive presence in our daily lives, a powerful register that shapes the ways people think of and act in the world. In investigating the enduring power of nations, it also acted as a key challenge to theorists of globalisation, who at the time were positing

(and often welcoming) an end to national forms of identification and organisation (Beck 2006).

Billig's book was enthusiastically received by a range of scholars across the social sciences. Many, wishing to emulate the original research, tried to transfer his ideas to new settings or identify additional ways in which the nation is reproduced through banal forms. Some followed the original banal nationalism thesis by focusing on the routine representation of the nation in places as diverse as Scotland (Law 2001), Turkey (Ozkirimli and Yumul 2000), Belgium (Dhoest 2007) and Japan (Perkins 2010). Others moved away from Billig's preoccupation with dominant institutions by focusing on the everyday talk of 'ordinary people' and the ways in which they often unthinkingly drew on national frameworks to make sense of particular issues or processes (Condor 2000; Condor and Abell 2006; Skey 2010; Valkonen and Ruuska 2012).

Some emphasised the materiality of the banal nation through the analysis of coins, banknotes and stamps (Hammett 2012; Penrose 2011; Raento and Brunn 2005; Unwin and Hewitt 2001), license plates (Airriess et al. 2012; Leib 2011), street names (Alderman 2003; Azaryahu and Kook 2002), gardening (Tilley 2008), buildings' styles (Cusack 2001; Lahoud 2008) and even horses (Raento 2017). The very notion of 'banal' also escaped its original national register and was adopted in conceptually similar notions associated with other spatial dimensions: local (Alasuutari 2013), European (Cram 2001), transnational (Aksoy and Robins 2003), global (Szerszynski and Urry 2006), cosmopolitan (Beck 2004) and 'Occidental' (Bozatzis 2014).

Like any important theoretical contribution, *Banal Nationalism was also subject to* criticism. For instance, Skey (2009b) observed that banal nationalism tends to operate with the notion of a uniform, homogenous national audience—something which is particularly untenable in a context of increasing international mobility of people. Billig (2009) rebuffed this criticism, but Skey's invitation to analyse whether, when and who takes the nation for granted is obviously of great importance. Rosie et al. (2006) also showed that the banal reproduction of the nation in the mass media is much more complex than Billig (and Anderson as well) implied, particularly in contexts where different

understandings of what may constitute 'the national' co-exist, like in multinational states.

Elsewhere, Billig's interlocutors have focused attention on the apparent dichotomy between banal and hot nationalism, arguing that banalisation should be theorised as both a (reversible) process (Hutchinson 2006) and a 'social achievement' (Condor 2000: 199). This is something that Billig acknowledged, in the foreword written for the Serbian translation of his book, where he explicitly wrote of banal and hot as existing on a logical continuum (see also Spasić and Billig this volume). In more practical terms, this interrelationship between hot and banal has been explored in works by Jones and Merriman (2009) on road signs in Wales and, more recently, by Christian et al. (2015) on the geopolitical connections between the intimate and the global, by Paasi (2016) on state independence and Culcasi (2016) on the imagining and mapping of the Jordanian nation. In a similar vein, Benwell (2014) introduced the idea of 'blatant' nationalism as a means of drawing attention to the signs and symbols of nationhood that were overtly referenced and discussed in everyday settings, such as the classroom.

A further attempt to tease out the relationship between banal and other forms of national expression has been provided by Skey (2006, 2009a) who suggested that more attention should be focused on ecstatic forms of nationalism, mass events designed to celebrate or commemorate the nation. Drawing on insights from anthropology and the study of ritual, he has argued that just as banal forms of nationalism make ecstatic events meaningful, ecstatic events realise the nation as a concrete community that can be seen, heard and idealised.

Other recent studies have looked to unpick the relationship between the 'everyday' and the 'banal'. Despite their close resemblance in common language, these two terms should not be equated when it comes to a theoretical understanding of nation. Contrary to Billig, for instance, Brubaker (2006) suggests that the nation is not omnipresent in people's lives, but it is made present by them in specific circumstances. Henceforth, the importance of attending to the everyday as a way to understand when, where and how people call into existence the nation in order to make sense of their life worlds (Skey 2011). Building on this insight, Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) have offered an effective research

agenda for studying everyday nationhood. Their study builds on Edensor's influential book *National Identity and Popular Culture* (2002), which examined the ways in which the nation was routinely represented, materialised and performed through a range of cultural forms, material environments and everyday practices. For Jones and Merriman (2009), the banal should be considered as one specific aspect of the everyday, which might also contain hot forms of nationalism. This key paper again demonstrates the need to think carefully about the ways in which different people respond to, or overlook, particular signs and symbols of the nation at a particular moment or period of time. In this way, the everyday perspective tends to emphasise much more people's agency in the reproduction of the nation. This latter point has been expanded by Antonsich (2016), who clearly distinguishes from a top-down, state-centric conception of nationhood (the banal) from a more bottom-up, agency-centred engagement with nation (the everyday).

Notwithstanding this criticism, *Banal Nationalism* has proved immensely popular across a range of disciplines, marking a broader interest in the importance of the everyday in understanding questions of identity, belonging, culture and power. The present book is designed to not only pay homage to an influential approach, but to also assess its ongoing relevance and limitations and suggest new directions for the study of these key issues. It first took shape during the international symposium titled 'Everyday Nationhood', convened at Birkbeck College, London by Michael Skey on 8 September 2014. Some of the papers presented on that occasion feature in the present edited collection, and others have been invited to offer a broad overview of the notion of *Banal Nationalism*. In particular, the book's contributors draws on recent developments in theories of practice, affect, belonging, sociology of everyday life, material culture and media and communications. For organisational purposes, the chapters have been grouped into four distinct sections, although, as expected, some of these chapters can easily cross the boundaries of their sections. We are particularly grateful to Michael Billig himself, who has kindly accepted to join us in this editorial project by writing a commentary chapter.

The first section gathers the contributions of Calhoun, Spasić and Szulc, which directly engage with the main tenets of *Banal Nationalism*.

Calhoun offers a critical reading of Billig's work, praising on the one hand the novelty of the approach, for its focus on the everyday, and on the other hand pointing to some limitations. Among these, the tendency of treating nationalism as an ideology, overlooking its imaginary dimension. In other words, as also observed by Anderson (1983), nationalism is not another ideology, alongside communism or liberalism, but a pervasive way of imagining the world—a sort of grammar and syntax that allows people to speak about and act in the world. Moreover, contra Billig, Calhoun believes that nationalism can also be benign, as it is an integral factor to the functioning of modern democracy, and concludes by inviting further work on the tension and negotiation between the flagged and the unflagged of the nation or what he calls 'active unflagging'.

The chapter by Spasić also takes a critical stance towards the banal nationalism thesis, interrogating its Western-centric character. Focusing on the case of Serbia, a country of the 'semi-periphery' of the world, Spasić shows how banal nationalism hardly applies in a context where an insecurity in what/who is 'Serbian' breeds constant self-consciousness, thus preventing the unnoticed reproduction of the nation. Her chapter is an acute analysis of how banal nationalism travels from the centre (West) to the periphery, taking careful note of all the bumps along this uneasy journey.

In an interview with Dodds for a special edition of the journal *Political Geography* (Dodds 2016), Billig observed that if he were to rewrite his book today, he would have dealt with the Internet. The chapter by Szulc expands on the thesis of banal nationalism in the Internet age, asking how and what kind of nations and nationalism are reproduced on the Internet. Drawing on cultural and media theory, he points out how the ccTLD domains (for example, UK) not only reproduce banal nationalism online, but are also actively and consciously used by various groups to meet national and other objectives. In addition, his analyses suggest a more variegated understanding of the nation, beyond the implicit singularity at work in banal nationalism. An additional relevant point is that banal nationalism in the Internet age is less a top-down matter since it features the active role of ordinary people in reproducing, rather than merely receiving, expressions of nationhood.

The second section revolves around everyday attitudes and practices and how they intersect the banality of the nation. In the chapter by Wallem, the everyday and the banal are put in a fruitful dialogue, by focusing on the Germanisation of the names of ethnic German migrants from the former Soviet Union. Through ethnographic work in the transit camp of Friedland, Lower Saxony and among Russian-speaking migrants' associations in Berlin, she aptly suggests how the extraordinary act of changing name reveals the banality of national belonging associated with names, which are generally not consciously registered as signs of national affiliation. Her focus on practices is also a fertile way to connect the banality of the nation to an agency-based everyday approach to nationhood. The chapter also makes excellent use of insights from the work of Erving Goffman on stigma to highlight the power relations between different groups within the same national setting.

The chapter by Pratsinakis also explores the ambiguous category of co-ethnic migrants. Focusing on the case study of former Soviet Union migrants of Greek descent and relying on an ethnographic field work in Thessaloniki, Pratsinakis shows how, despite the common ancestry, 'established' or native Greeks maintain a clear dividing line between themselves and the 'outsiders'. Drawing on Elias' seminal work on insider/outsider relations, the chapter again focuses our attention on the ways in which everyday practices are used to define belonging and the material and psychological benefits that flow from membership of the in-group.

Goode offers an interesting contribution to expand both banal and everyday nationalism by attending to the private/public divide which has gone unnoticed in both literature streams. Focusing on Russia and building on interview and focus groups data collected among ordinary Russians in the cities of Tiumen and Perm, Goode exposes the different understandings of patriotism, highlighting the contradiction between the views expressed in the private conversation (interview) and those held in public (focus group). This suggests the importance of studying how the nation is narrated across different contexts for particular purposes.

Bonikowski uses a different methodological approach to the study of everyday nationhood, which is traditionally explored in qualitative

terms and in individual countries. Adopting a comparative research design involving France and Germany, he relies on survey data to examine how established cultural repertoires inform people's broader understandings of a range of issues. He finds close similarities when it comes to views on immigration, economic protectionism, support for radical right parties and Euroscepticism, which allows him to connect the micro-level of everyday nationalism with macro-levels of social and political outcomes.

The third section of the book investigates one aspect of banal nationalism, affect, which although present in Billig's original work was never given extensive treatment. Through auto-ethnographic work in Azerbaijan, Militz pays careful attention to the affective relationship between bodies, corporeal practices and objects to reveal feelings of national belonging and alienation. Her argument is that to attend to this 'more-than-representational' expressions of mundane nationalism is essential for understanding the persistence and power of the nation in everyday life.

Sumartojo also uses auto-ethnography to reflect on the importance of our sensorial qualities in appraising, feeling and making sense of the nation. In this case, the 'more-than-representational' helps understand the salience or the emergence of the nation in the everyday realm. Sumartojo, like Billig, believes that the nation is a pervasive condition of our daily lives and our senses allow for its emergence. Attending to the atmospheric and affective qualities of the nation, suggests Sumartojo, offers an additional way to expand on the insights of banal nationalism, connecting the scale of the individual to the macro-scale of state structures.

Affect is also the central focus of the chapter by McCreanor et al. Yet, they depart from the 'more-than-representational' approach seen in the previous two contributions. For them, affect is not different from emotion and both are not beyond representation. Instead, they are tied to processes of meaning making and should therefore be treated and analysed as social practices. They illustrate this point through a qualitative study of two national days in New Zealand, Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. Their empirical findings suggest that affective-discursive practices

reinforce the banal and normative common sense of the imagined national community.

The last section engages with banal nationalism beyond the national scale. The contributions in this section explore how this concept might also be put at work at the international, transnational and global scales. Presenting the case of 'Cuban Twitter'—an US undercover strategy of mobilising civic groups in Cuba—the chapter by Aronczyk reveals how the banality of nationalism travels outside the boundaries of the US through a project of cultural imperialism within globalising processes.

Lekakis's chapter adopts a similar outlook, examining the ways in which banal nationalism gets reproduced at different scales, national, regional and transnational. In her analysis of the Twitter campaign #BoycottGermany, promoted in response to the conditions of austerity imposed on Greece by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, Lekakis shows that transnational activists often adopt national frames to convey their messages and mobilise transnational solidarity. Her findings thus suggest that there is a fine line between resistance to and reinforcement of banal images of nationhood.

Ichijo explores the power of banal nationalism at the international scale by examining the role of global institutions in framing particular practices, materials and people in national terms. The chapter focuses on the food practices of France and Japan and how they are narrated by their respective governments and private food sectors in order to be placed in UNESCO's Intangible Cultural Heritage list. She convincingly argues that banal nationalism is reinforced by the ways UNESCO operates, thus inviting further exploration of the ways in which the international/global level, advertently or inadvertently, reproduces a world of nations.

Finally, Billig's chapter draws together some of the main threads from the preceding contributions and offers additional comments to assess the original argument of *Banal Nationalism* and its ongoing relevance to our understanding of belonging, identity and culture in the contemporary era.

All together the contributions presented here address important aspects of the notion of banal nationalism and expand it towards new

terrains of investigation. It is on the future research agenda of the banal and everyday nation that we reflect on in our conclusion.

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Part I

Critical Reflections on the Banal Nationalism Thesis

The Rhetoric of Nationalism

Craig Calhoun

Michael Billig's *Banal Nationalism* was a breath of fresh air when it was published in 1995. Many students of nationalism had grown more than a little tired of arguing about civic vs. ethnic nationalism or the distinction of benign patriotism from more dangerous nationalism. To my own considerable regret, I had turned in the text for my own first book on nationalism before reading Billig's book (Calhoun 1997). It is cited, in the relatively modest way possible when something is discovered only as one is making final revisions, and not as prominently as it should have been given our substantial agreement.

I cited Billig in a way I think is correct and appropriate, but limited. Moreover, the limits of my statement reflect some limits in the relationship between Billig's work and social science more generally that I want

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to address. I wrote: "Nationalism gives shape to soccer loyalties and the Olympic games, as well as to wars and economic competition (Billig 1995)." This is important and Billig made the case for it persuasively.

The Pervasive Flagging of Nations

Billig in a sense opened the eyes of researchers to the omnipresence of nationalism and the question of when, in his words, it is flagged and unflagged. The last was a pun, of course, because national flags themselves could appear in flagged and unflagged ways. They could be a casual background in everyday transactions and fields of vision, or the focus of patriotic attention in ceremonies—or indeed military mobilizations. One of Billig's key points was that, at least in "established nations" it was possible much of the time to forget the very remembering and reproduction of nationalism embedded in everyday representations (Billig 1995: 38). In other words, it is not just that we forget acts of violence that shaped our collective past as Renan famously observed (1990); we fail to see many of the ways in which we are led to remember to think of ourselves as nationals.

Since Billig wrote, there has been a dramatic expansion of attention to everyday nationalism. Examples are wide and interesting, from gymnastics to queers online to higher education itself. As in Billig's original work, a recurrent subtext is that seeing the nationalism in each setting reminds us that we didn't see it before. As Billig himself put it in the opening of the Conclusion to *Banal Nationalism*, "This book has been urging again and again: 'Look and see the constant flaggings of nationhood'" (Billig 1995: 74).

This calls attention to the blind spots in *doxic*, uncritically taken-for-granted everyday life and in social science itself. We notice violent nationalist mobilizations and extreme nationalist politics but fail to spot the pervasive appearance of national symbols and the constant location of "the" nation as "our" location in the world. Billig was especially attentive to nationalism in linguistic representations, calling our attention to the way it crept in even when it was not part of the topic, indeed perhaps especially so. He emphasized, thus, the role of "little words" like

the definite article "the" which helps reproduce the notion of bounded, discrete nations even when deployed in seemingly apolitical popular culture and media reports. To say, "the nation was shocked", does this work whether the shock involves a football loss or the disappearance of an airplane from distant skies. And of course football competitions and international news reporting are prominent among the many occasions for recurrent flagging of nations.

In addition to just noticing the pervasiveness of nationalist thinking, researchers have also brought attention to the ways it is presented. Though language was Billig's special interest, researchers in recent years have paid more and more attention to visual representation. This includes symbolism and iconography, but also as with language there are constant apparently less loaded representations, like maps and the organization of museum galleries as presenting French or Italian artists. And of course there are flags: actual, literal flags. Scotland's Saltire and England's Cross of St. George evoke nations—and also stances toward nations. At the time of this writing, they also evoke a crisis of British solidarity. The flagging is seldom if ever entirely neutral.

Hot Nationalism Depends on Banal Nationalism

In fascination with identifying examples of everyday nationalism, both flagged and unflagged, one of Billig's key points has been slightly obscured: nationalist politics depends on the seemingly apolitical deployment of the rhetoric of nation; "hot" nationalism depends on banal nationalism. Billig left this somewhat implicit but it is of central importance. Nationalism is available for political purposes and dramatic moments of mobilization only because it is produced and reproduced in banal and everyday forms. This point is inadequately incorporated into the debates of both specialist scholars and broader publics.

There is considerable work to be done on the relationship between the banal and the dramatic, the partially unconscious everyday and the consciously manipulated forms of nationalism. This is a theme of other papers in this volume, and evident in contemporary cases from responses to immigration in France to the unfolding crisis in Ukraine.

The violence against writers and cartoonists for *Charlie Hebdo* provoked not just a defense of free speech but a “hot” mobilization of discourse about Frenchness, no less powerful for being bundled with other values like reason, civil peace, and secularism. Russian annexation of Crimea could proceed as easily as it did not only because of Western lack of historical memory and therefore anticipation but also because Russian identity had been nurtured in a host of mostly cool but still significant ways for decades, underpinned by naval presence, business relations, and a substantial repopulation of the peninsula.

All of us in Britain see aspects of the same phenomena daily in the question of Scottish independence and the partially reactive assertion of English national identity.

Billig didn’t just show that banal or everyday nationalism exists and indeed is pervasive, but made the deeper point that it is crucial to the rest of nationalism. Still, his own emphasis was on demonstrating the existence of banal nationalism and this is the main point taken away by readers of his book. As a result, his book is mostly cited simply for the observation that there *is* banal nationalism. This is a pity, because most of political science continues to try to account for nationalism directly in terms of politics and interests. The problem is by no means limited to political science. Throughout the literature on nationalism, and even more in the press and popular accounts, there remains a bias toward seeing nationalism in a mixture of instrumentally pursued agendas and potentially bloody political passions. There isn’t enough analysis of the underlying conditions for such conscious appearances of nationalism. Everyday nationalism is among these conditions.

Billig focuses mainly on the attachment people feel to “their” nation, explaining how everyday representations matter alongside more dramatic political engagements. In this he addresses very helpfully the characteristic forgetting and even denial that allows people in the West and especially perhaps in the US to think they have no nationalism, but only patriotism or calm and sensible civic feeling. Nationalism is seen mainly in other places and in extremists. But the successes of UKIP or France’s *Front National* are made possible not just by persuasive demagogues or fear of immigrants. They are made possible by the constant reproduction of a sense of national belonging in everyday language use,

media, and even sports. This generates and reproduces an "us" identity in the sense of Billig's teacher Henri Tajfel, one about which we are both prideful and defensive. The reproduction of identification with the Confederacy in the US South stands in the background of white supremacist identity projects—and violent attacks—that oddly merge a sort of American nationalism with challenges to the actual US state as well as to racial minorities.

The 1990 Iraq war is recurrently mentioned in Billig's account. Discussion of it is perhaps where Billig comes closest to analyzing the ways in which broad patterns of everyday nationalism inform specific inflations of national sentiment and more dramatic action. But though I think Billig is broadly right, the underlying point hasn't registered as fully in the literature as it might have done.

In this connection, Billig makes points that I think are sound but unfortunately underdeveloped in his book and missed in quite a bit of the literature. One concerns the elision between "nation" and "society" in much discussion. Billig points in particular to the prominence of this in much American sociology (he has Parsons especially in mind). There it reflects the particular penchant to forgetting nationalism that is connected to hegemonic power and a tendency to elide the idea of national and universal interests (Billig 1995: 98). But it is clearly a broader phenomenon than this. And while he wants to point out that it influences academic sociology, he also sees it as part of the more general forgetting of everyday nationalism. He doesn't offer a sustained critique of the society/nation elision, though one can imagine that had he written one it would be similar to his critical analysis of the implicit nationalism of Richard Rorty's philosophy. He would be interested in the fact that Parsons did this as an American, and thus that his own society was always implicitly behind his accounts that purported to be more universally about society. I think this is true, but it is also true much more generally that the very modern idea of societies as implicitly discrete and bounded units owes much to nationalism. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, the two ideas grew up together each informing the other (Calhoun 1999). This is one reason for what critics have called the widespread "methodological nationalism" of much social science—like the way statistics on a variety of subjects and the units of analysis in

comparative research naturalize as well as reproduce nations.[1] Or again, as Billig remarks, through "routinely familiar habits of language … the world of nations will be reproduced as *the* world, the natural environment of today" (Billig 1995: 93). And "in so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations" (Billig 1995: 8).

In general, Billig seems simply less interested in explaining nationalism as such than in demonstrating that we habitually fail to see a lot of it, and therefore both misunderstand it and misunderstand our own participation in it—as citizens and as social scientists. He is more interested in how we situate ourselves in "our" nations than in how or why the idea of nation is in general currency. As a result, readers may miss the contributions he makes to more general explanation.

Ideologies, Imaginaries, and Rhetoric

I think the argument would be stronger if Billig relied less on the notion of "ideology" to categorize nationalism. In the first place, this very easily locates it in the realm of politics and actually obscures the banal forms of its reproduction that Billig emphasizes. It is as though he thinks the general understanding of the way "hot" nationalism works is sound, but we are just apt to miss the ways banal nationalism reminds people of their national location and makes it easier to summon nationalist sentiment. Secondly, though perhaps not necessarily, this emphasizes the role of interests in constituting national identities. I don't deny such interests and attendant biases, of course, but when we consider the general ubiquity of the national form, it is hard to see this as simply the sum of special interests. No doubt it derives in part from the existence of states, and Billig claims association with those who would explain nationalism by the rise of modern states with their sharp borders and administrative apparatuses that make them "power containers" (Giddens 1987). This view carries weight, but I think it may not do justice to the strength of what I would prefer to call the national or nationalist *imaginary*. I think it is important to see nationalism not just as an ideology that happens to be implicit in Parsons or any other sociologist,

but as a social imaginary that informs much more generally the way in which academics and others understand the idea and existence of nations. The nationalist imaginary is not simply an error by analysts, but an active part of the reproduction of a world organized in terms of nations. Analysts may participate in this uncritically or be more reflexively aware of it (Calhoun 2002, 2007a).

Benedict Anderson famously suggested that nationalism was not so much one modern political ideology, like liberalism or communism, as it was a pervasive way of imagining the world—more like religion and kinship. Billig cites Anderson several times and occasionally uses the notion of "imagining" the nation, so I think this is not foreign to his account. But he doesn't make this idea a serious part of his theoretical toolkit or of an explanation of nationalism. And he does partially distance himself from it. He says "Benedict Andersons's idea of the nation as an 'imagined community' is a useful starting-point for examining these themes—at least so long as it is realized that the imagined community does not depend on continual acts of imagination for its existence" (Billig 1995: 70). It seems to me that this deprives the idea of a good deal of its force.

Billig may be concerned to make clear that lots of the representations of everyday nationalism are in circulation without being mobilized in imagining anything in particular. We see the flag at the post office without thinking about it. Moreover, Billig seems to think that reference to imagining is inherently subjective and obscures the recurrent formal aspects of nationalism. But this implies an unfortunate dualism, as for example he claims that "national identities are forms of social life, rather than internal psychological states" (1995: 24). He is right to emphasize social forms, but surely this is a false opposition.

The idea of social imaginaries is precisely a bridge between the objectively recurrent and the subjectively enacted. It is because we have a social imaginary of the market or voting, to follow Charles Taylor (2004), that we are able both to take a variety of actions, indeed interactions, and understand ourselves and others as we do so. This speaks to a curious flatness to many accounts of everyday nationalism, including some of Billig's: they limit themselves to representations, not developing the way in which these representations are embedded and reproduced

in action. Put another way, everyday nationalism consists not just of a bunch of words that happen to be repeated, but participates in grammar and syntax that make it hard to speak without reproducing national thinking. Billig makes clear that this is a matter of visual imagery as well as words, but it is also a matter of action, of phenomenologically inhabiting the world, not only of engaging with representations.

Anderson (1991) offers a number of illustrations of how the idea—and the lived reality—of nation is produced and reproduced through organizations of imagination. In a powerful analysis, he discusses how novels prepare the way for this imagination by presenting interacting storylines that suggest multiple personal histories entwined with each other even when the characters are not in interaction. In a famous image, he describes the (now dying) ritual of people all over a country reading their daily papers. His point is not merely that they get the same information (which of course they may not if the papers vary). It is that they are embedded together in both synchronicity and narrative and this—not similarity as such—helps produce a sense of commonality. In the 1991 revised edition of *Imagined Communities*, Anderson added a brilliant chapter on "census, map, and museum" as vehicles for imagining nations. To note that Billig doesn't cite the revised edition would be mere pedantry were it not that it matches up with an apparent misunderstanding in which he suggests that imagining in Anderson's sense is a purely internal state rather than a social form, and a matter of similarity rather than entwined lives. He takes Anderson's example of newspaper reading to be about contents rather than practice.

More deeply, social imaginaries are crucial to the process of the production and reproduction of social reality. They are not merely subjective, but evidence of the speciousness of the sharp opposition between subjective and objective. They are ways in which some very firm and even in certain senses material realities come into being and continue to influence our lives. Corporations are creatures of social imagination; so are nations. I have addressed this elsewhere and won't elaborate or fully develop the point here (Calhoun et al. 2015). But it speaks to everyday nationalism because this is not merely a set of "flat" contents on the surface of social life, but part of the process of social imagination that

makes national thinking and national sense of belonging available for politics.

The work of social imaginaries is often very prosaic. As Billig writes of being part of a country: "This place has to be unimaginatively imagined and the assumptions of nationhood accepted, for the routine phrase to do its routine rhetorical business. Through this routine business, the nation continues to be made habitual, to be enhabited" (1995: 107). In other words, the nation must be routine and commonplace some times and in some contexts for it to be available to extraordinary and dramatic mobilizations at others.

In addition, the reproduction of nationalism may take place in argument as well as agreement (as indeed the whole rhetorical tradition might suggest). Billig twice quotes Shotter (1991) to the effect that nationalism is commonly a "tradition of argumentation." The nation is reproduced as a common reference point in debates over what the nation should be, how it should be defended, or its interests advanced. For this reason, a vital, agonistic public sphere may be a feature of thriving national solidarity not its enemy.

Nationalism, Good and Bad?

The point is of significance for further research on everyday nationalism. For all of his refreshing willingness to think anew about nationalism, Billig sees it almost completely as pernicious. He offers a "confession" of his own participation as a sports fan who cheers the national sides. But though he apparently thinks that some manifestations of banal nationalism fall well short of evil, the implicit concern of his book is that everyday nationalism be recognized as on a continuum with "hot," or dramatic, or violent nationalism. I think he is absolutely right to refuse the separation of supposedly benign patriotism from malign nationalism as though they were two completely different phenomena. He is right to refuse to generalize from the extremes of nationalism alone. He is right to refuse to let those who participate in everyday nationalism off the hook of responsibility for more abusive

nationalism. But in making this point, he misses something very important to the reproduction of both banal and dramatic nationalism.

To think that nationalism is always bad, and that banal nationalism simply underwrites the always available potential for more evil, obscures the importance of nationalism to some much more positive projects. I don't just mean that in times of war soldiers and indeed ordinary people may feel a sense of solidarity and that this is good. More basically, I mean that nationalism is integral to much of modern democracy. Nationalist discourse is integral to constructions of "we the people" (Smith 2003). A sense of common national membership is integral to acceptances of different opinions and even electoral losses. And beyond democracy, a sense of belonging to a common nation has underwritten many modern projects of economic redistribution and social welfare. The National Health Service has its name for a reason.

My point is not that these good institutions justify the evil actions undertaken in the name of nations. It is, rather, that a very significant part of how nationalism is reproduced is through its embedding in collective projects of national improvement.

The projects of national improvement often reflect explicit or implicit comparisons to other countries. "*They* are getting ahead of us," "*they* have more power, more freedom, more wealth, a better educational system, or better roads." As Billig argued, "the nation is always a nation in a world of nations. 'Internationalism' is not the polar opposite of 'nationalism', as if it constitutes a rival ideological consciousness" (1995: 61). This is clearly right, but often forgotten.

Forgetting the international character of nationalism is conducive to illusory notions of how globalization will affect nationalism. It never ceases to amaze me how many people have imagined that globalization will simply replace nationalism with a universal, cosmopolitan consciousness. Billig points out reasons why this is a fantasy, even though globalization does pose challenges to national states. I would go further arguing that nationalism, including reactive, defensive, and belligerent nationalism, is among the ways people respond to globalization (Calhoun 2007). Nations are not merely valued goods people defend against global challenges; they are resources people mobilize and augment to cope with global challenges. This extends to the solidarities

maintained in diasporas and not only solidarity against migrants but the projects of assimilation by which migrants are integrated into host nations which are not only enriched, but actually become more articulate about themselves in the process.

Billig wrote in the early 1990s. The Iraq War was in the background of his account, as I have mentioned. But so was New Labour. This was a dramatic moment of simultaneously mobilizing and forgetting nationalism. Enthusiastically cosmopolitan, the coiners of the phrase "Cool Brittania" were also banally and constantly nationalist.

Of course, we live with new and interesting manifestations of nationalism today. The UK may shortly be dismembered. Britain is uncertain whether its national sovereignty, interests, and essentially symbolic being are threatened by membership in the EU. There is perhaps more "hot" nationalism in the West than there was when Billig wrote. It appears in responses to immigration, to Islam, to conflict in Eastern Europe. But there is always an entanglement of "hot" nationalism with the everyday—and this is manifest in the extent to which the financial crisis of 2009 and after brought not an EU of reinforced solidarity but one of much more nationalist discourse.

Conclusion

Billig has called our attention to the pervasiveness of both flagging nationalism and rendering flagging self-consciously unflagged—that is, deploying the symbols and rhetoric of nationalism in ways that stay mostly below the level of explicit consciousness. But it is worth considering also practices and projects in which there is active unflagging. I have in mind humanitarian action. Sometimes this has manifest national dimensions, especially when funded by governments. USAID may ask that its (national) logo appear on every bag of wheat it ships. But NGOs often go out of their ways not to flag nationality. Media representations of humanitarian suffering, likewise, tend systematically to be devoid of flags (though these may appear on the uniforms of those said to cause them). This doesn't mean that the intentionally non-national altogether escapes nationality and even nationalism. The

effort to help suffering strangers relies in part on ideas of who we are in relation to them and on nationally shaped views of the situations of distance suffering—US views of Darfur and South Sudan, for example, and UK views of Afghanistan. There is a tension and negotiation between the flagged and unflagged that merits more exploration.

Finally, it is worth remembering that nationalism and related concerns like fascism, racism, and intergroup relations are not the only thread running through Billig's work. He has written widely in social psychology, and very importantly on rhetoric. Without sustained discussion of either the history or theory of rhetoric, I have tried in this paper to bring out the importance of a rhetorical view of nationalism. This appears in *Banal Nationalism* in various places and ways; deepening social science engagement with rhetoric is of wide importance and strengthening it will enhance our ability to understand nationalism, appeals to identity, and projects of political mobilization.[2] Rhetorical analysis is a part of the so-called linguistic or discursive turn of the 1990s that has not taken off as much as the others. Also of value is exploring the link between rhetoric and language on the one hand and emotions on the other. As Billig wrote (though he said much less about affect in *Banal Nationalism* than in some of his other works), hatreds are commonly justified in the name of love (57). We could add that however justified, they often have roots in shame (Scheff and Retzinger 1991).

But let me close with two summary thoughts. Michael Billig's book, as I said at the outset, was a breath of fresh air. He offered a range of compelling insights and he offered help to those who would think a bit outside the box of conventional analyses of nationalism. One must hope both that Billig's book continues to be reprinted and read and that his subsequent interlocutors get the attention they richly deserve.

Notes

1. Many have commented on methodological nationalism from Anthony Smith to Ulrich Beck, for whom it was an important focus of critique. The term was first used, so far as I know, by Herminio Martins in 'Time and Theory in Sociology', pp. 246–94 in J. Rex, ed.: *Approaches to Sociology*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974 (Martins 1974).

2. See Billig's other books, including especially *Arguing and Thinking: a Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, rev ed., 1996) (Billig 1996).

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The Universality of Banal Nationalism, Or Can the Flag Hang Unobtrusively Outside a Serbian Post Office?

Ivana Spasić

Joining the conversation that has followed the publication of Michael Billig's *Banal Nationalism* (1995), this paper will attempt to cast a fresh glance at the banal nationalism thesis from a perspective empirically and epistemologically embedded in contemporary Serbian society, as an instance of what has been called the semiperiphery. This exercise is premised on the belief that it is always beneficial to bring into productive confrontation theoretical constructs invented (almost invariably) in the affluent, peaceful societies of Western Europe and North America, with social contexts their authors did not have in mind. Two tasks will be involved: one, to examine the applicability of banal nationalism to a particular setting; secondly, and more importantly, it is hoped that the concept itself, as well as its accompanying theory, will reveal their strengths and weaknesses in bolder relief when scrutinized from an unexpected location.

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Three general questions will guide my inquiry: Who qualifies for banal nationalism? What does 'banal' actually refer to? Does Billig manage to avoid the trap of Western theoretical ethnocentrism?

Serbs in *Banal Nationalism*: From Antithesis to Assimilation

Let me start from the role allotted to Serbs in the argument of *Banal Nationalism*. They are cited at a number of points as the antithesis to the book's main subject, that is, as an embodiment of the other, non-banal, hot and aggressive kind of nationalism. In the most famous introductory definition of his central concept, Billig writes: 'The present book insists on stretching the term "nationalism", so that it covers the ideological means by which nation states are reproduced. To stretch the term "nationalism" indiscriminately would invite confusion: surely, there is a distinction between the flag waved by Serbian ethnic cleansers and that hanging unobtrusively outside the US post office. (…) For this reason, the term **banal nationalism** is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced' (Billig 1995, p. 6; emphasis in the original).

Several paragraphs earlier, Billig points to the blank spot in political theory and public discourse which habitually ascribes the label of nationalism only to some Others. Again, Serbs come in handy: 'According to customary usage, George Bush is not a nationalist; but separatists in Quebec or Brittany are; so are the leaders of extreme right-wing parties such as the Front National in France; and so, too, are the Serbian guerrillas, killing in the cause of extending the homeland's borders' (Billig 1995, p. 5). True, Billig is here criticizing what he is writing about, but the target of critique is rather the habit of *limiting* the title of 'nationalism' to its extreme forms than the distinction itself, or its association with particular actors and places.

In these and other similar passages in the book, the dichotomy banal/non-banal is basically framed as Us/Them. It is suggested that these kinds of nationalism are distributed rather simply—some people have

one, others have the other; 'We' have this one, 'They' (and some stray members of 'Us') have the other. Flags do not hang unobtrusively outside Serbian post offices. The message is that 'We' too have our own nationalism, not at all innocent, and that 'We' should finally come to terms with this fact and approach our own habits and practices with a little more self-criticism.[1]

In a foreword written specially for the Serbian translation of the book (Billig 2009a), however, matters are set rather differently. In this new text, Billig endeavours to preclude a possible 'orientalist' (Said 1977; Todorova 1997) interpretation of his position, whereas in the 1995 book, he did not seem to care that much: '[T]he recent Serbian nightmare is … not something that stands as a unique reflection of the Serbian "character" or Serbian "history". It belongs to the continually changing history of modern nationalism' (Billig 2009a, p. 12).[2] The rhetorical gap between 'Us' and 'Them' is now much narrower. Serbs are de-exoticized, assimilated and, together with 'Us', placed on the same continuum stretching from 'hot' to 'banal' nationalism: 'The point is not that these two forms of nationalism—the hot and the cold—are entirely different, or that they are to be found in different nations. It is not the case that one nation only shows the hot form while another nation the cold form … The routine, 'cold' forms of nationalism provide the grounding from which vigorous episodes of flag-waving nationalism can emerge' (Billig 2009a, p. 9). This implies, unlike the frame deployed in the book, that banal and non-banal nationalism are conditions of some sort of collective thermometer, switching on and off according to circumstances, a matter, that is, of *time* rather than *space*.[3]

Furthermore, Serbs are reassured that their nationalism too will soon grow banal: 'As Serbia and its neighbours slowly and painfully emerge from the period of nationalist warfare, they do not leave nationalism behind. Those flags, which not so long ago were waved in national exultation and violently against the non-national Other, have not disappeared. They now hang limply on public buildings, which the citizenry daily pass on their business with hardly a second glance. In this regard, Serbia is moving towards a nation state like other nation states in Europe' (Billig 2009a, p. 10).

Is There Such a Thing as Serbian Banal Nationalism?

Confronted with these two rather different explications, the puzzle remains: Can Serbs have banal nationalism or not?

At the first and simplest level, the answer would surely be—yes, of course. Most examples that Billig (1995) uses to illustrate banal nationalism in the US, UK, or France could easily be found in Serbia. To do a research on 'Serbian banal nationalism' modelled on the many post-*Banal Nationalism* studies that apply the concept to diverse milieus would not be a very difficult task. Mundane symbols of the nation are pervasive in daily life, on the banknotes people use, in the names of city streets they walk, on the public buildings they enter every day, in TV weather forecast and coverage of sporting events. Public and private talk is full of deictic references to 'us', 'here', and 'our'.[4]

Yet, at a more profound, conceptual level, things become tangled immediately. Reflecting on the question in a more rigorous manner, we stumble upon (at least) two complicating factors that constrain the space for a possible Serbian banal nationalism. Each of them signals a problem in the theory itself.

The Flag(s)

The first circumstance is that Serbia is an old/new nation state, re-established in 2006 after almost ninety years of shared statehood experience in various unions with other South Slavic peoples.[5] The present-day Republic of Serbia, although it claims continuity with previous state structures (Kingdom of Serbia before 1918, Socialist Republic of Serbia within the Yugoslav federation), still has in a sense to constitute itself anew, and within vastly changed international environment. Thus, the nation state remains more of a project than a fact—and in a much stronger sense than 'any' nation state could be seen as unfinished by definition. For a variety of historical, demographic, political, and cultural reasons, Serbian national identity has traditionally been layered and blurred by fusion with a broader, South Slavic or Yugoslav identity.[6] At

present, it is not quite clear what the designation 'Serbian' refers to—to the territory (and which one),[7] or to the ethnocultural nation, living in significant numbers in neighbouring states?[8] Thus, in the Serbian case, there is no simple coincidence between nation and state. The relation between the two has been complex and shifting.

The consequences of this situation can be illuminated through Billig's favourite image of the flag. In the Serbian Preface, to recall, Billig (2009a, p. 10) comforts Serbs that they will soon become like everybody else because 'those flags, which not so long ago were waved in national exultation (…) now hang limply on public buildings'. However, this is not in fact true. The flags now hanging limply on public buildings throughout Serbia are, literally and metaphorically, *not the same* flags that were waved during the 1990s wars. The Serbian side in the wars, consisting of a motley collection of armed groups of different backgrounds, legal statuses, recruiting methods, and ideological persuasions, used a variety of flags. They were generally recognizable as Serbian, containing one or more of the traditional Serbian symbols (red-blue-white colours, cross with four firesteels, etc.), but lacked visual unity as there was no central designer agency that would mandate how they should look.[9] And that is not all: in the early phases of the war, a major force on the Serb side was the Yugoslav People's Army, the official army of the crumbling federation, which, in spite of being progressively Serbianized and fighting against its own citizens of a 'wrong' ethnicity, continued to use the Yugoslav flag long into the collapse of the country it had vowed to protect.

So the flag of the (old/new) Republic of Serbia, somewhat taken by surprise by its own regained independence,[10] had to be reinvented before it could be hung on post offices—or even precisely *in order to* be hung there. There was no ready precedent to lean on directly, and the reinvention was anything but easy. For several years, the choice of both the flag and the national anthem was a topic of heated public debate, involving intellectual and political elites as well as many ordinary citizens. Aesthetic, historical, and particularly ideological connotations of various visual elements and their combinations aroused a great deal of passion because they were felt to reflect competing visions on the desirable character of the Serbian state (monarchy or republic? which of the

two historical Serbian dynasties? an ethnically defined or an inclusive civic polity? ancient or modernist tradition? religious or secular face? what about the socialist legacy?). The controversy indicated the ambiguities of this reluctant nation state which likes to think of itself as age-old, but in fact finds it hard to decide what it wants to be. The issue of the flag was temporarily resolved by a governmental decree in 2004, and after several more modifications, its current form was finally adopted in 2010.[11]

The flag muddle can be extrapolated into a more general question: What, in such conditions, would the thesis of the continuity between two types of nationalism mean? To recall, Billig (2009a, p. 9) argues that the 'routine, "cold" forms of nationalism provide the grounding from which vigorous episodes of flag-waving nationalism can emerge'. But from which banal nationalism did the vigorous Serbian nationalism of the war years emerge? It could not be any purely Serbian banal nationalism since for 45 years Serbian statehood, like Serbian national identity, had been incorporated in the broader, Yugoslav statehood and identity.[12] This was certainly true of the official, publicly permitted discourse, but also held to a large extent at the mundane level of how these identities were felt and lived. Serbhood was definitely not 'forbidden', as latter-day nationalists are fond of complaining, but it was tempered by the ideology of socialism and Yugoslav brotherhood.[13] Conversely, the nationalism being banalized in today's Serbia can hardly be seen as basically the same as the ethnic nationalism that had driven Serbs to war—only cooler. Like the flag, it has to be reinvented. This looks like a change of the matter itself, rather than just its temperature.

The Serbian example is not one of a repressed minority fighting for freedom, of an imperial majority losing control over its dominion,[14] or of a colonial situation, viewed from either end (see also Foster 2002). The very logic of nationhood is here different. And Billig's model leaves us at a loss when confronted with instances of this kind, when a nation sets on its way to statehood—to the condition of 'limply hanging flags'—from a multiethnic federation.[15]

At the roots of the theory of banal nationalism, in Billig's original rendering, lies a simple identification of nation and state. The

implications of a situation where this presumption does not hold are never considered.[16]

'Novak Is Us!'

The second difficulty in applying the concept of banal nationalism to today's Serbia concerns the latter's place in the 'world order of nations'. Serbia's position can best be described as *semiperiphery,* that is the periphery of the Core, the 'West'. The concept of semiperiphery derives from the world system theory but has recently been reappropriated by more culturalist streams of thought. For instance, Serbian feminist author Marina Blagojević (2009; Blagojević and Yair 2010) has proposed to complement the economic emphasis of the original term with cultural and symbolic dimensions. On this view, semiperipheral societies are located 'neither here nor there', on the margins of the global Core, never completely incorporated in the latter, yet too far removed from any other geographical/historical/cultural area—like 'the global South', or 'Chinese civilization', and so on—to identify with. They try desperately to 'catch up' with the Core, to which they claim they belong, but where they know they will never be fully accepted as equals. Feeling chronically insecure, such societies are beset by problems of identity and self-confidence. For Serbia, an excellent example of this kind, such geosymbolic position, is exacerbated by it being a small, poor, and politically weak country. Topping it all, its international reputation has been seriously and for the time being irreparably damaged by its conduct in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.

For all these reasons, manifestations of the Serbian national feeling have become uneasy, tense, self-conscious, politicized, and internally divisive. Whatever is talked about, the Nation is always barely beneath the surface. Identity questions (What are we like? Is this really Serbian? Who is a better Serb? How should we present ourselves to the world? How do we rate on this or that international scale?) arise all the time, even in trivial daily conversations. Passionate talk of the nation easily switches between enthusiastic celebration and bitter self-criticism: a melodramatic phrase, 'You can find *this* only in Serbia!' is used almost

like a buzzword, where *this* can just as well be something extremely bad, as something very good. A huge power asymmetry is sorely felt to be separating (semiperipheral) 'Us' from (Core) 'Them', to whose judgmental gaze 'We' are exposed and who are in a position to determine 'our' destiny. Against such strong 'geopolitical affect' (Jansen 2009), being Serbian in a relaxed, mindless way becomes next to impossible, and banalization of nationhood, its relegation to the unnoticed 'subliminal backdrop' of people's lives (Thompson 2001, p. 28), is very unlikely.

Consider the example of the tennis player Novak Djoković, one of the world's best and by far Serbia's most celebrated athlete. It is ironic that a brilliant personal career in this most individualist and gentlemanly of all sports has produced the best-known emblem of Serbian national, that is, collective success. In the Serbian media and public opinion, Djoković is framed primarily as 'ours' rather than his own: while his extraordinary talent and personal effort are acknowledged at the declarative level, at bottom he is felt to be a sort of 'delegate' of the collective. He is the foremost idol of young people. Tennis became a popular sport overnight; city streets are empty during his important matches. In June 2011, after Djoković's first accession to No. 1 on the ATP list, over one hundred thousand exuberant people welcomed him in the centre of Belgrade, chanting and waving national flags.

Being a successful sportsperson and elegant, competent member of the world jet set, *and* a proud Serb and devout Orthodox Christian believer, Djoković is described as 'our hero', 'the beautiful face of Serbia', 'our best ambassador in the world', the saviour of Serbia's blemished image, a paragon of how to triumph internationally without giving up one's identity. In internal Serbian squabbles between 'patriots' and 'cosmopolitans', he is used to symbolize what has been called the 'Third Serbia', the one which smoothly weds both virtues (Spasić and Petrović 2012; Petrović Trifunović and Spasić 2014). Also, in his public performances, Djoković himself is careful not to appear chauvinist; he makes a point of being on friendly terms with Croatian and Bosnian players, and his patriotic messages are always coupled with appeals to transnational understanding, cooperation, and mutual respect.

In terms of banal vs. hot nationalism, Djoković is an ambivalent figure. Emotional moments of public celebration can be fitted rather well into what Skey (2006) calls 'ecstatic nationalism', yet beyond such high visibility occasions he does not trigger strong national(ist) passions all the time. Similarly, there is a tension between the habit of turning Djoković into a proxy for the nation, and the open-minded, positive, and 'civilized' version of national attachment he is keen on promoting. Djoković shows how one's Serbhood may be expressed not by gnashing teeth and hating others but, for a change, by smiling, being polite, and rejoicing in 'our' victories. Whether one likes this sort of collective self-glorification or not, it is undoubtedly an improvement compared to the 1990s.[17] Besides, there is a small but vocal minority that angrily opposes the routine nationalization of Djoković as well as his conservative patriotism.

There would not be so much fuss about Djoković if it were not for Serbia's vulnerability within global symbolic hierarchies. Insecurity breeds self-consciousness. This is the second big problem in the operationalization of banal nationalism: the differential effect of global positioning. And it is, like the first, left out from the original conceptualization, though Billig seems to have a hunch in that direction when he writes of the 'established nations' as 'those states that *have confidence in their own continuity*' (1995, p. 8), or that are 'at the *centre of things*' (1995, p. 5, both emphases added). However, Billig misses the opportunity to follow this analytical path and explore where it might lead. This has not been redressed in later elaborations either, in the reply to Skey's critical comments (Billig 2009b), or even in the Preface to the Serbian translation, where it would be expected (Billig 2009a). In these afterthoughts, Billig does note the importance of the global dimension, but merely in the form of 'globalisation', which for him effectively boils down to Americanization (see also Skey 2009). Again, there is no discussion of global structures of inequality that obviously affect the banality of anyone's nationalism.

What Is Banal in Banal Nationalism?

This analytical endeavour leads to an unanticipated general insight: the semantic transparency of the key term, *banal nationalism,* is only apparent. The adjective does not refer to a single property, or even a delimited set of properties. In fact, three dimensions, aspects, or bases can be identified along which Billig defines the term, and contrasts it with some other, non-banal nationalism. Thus, 'banality' of nationalism can be construed:

(a) *Geographically*: determined by the place where it is found and the corresponding type of collective agent. In this case, banal is the nationalism of the advanced, affluent, liberal democratic West, while others (with the addition of a few wayward Western minorities and political extremists) have the other, hot, and belligerent nationalism. The dichotomy is: the West vs. the Rest.
(b) *Substantively*: according to empirical contents and social realm. On this reading, banal nationalism is what transpires in the non-political spheres of social life (entertainment, sports, mundane conversations, and practices), as opposed to the field of political activities more narrowly understood (state institutions and policies, political parties, movements, and international relations). The dichotomy: non-political vs. political.
(c) *Cognitively*: according to the mode in which nationhood is sustained, expressed, and reproduced. On one side is the unconscious, implicit, routine, unnoticed, passionless nationalism, and on the other the intentional, conscious, deliberate, explicit, warm one. The dichotomy: mindless vs. mindful.

The three dimensions intersect and are not mutually exclusive, but can be separated analytically. Moreover, they steer inquiry onto different tracks and suggest different conclusions. Yet, Billig does not commit himself to any one of these meanings, nor deals explicitly with their multiplicity. The impression one gets by reading the original book is that the first criterion is dominant; but, as we already know, Billig later

denied it.[18] The other dimensions mingle and cross-cut each other, with shifting emphases.

If we take up the question 'Is there a Serbian banal nationalism?' again, the answer depends on which of the three meanings is meant. The option (a) is ruled out by definition. Under (b), the answer is—yes, but it is almost never cold and mindless (c).

There are plenty of positive, non-violent, easygoing, and friendly manifestations of Serbhood, immersed in the flow of ordinary social life. Yet, they are usually fraught with emotions, and can easily turn into their aggressive varieties. A stable banalization, in the sense of a durable transformation of national referencing into an unemotional automatism, is hardly possible. What looks banal is only provisionally so, and results from a tacit agreement of all concerned not to press the issue at hand—for the moment.[19] And underneath the thin crust of banality there usually lurks a kind of nationalism which, if not outright hot, at any rate is impassioned, resentful, and oversensitive.

Also, those sporadic examples of 'banal nationalism' that resemble Billig's illustrations, while not difficult to find, do not actually matter very much. The concept of banal nationalism does not provide great analytical purchase when applied to the Serbian society. Some things are revealed, but more is obscured. It could even be misleading, driving the researcher away from the central processes shaping the Serbian society now and for the near future. As has already been said, there is a confusion regarding what kind of entity the national deixis (we, our, here) refers to. Where does the homeland begin and end? In the minds of older generations, the idea of Yugoslavia is still alive to a degree. Are the Serbs in the staunchly Serb Republika Srpska within the neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina in-groups or out-groups? Should Kosovo be counted as part of the national territory, or not? (It still is, according to the Serbian Constitution.) The most useful aspect of the concept of banal nationalism, to my mind, is the injunction to look at nationhood as a practical category, classificatory scheme, cognitive and pragmatic frame for understanding and interpreting experience (Antonsich 2015). And when this is attempted in the Serbian case, it only adds to the fog: Which nationhood? What is being reproduced, used as a pragmatic frame, operating as a classificatory scheme?

It may prove most reasonable, in the end, to revert to the position originally read off the 1995 book, despite Billig's protestations: banal nationalism is a concept intended for the advanced, liberal West. This casts the shadow of (inadvertent) ethnocentrism on this theory.[20] This is highly ironic because Billig's principal intention was to address critically this very same West, offering it a mirror in which it can look at its own face. But precisely because the West is Billig's primary target, the rest of the world easily falls out of sight and, along with it, the issue of epistemic status: Is this a universal or a particular theory? It is presented (explicitly in Billig 2009a, b) as, in principle, all-applicable. Yet, Billig fails to make his model supple enough for this purpose. Preoccupied with a debate internal to the West, he does not pay systematic attention to crucial dimensions that are bound to vary across contexts.[21]

The emergent concept of 'everyday nationhood' seems to hold more potential for studying the Serbian example. For one, it does not force us to choose between 'hot' and 'cold' forms of nationalism (Antonsich 2015); it takes in both poles and all the points in between. By taking more conscious notice of the messiness of daily life, which, as prominent students of the everyday have taught us (Lefebvre 2002; Moran 2005), is not sheer banality but mediates between stasis and change, dreariness and drama, instant and history, the notion of everyday nationhood makes it possible to turn the continuous sliding back and forth along the hot/cold continuum—something I have shown to be especially important in the Serbian case—into a central object of study. Edensor (2002) broadens Billig's somewhat reductive concern with the banal production of discourse to highlight material, spatial, and performative dimensions, so that the whole of everyday life becomes an arena for reproducing nationhood. Moreover, Edensor's focus on popular culture is helpful in disentangling the knot of 'Yugoslav' and 'Serbian' streaks in mundane nationhood before and after the breakup of Yugoslavia, as well as in understanding present-day ambivalences in the region, where a narrow-minded popular chauvinism peacefully coexists with a largely shared popular culture inhabited by the same celebrities, soap operas and reality shows, and popular music hits.

Fox and Miller-Idriss's (2008) analytical separation of discourse, or 'talking about/with the nation', as one of the four dimensions of

everyday nationhood is another useful move for studying Serbia, where the nation is talked a lot, both 'with' and 'about'—and often, it is really 'about' while it seems to be just 'with'. Even more helpful is Skey's (2011, 2013b) elaboration of this dimension, where instead of the said distinction, the focus is on the shifting of discursive registers and justificatory frames that people engage in when talking about the nation. Explicitly acknowledging contradiction and incongruence as regular features of mundanely discussed nationhood, this is a good heuristic tool for examining Serbian endless discursive plays about the nation. Also, another of Fox and Miller-Idriss's (2008) analytic dimensions, 'performing the nation', could be deployed to grasp the vacillation between more 'ethnic' renderings of the Serbian nation, such as those conjured in mass celebrations of sports victories, and more 'state-civic' ones, performatively reproduced through state-sponsored rituals on the occasion of important holidays and anniversaries.

Finally, Skey's (2011, 2013a, 2014) development of a cue taken from Hage (2000) that national belonging is connected to psychological and moral benefits such as sense of self, security, entitlement, and empowerment is well adapted to the Serbian case because, as pointed out, Serbia's semiperipheral position and its recent past make issues of dignity, respect, and power particularly prominent here.

Conclusion: The Normative in Banal Nationalism

Nationalism studies often contain strong normative overtones. Evaluative judgements are passed, though usually in an implicit mode, and differentiations made between a 'better' and a 'worse', desirable and undesirable, more and less worthy. The much discussed distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism is just the most conspicuous example.

Billig too wrote his book with more than a hint of a moral message: 'banal does not imply benign', he says (Billig 1995, p. 6).[22] Banal nationalism was originally coined as a (self) critical tool, aimed at uncovering what the West did not care to know about itself: that its stable, democratic nation states also engage in incessant nation-making

that is not separated by an impenetrable wall from the irrational, brutal nationalism of others.

Transposed to a different context, however, the normative in banal nationalism may shift as well. What if the state is the solution rather than the problem? One may feel compelled to actually *support* the establishment of a strong nation state which sees its own identity as straightforward, powerful, and worthy of pride. One may find reasons to welcome a stable, confident state happy to flag (unobtrusively, but insistently) the nation because such a state can be expected to be more expedient in upholding democratic principles, including minority rights protection.[23]

The federal Yugoslavia was an attempt to found a different kind of polity, and have it reproduced through other, non-national mechanisms. From the normative perspective of *Banal Nationalism,* it was a desirable, morally superior political option. Yet, it disintegrated in a bloody war. What is the lesser evil?

A similar normative uncertainty surrounds a translation of Ghassan Hage's (2000) critical idea, further developed by Skey (2011; 2013a), that the symbolic centres of nations are occupied by core groups endowed with lots of 'national cultural capital'. Those who, in Skey's words, 'belong without question' are in a position to control the definition of the nation for everybody. They are 'recognized as having an entitlement to judge who and what is appropriate within the bounded territory of the nation' (Skey 2013a, p. 94), and derive from this status a secure sense of subjectivity and agency. In Serbia however, it is doubtful if these psychological and symbolic profits are guaranteed.[24] Given the mismatch between nation and state, the traumatic recent past and a dominated geopolitical/geosymbolic position, to feel recognized unconditionally in one's entitlement may prove beyond reach.[25]

Perhaps a more secure position—within a stable state with fully 'banalised' nationalism—from which they could comfortably claim privileged membership and the right of 'management of national culture and territory' (Skey 2013a, p. 95) would be advisable because it would alleviate the tensions and open up the space for more democracy. (In that sense, explosions of national joy after Novak Djoković's victories, however irritating to the cosmopolitan souls, might be just

the right thing.) To push irony a step further, an important element in the 'stories Serbs tell themselves about themselves' (Živković 2011) is the self-stereotype of an extraordinarily kind, generous, and hospitable people. Could this be put to use? Would a self-assured nation that 'grants' rights to others and generously 'includes' them in the polity—precisely the mechanism that Hage (2000) subjects to searing criticism—be the lesser evil, again? An unconsolidated, fragmented, nervous nation cannot do that, for both psychological and institutional reasons. The (moral) question thus is: Should one support the reinforcement of such a self-complacent sense of nationhood, in the hope that those who 'belong without question' will be nice enough not to be chauvinist; or reject it all as repulsive and ultimately dangerous?

We are no longer talking about *can the flag hang unobtrusively outside a Serbian post office*, but *should it.* This is a different question indeed, but it is also part of the appraisal of how well the concept of banal nationalism travels from where it was originally conceived.

Notes

1. I hasten to add: here or in the rest of my analysis, I have absolutely no intention to belittle the importance, novelty, or intellectual honesty of this message. Quite the contrary: it is because I have seen my own views of nationhood and social theory profoundly transformed by Billig's work that I have felt compelled to deal with his ideas so closely.
2. Quotations from the Preface follow Billig's original English manuscript, made available to me by courtesy of the editor of the Serbian language publication, while the references in parentheses indicate the corresponding pages in the published Serbian translation (Billig 2009a).
3. Moreover, in this new text, banal nationalism is defined as "the routine nationalism of established nation states" (Billig 2009a, p. 8): note that the qualification "of the West" is dropped.
4. The most common Serbian phrase from this register, *kod nas,* is actually perfectly 'Billigesque' because it condenses, in a happy haziness, all the deixis that one can think of. Grammatically a case of the pronoun 'we' with a preposition, it can mean anything from 'at our home', 'in our house', or 'at our place' to 'among us', 'in our country', 'in our society',

'in our culture', 'in our tradition', 'in our way of life', or even 'in the current political and economic arrangements in our country'.

5. Although state formations bearing a Serbian name briefly flourished in the Middle Ages before Ottoman conquest, Serbia emerged as a nation state only in the nineteenth century, gradually winning autonomy from the Ottoman Empire through armed rebellions and diplomacy. Full sovereignty was achieved in 1878. (National borders changed several times before and after.) In 1918, coming out of the First World War among the victors, Serbia initiated the unification of South Slavs in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later Kingdom of Yugoslavia) under a Serbian king. Yugoslavia was occupied and dismembered by Nazi Germany and its allies during 1941–1945, and rebuilt after the war as a socialist federation under the control of the Communist Party. Serbia was one of its six constituent republics, with a sizeable portion of the Serb ethnic corpus living in other republics. The wars of Yugoslav succession (1991–1995) resulted in four of the former republics becoming independent states, while Serbia and Montenegro remained united within the—no longer 'socialist'—Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992–2003). The two-member federation was transformed into a confederative State Union in 2003, and in 2006 eventually dissolved after Montenegro opted for independence in a referendum.
6. Whether this allegiance—induced, among other things, by Serbs' territorial dispersal across large parts of what was Yugoslavia—is conceived more as a (truly multicultural) Yugoslavia or as a Greater Serbia is often vague, and strategically so. Different Serbian visions of Yugoslavia are discussed in Djokić (2003).
7. Serbia lost de facto sovereignty over part of its territory, the formerly autonomous province of Kosovo, after the 1998–1999 war and NATO intervention. Kosovo proclaimed independence in 2008, but officially Serbia refuses to acknowledge the fact. Serbs regard Kosovo as their national historical and cultural 'cradle'.
8. Although the share of ethnic Serbs living outside Serbia proper is now smaller than it used to be prior to the 1990s wars, there are still about million and a half in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Croatia.
9. On the contrary, waving the same flag would make evident the connections it was in everyone's interest to downplay. Serb forces in Croatia and Bosnia, though amply backed by the Serbian military and power structures, wished to stress their autonomy and local roots, while the

Serbian government, wary of international legal implications of its engagement in other former Yugoslav republics, was officially *not* involved in the war up until 1999, when NATO attacked the territory of Serbia itself.

10. Since it was Montenegro that left the State Union, Serbia became an independent state not really by its own choice. In the process of Yugoslavia's decomposition, Serbia in a way 'stayed put' while others were leaving.
11. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_Serbia, http://www.rsz.gov.rs. Accessed 10 Dec 2015.
12. There was *Yugoslav* banal nationalism as well: cheerful references to 'our country' (usually the best, most beautiful, etc. in the world) were common in everyday life. Yet, this was obviously not enough to keep the country going. And the disintegration of Yugoslavia cannot be understood without taking into account the economic factor, power games among political elites, and global geopolitical change—which are all issues Billig ignores in his discussion of banal nationalism.
13. The relation between Yugoslavism and the particular identities of the constituent nations, the way the communist regime managed this relation, and the effects of all this on Yugoslavia's collapse are extremely complex topics that cannot be dealt with here. For good recent overviews, see Cohen and Dragović Soso, eds. (2008); Djokić and Ker-Lindsay (2011); Jović (2008); the most comprehensive Serbian language source is Bakić (2011).
14. Serbs, as the most numerous ethnic group in Yugoslavia, accounted for just a little above one-third of the population (36% in the 1980s; Sekulić et al. 1994). Claims of Serbian dominance in the Yugoslav federation, promoted notably after the country's breakup, rest on shaky grounds (see the references above).
15. An analysis of banal nationalism in a roughly comparable situation, that of Catalonia within Spain, has been attempted by Crameri (2000).
16. Skey (2011) and Antonsich (2015) also note Billig's statist assumption.
17. In that sense, Skey's 'ecstatic nationalism' may not be appropriate here. When the opposition ecstatic/banal is used for long-pacified and democratized nations such as England, it excludes the belligerent, murderous side of the nationalist phenomenon. So what is 'ecstatic', and therefore a little suspect, for some, may be relievingly 'banal' for those less fortunate.

18. 'I think there has been a misunderstanding. (…) [I]t is not difficult to find the banal reproduction of national symbols in non-Western nations. (…) For political and theoretical reasons [the book] deliberately focussed on banal nationalism within Western democracies. I wanted to stress the nationalism of "our" mundane practices' (Billig 2009b, p. 349).
19. Surak (2012, p. 178) observes astutely that shared membership in the national community sometimes generates, and is in turn reinforced by, internal competition and comparisons of fellow nationals against each other. The chronic lack of consensus on what it means to be Serbian and wrangling over who is better at being one can be understood as a hyperbolic instance of this process.
20. I thank Atsuko Ichijo for first making me think about this possibility.
21. This is not to deny the importance of criticisms addressed to banal nationalism *as applied to Western societies,* such as audience homogenisation, absence of ordinary people's agency, state-centrism, lack of a global perspective, and inadequately theorized hot/banal distinction (Antonsich 2015; Skey 2009, 2011; Jones and Merriman 2009; Thompson 2001; Hearn 2007).
22. As Antonsich (2015, p. 9) explains: 'For Billig, nation and nationalism are not benign concepts. Behind them, there is the state with its destructive arsenal. Reproducing nationhood even in banal terms is therefore functional to the reproduction of the state'.
23. This is broadly in line with Calhoun's (2007) and Brubaker's (2004) reminders of the 'positive work' nationalism can do, and has already done, especially for the weak.
24. To begin with, it is not completely settled even who this group is: the likeliest candidates are Serbs in Serbia, but in the ever open competition for the 'most genuine Serb', their position is sometimes challenged by Serbs from Bosnia or the Serbian minority in northern Kosovo, who are thought to be 'tougher'.
25. Greenberg (2011) shows how an impaired sense of individual agency in today's Serbia is intrinsically linked to the experience of collective powerlessness and humiliation.

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Banal Nationalism in the Internet Age: Rethinking the Relationship Between Nations, Nationalisms and the Media

Lukasz Szulc

Classic authors in nations and nationalisms studies recognize traditional media as crucial for the construction of nations and spread of nationalisms. Anderson (1983), for example, insists on the importance of press capitalism, particularly the simultaneity of reading national newspapers, for the creation of a national consciousness. Gellner (1983, p. 127), in turn, focuses on media technologies and points out that 'it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralised one to many communication, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted'. He clarifies that those who can understand the language and style of the message transmitted are included in a particular (national) community and are distinguished from those who cannot understand the message. Conversely, Hobsbawm (1990, p. 142) argues that the content of media messages

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does matter and explains that the media manage to break down the division between the public and the private, or the national and the local, by making 'what were in effect national symbols part of the life of every individual'.

The latter argument is also echoed in Billig's (1995) concept of banal nationalism, which refers to subtle, unconscious and unnoticed reproductions of both individual nations and the world as a world of nations. Even though Billig does not devote much space in his book to scrutinize the relationship between nations, nationalisms and the media, he does implicitly recognize the key role of the media in reproducing banal nationalism. The core part of his analysis is based on a one-day survey of 10 British newspapers, both tabloids and broadsheets, sampled on one not particularly eventful day of 28 June 1993 (Billig 1995, pp. 109–111). In the analysis, he shows how the newspapers unwittingly reproduce the world as a world of nations, for example in the categorization of news items into 'Home' and 'Foreign', as well as casually adopt national references, for example in the use of country maps and deictic words such as 'we', 'here' and 'the' (as in 'the nation'). Additionally, Billig more explicitly acknowledges the role of the press, and traditional media in general, as one of the key agents of banal nationalism: 'The media of mass communication bring the flag across the contemporary hearth. Daily newspapers and logomanic politicians constantly flag the world of nations' (Billig 1995, p. 174).

While all those classic works on nations and nationalisms were written at the time when the media landscape was largely confined to traditional media such as press, radio, television and cinema, the last 20 or 30 years have witnessed radical media developments, which call for the rethinking of the relationship between nations, nationalisms and the media. One such development, critical for the studies of nations and nationalisms, has been the rapid spread of the Internet, initiated by the invention of the world wide web in the early 1990s (Gauntlett 2004, p. 5). As Diamandaki (2003, no pagination) points out, 'the Internet poses anew the issue of national or ethnic identity. It is another archive, mirror and laboratory for the negotiation of national and ethnic identity'. While some scholars perceive the Internet as the key agent of globalization, possessing a great potential for rendering territorial boundaries

meaningless (Mills 2002, p. 69), promoting global understandings (Bulashova and Cole, 1995, in Curran 2012, p. 8) or even enabling 'new forms of postnational identity' (Poster 1999, p. 239), other scholars argue not only that nations are very much there on the Internet but also that 'nations thrive in cyberspace' (Eriksen 2007, p. 1) and point to, for example, the online presence of stateless nations (Eriksen 2007) or online networks of nationalistic groups (Caiani and Parenti 2009).

In this chapter, I will further examine the role of the Internet for the reproductions of nations and nationalisms, with a particular focus on Billig's concept of banal nationalism. My discussion will be structured around three fundamental questions: (1) To what extent and how are nations and nationalisms being reproduced on the Internet? (2) What kind of nations and nationalisms are being reproduced on the Internet? and (3) What role do these reproductions play in the construction and sustenance of national identities? I will address those questions separately in three subsequent parts of my chapter. Each part will start with a specific point of criticism of the banal nationalism thesis, which will be developed in relation to wider cultural and media theory, and applied to the Internet age. I will then conclude the chapter by summarizing my key arguments as well as pointing to important gaps in the existing scholarship on banal nationalism and the Internet to explore new avenues for research in this area.

Banal Cosmopolitanism: Against Methodological Nationalism

The sociologist Ulrich Beck (2000, 2002) has offered one of the strongest challenges to the banal nationalism thesis. Explicitly referencing Billig's work, Beck (2002, p. 28) proposes a counter-concept of banal cosmopolitanism, 'in which everyday nationalism is circumvented and undermined and we experience ourselves integrated into global processes and phenomena'. Beck (2002, p. 28) does not completely dismiss Billig's argument but points out that banal nationalism is fading away: 'banal cosmopolitanism appears to be displacing banal

nationalism—involuntarily and invisibly, and throughout the world'. While Beck himself does not provide any empirical evidence for this alleged quantitative change, some authors do document the emergence of banal cosmopolitanism, or other more or less similar concepts, also in relation to traditional media. For example, Szerszynski et al. (2000) point to the cases of banal globalism in the production, circulation and reception of television images and narratives; Georgiou (2012) indicates the instances of banal nomadism in the uses of satellite television by Arab audiences in Europe; and Cram (2001) gives examples of banal Europeanism in such media as *European Voice*. Still, this does not mean that banal nationalism is fading away: other authors continue to document the persistence of banal nationalism in different national contexts and across different media, especially in the press (e.g. Costelloe 2014; Yumul and Özkirimli 2000) and television (e.g. Cann 2013; Perkins 2010). Moreover, when Waisbord (1998, p. 390) considers the idea of regional nationalism in Latin America, which would be based on a shared colonial past, language, religion and also media culture (e.g. telenovelas), he finds out that such regional integration 'may not be sufficient to spawn a transnational identity', specifically pointing to the lack of a political investment in institutionalizing such transnational identity.

Beck, however, goes further than arguing for the quantitative dominance of banal cosmopolitanism over banal nationalism. He postulates that 'what appears as and is proclaimed as national is, in essence, increasingly transnational or cosmopolitan' (Beck 2002, p. 29), suggesting that the national framework becomes more often merely a scam, as in the case of national football teams 'in which players of every skin colour and culture play against one another' (Beck 2002, p. 28). The key problem here is what Beck (2007) identifies as methodological nationalism, that is an often casually adopted research approach which equates societies with nations and favours nations or nation states as units of analysis over all other possible units, such as cities, networks and communities (Georgiou 2007, p. 19). While methodological nationalism tends to be simplified and exaggerated in Beck's accounts (Chernilo 2006, 2011), it does pose a challenge for scholars of nations and nationalisms: if we limit our units of analysis to nations or nation states and constrict our focus to national issues, we may indeed overemphasize the

national and underestimate the sub or supranational. After all, Billig's (1995) choice to analyse national newspapers makes it easier to find instances of banal nationalism, as much as Cram's (2001) choice to analyse European newspapers makes it easier to find instances of banal Europeanism.

While newspapers and other traditional media can rather easily be categorized as local, national, regional or international, the Internet problematizes such categorizations. Consequently, we may wonder: Is it possible to identify national webs similarly to the identifications of national markets of traditional media? Rogers (2013, pp. 125–151) took on such a task in his recent book *Digital Methods*. He explains that the difficulty of demarking national webs lies in the fact that there are multiple ways to identify websites as national. For example, he notes that the National Library of the Netherlands defines a website as Dutch if it is

> in the Dutch language and registered in the Netherlands; is in any language and registered in the Netherlands; is in Dutch and registered outside the Netherlands; or is in any language, is registered outside the Netherlands, and has a subject matter related to the Netherlands. (Rogers 2013, p. 129)

Reporting on a number of other possible criteria for identifying websites as national, Rogers argues against any predefinitions of what makes a website national. Instead, he proposes to demarcate national webs through 'devices that "go local"', that is the devices which 'have location or language added as a value' (Rogers 2013, p. 150), for example local versions of Google search engine. While this is surely an innovative way to think about geography online, Rogers' approach falls into the trap of methodological nationalism: it assumes that all websites could be identified as national and imposes national framework on the web without explaining why such a framework would be relevant to the web in the first place.

To What Extent and How Are Nations and Nationalisms Being Reproduced on the Internet?

Trying not to fall into the trap of methodological nationalism, we still may ask: To what extent and how are nations and nationalisms being reproduced on the Internet, particularly in a banal way? The most obvious instances of banal nationalism can be found in Internet content, even though there are relatively few studies on the topic (Sheyholislami 2010; Szulc 2016). For example, in my analysis of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) websites in Poland and Turkey, I identify such classic instances of banal nationalism as (a) categorizations of news pieces and hyperlinks by countries, (b) casual uses of country maps and (c) subtle integrations of national symbols or colours into website logos (Szulc 2016). Still, during my research, I also found some instances of international LGBTQ symbols such as rainbow flags, lambda sings and pink triangles, which point to a broader than national LGBTQ culture. However, sharing Waisbord's (1998) scepticism about the strength of transnational identifications, I argue that the adaptation of international symbols is not enough to claim that the websites' authors 'drift away from their particular national identifications' (Szulc 2016, p. 319).

One important aspect of Internet content is language. Even though the relationship between languages and nations is a complicated one, Billig (1995, p. 31) argues that 'the world of nations is also a world of formally constituted languages'. The early Internet was considered as facilitating the process of Englishization because English was the dominant language of both Internet content and Internet structure (Dor 2004). However, with the growing number of Internet users based in non-English-speaking countries (see Table 1), Internet content shows the trend towards multilingualism, which is visible, for example, in the introduction of language-specific versions of popular Internet services such as Google, Facebook and MSN (Soffer 2013). Internet structure too is becoming more linguistically diverse. Since the early 2000s, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which coordinates the governance of domain names (e.g. .com, .org,

Table 1 Top 5 countries with the highest number of internet users in 2005 and 2015

2005		2015	
Country	No of users in m	Country	No of users in m
United States	204	China	674
China	103	India	354
Japan	78	United States	281
Germany	47	Brazil	118
India	39	Japan	115

Source Internet World Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm, accessed: 8.01.2016

.net), works to internationalize domain namesdomain names so they could be used in different languages and alphabets (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/about/idns). Commenting on those developments, Hafez (2007, p. 105) argues that 'the multilingual Internet […] can rapidly become the vehicle of a reinvigorated nationalism'.

Banal nationalism can be traced not only in the language but also in the design of Internet structure. Interestingly, the Domain Name System (DNS) consists of two main types of domains: generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs, such as .com) and country-code Top-Level Domains (ccTLDs, such as .uk for the UK). Consequently, as Steinberg and McDowell (2003, p. 54) note, 'even though the internet was envisioned as an arena that would transcend the territorial divisions of the world, the domain name structure reproduces these divisions'. I also argue elsewhere that ccTLDs reproduce these divisions in a banal way: 'ccTLDs may seem obscure, insignificant and innocent, and they frequently go unnoticed' (Szulc 2015a, p. 1531). However, some ccTLDs have been purposively dissociated with the countries they are supposed to signify, for example .tv is being advertised as a domain for television-related rather than Tuvalu-based websites (Hrynyshyn 2008). More importantly, DNS has undergone crucial redesigns, which resulted in the introduction of new sub and supranational TLDs such as .cat for Catalonia (Atkinson 2006), .asia (Ng 2013) and .eu for European Union (Zowislo-Grünewald and Beitzinger 2008). Additionally, in 2014, ICANN started launching new gTLDs chosen in a bottom-up

application process (http://newgtlds.icann.org/). Many of the newly introduced gTLDs are geographical in scope and refer primarily to cities (e.g. .berlin, .moscow, .kyoto) but also provinces (e.g. .quebec, .vlaanderen) and continents (e.g. .africa). Hence, the latest developments in the design of DNS are diluting the importance of the national framework, initially inscribed in Internet structure.

Heterogeneous Nations and Dynamic Nationalisms: Against Sociological Essentialism

Another criticism of banal nationalism centres on destabilizing the notions of nations and nationalisms. In the book *Mediating the Nation*, Madianou (2005, p. 7) argues that most theories on media and identity, including national identity, tend to 'essentialise identities, culture and in some cases the media themselves'. Similarly, in his critical engagement with banal nationalism, Skey (2009) points out that Billig fails to acknowledge the complexity of the British society, which in fact includes four 'national' groups as well as many migrant communities. Skey (2009, p. 335) also criticizes Billig's use of the concept of the British press: 'so-called British newspapers often carry distinct English and Scottish editions, while Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish audiences are all served by their own dedicated press which through the use of Deixis, location markers etc. "flag" their stories accordingly'. Furthermore, Petersoo (2007) notes that in Scottish newspapers the deictic word 'we' may refer to Britain, Scotland or the editorial team of a particular newspaper. Therefore, she proposes the concept of 'wandering "we"' and concludes that 'there is no simple and banal national "we" in the media, but a kaleidoscope of different "we's"' (Petersoo 2007, p. 433). Responding to these criticisms, Billig (2009) points out that banal nationalism acknowledges the fact that different groups 'struggle for the power to speak for the nation, and to present their particular voice as the voice of the national whole' (Billig 1995, p. 71), but still they do so within the universal framework of nationalism, that is they take for granted the naturalness of the world as a world of nations.

Not only nations are heterogeneous but also nationalisms are dynamic, continue the critics of banal nationalism. Hutchinson (2006) warns against teleological models of nationalisms, which assume a gradual, linear and irreversible development of relatively stable nations. Instead, he suggests 'the co-formation of two types of nationalism: a "hot" transformational movement produced by a sense of crisis and a 'banal nationalism' that people consume as part of giving meaning to the experiences of everyday life' (Hutchinson 2006, p. 295). Mihelj (2008) makes a similar distinction between 'nations in fabula' and 'nations in actu', where the former are characteristic of the times of quiet nationalism and the latter of the times of mass mobilizations of national feelings. Drawing on the distinction between hot and banal nationalism, Skey (2009) proposes the concepts of heating and cooling of nationalism. He argues to extend the studies of hot and banal nationalisms to the analysis of the relationship between those two and to ask such questions as how and under which conditions hot nationalism may be cooled down and banal nationalism may be heated up (Skey 2009, p. 340). To acknowledge the dynamics between banal and hot nationalisms, some scholars propose the concept of everyday nationhood, pointing out that ordinary people not only reproduce nationalism unconsciously, as in Billig's (1995) thesis, but also deploy it more consciously and creatively (e.g. Antonsich 2016; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Skey 2014).

What Kind of Nations and Nationalisms Are Being Reproduced on the Internet?

While in the previous part of the chapter I discussed to what extent and how nations and nationalisms are being reproduced on the Internet, I will now draw on the criticism of homogenous nations and stable nationalisms to consider *what kind* of nations and nationalisms are being reproduced online as well as what conditions facilitate the heating of banal nationalism. Particularly, I will consider the role of the Internet for the groups which complicate the idea of homogenous nations and stable nationalisms. One such group are diasporas. Some researchers

build on the concept of banal nationalism to point to a quotidian form of diasporic nationalism present on online spaces of different diasporic groups, for example on Argentinian Mailing List (Boczkowski 1999) and The Iranian.com (Graham and Khosravi 2002). Studying media use of Chinese, Japanese and Korean women based in London, Kim (2011, p. 133) too concludes that 'electronic mediation intensified by the Internet provides a necessary condition for the possibility of diasporic nationalism'. Interestingly, all these authors note that the diasporic context provokes intensified, but also increasingly explicit, articulations of national belongings, and that the Internet affords their free and easy expression. This suggests that the diasporic context in combination with Internet communication facilitates the process of heating banal nationalism but we should be careful not to generalize this conclusion to all diasporic communities and individuals.

Another group problematizing homogenous nations and stable nationalisms are stateless nations, that is nations which do not have their own territory or do not have a full independent control of it. Most research on stateless nations and the Internet conclude that the medium is used, often in a banal way, as a new terrain where stateless nations can be articulated and legitimized. For instance, in his research on Kurds online, Sheyholislami (2010, p. 308) points out that 'new communication technologies have enabled Kurds to begin overcoming the geographical and political barriers that have kept them apart and fragmented'. He specifically mentions the insistence of Kurdish bloggers writing in Kurdish even though many of them have never received a formal education in the language. Besides, Sheyholislami notes that while the bloggers use different alphabets, grammars and vocabulary in Kurdish, the increasingly popular audio-visual features of social media (particularly Facebook and YouTube) facilitate the communication between the bloggers and, thus, help unify them.

Stateless nations also fight for their recognition in the DNS. One example could be the successful campaign of Catalonians who were granted the .cat TLD (Atkinson 2006). Similar though less successful campaigns include the dotCYM campaign for the recognition of the Welsh online community (Honeycutt 2008) and the dotKurd.org campaign, advocating for 'the identity of Kurds on world wide web'

(www.dotKurd.org; the campaigners managed to recently register the . krd domain as a new gTLD). Additionally, Enteen (2010, p. 68) reports on Sri Lankan Tamils who 'refuse to recognize the primacy of country-code suffixes to denote nation and location' and, therefore, do not request their own TLD but instead focus on ensuring the duration and reliability of their online presence to legitimize themselves as a nation. Importantly, by fighting for their own TLDs or explicitly refusing their authority, stateless nations do not dismiss ccTLDs as banal, but consciously acknowledge their ideological load and creatively respond to it, as described in the literature on everyday nationhood. Shklovski and Struthers (2010, p. 126) point out in their paper on the use of .kz for Kazakhstan that the importance of ccTLDs 'increases in locations where notions of nationalism and statehood are in flux'.

The last group complicating homogenous nations and stable nationalisms which I want to discuss are LGBTQs. While in some Western countries LGBTQs have recently been integrated in the dominant notion of national identity (Puar 2007), in most countries, LGBTQs continue to be excluded from the hegemonic national imaginations. At the same time, scholars speak about the growing globalization of LGBTQ culture, the emerging 'global gay' (Altman 1997; Szulc 2017), which is facilitated by the spread of the Internet. Having that in mind, I asked elsewhere (Szulc 2015b) what is left of nations and nationalisms on LGBTQ websites in Poland and Turkey. As I already explained, I found many instances of banal nationalism on the analysed websites, which I interpreted as the process of domesticating the nation online: the function of national references in that case was 'not to challenge hegemonic national discourses in a public debate but to domesticate the nation, so that queers too feel minimally at home within this overarching narrative [of the world as a world of nations]' (Szulc 2016, p. 318). I also pointed out that some authors of LGBTQ websites in Turkey refuse to use Turkish ccTLD (.tr) because they recognize its particular connotations of an LGBTQ-free notion of Turkishness (Szulc 2015a). Consequently, such Internet resources as ccTLDs are likely to lose their banality not only for stateless nations but also for those groups which are excluded from a hegemonic version of national identities.

Active Audiences: Against Technological Determinism

So far my discussion has centred on the issues of Internet content and its production as well as Internet structure and its design. In this part, I will move on to consider the criticism of banal nationalism related to Internet use. Madianou (2005, p. 7) points out that most theories about the relationship between media and national identity fall into the dichotomy between strong media and weak identities, on the one hand, and weak media and strong identities, on the other hand. While the former approach overestimates media effects and underestimates the agency of audiences, the latter overestimates active audiences and underestimates the power of structure. Hence, as Mihelj (2011, p. 10) observes, media tend to be seen either as powerful instruments of nation-building in the hands of the elites or as mere reproducers of national discourses. Regarding the banal nationalism thesis, Skey (2009, p. 337) argues that Billig falls into the strong media and week identities approach because he 'does not address how different constituencies might respond to the particular media texts or political speeches'. Billig (1995) tends to assume that banal national references in the media reproduce national identity, as much as Cram (2001) tends to assume that banal European references in the media produce European identity. In that sense, both banal nationalism and banal Europeanism bear the hallmarks of a soft version of technological determinism, which implies that technology strongly influences society and culture.

In his reply to these criticisms, Billig (2009) writes that his model does not assume people passively receiving media messages. Nevertheless, he explains that banal nationalism is mostly preoccupied with top-down phenomena and unconscious, that is so familiar and habitual that they pass unnoticed, aspects of nationalism (Billig 2009, pp. 348–349). In short, not denying the agency of audiences, which is the key preoccupation of the everyday nationhood approach, Billig focuses on the issues of structure, power and ideology. Some works on audiences and national identities follow his model of banal nationalism. For example, Dittmer and Dodds (2008, p. 449) argue that 'most

citizens cannot remember a conscious decision to be national subjects, but rather one day find themselves acting in a national manner', but the authors also add that later in life the citizens 'actively claim that identity and consciously project it'.

Slavtcheva-Petkova (2014) too adheres to the central argument of banal nationalism in her research on the role of television in producing national and European identifications among children. Yet, she also offers a more critical insight about Billig's 'taken-for-granted link between banal flaggings of nationalism in the media and national identities' (Slavtcheva-Petkova 2014, p. 43). The results of her research show that Bulgarian children, exposed to a relatively high number of European symbols on national television, tend to reject European identity, while English children, exposed to a fewer European symbols on national television, tend to endorse, but still not embrace, European identity. She explains that this is related to the representation of Europeanness only at the symbolic but not deictic level in the media of both countries as well as to the representations of Europe, mostly the EU, as a superior partner for Bulgaria and as an equal partner for the UK. Slavtcheva-Petkova (2014, p. 57) concludes that those inconsistent results demonstrate that the relationship between media and identity is neither casual nor secure, and that television, or any other medium for that matter, is only one of many identity resources.

What Role Do Online Reproductions of Nationalism Play in the Construction and Sustenance of National Identities?

In the previous parts of this chapter, I traced the instances of banal nationalism on the Internet and discussed the role of the medium for reproducing (and heating up) banal nationalism, notably for the groups which complicate the idea of homogenous nations and stable nationalisms. In this part, I will follow the conclusions of Slavtcheva-Petkova (2014) to ask the so-what questions: So what if banal nationalism is being reproduced online? What role do these reproductions play in the construction and sustenance of national identities? While those

questions are relevant in regard to all kinds of media, the Internet again problematizes the issue. The key difference between traditional media and the Internet, in that respect, is that the latter requires increasingly active audiences: as Livingstone (2004, p. 76) puts it, on the Internet, 'viewing […] is converging with reading, shopping, voting, playing, researching, writing, chatting'. Online audiences can easily become, and often do become, not only receivers but also producers of content. Consequently, the role of such information gatekeepers as journalists and politicians, key in traditional media and in banal nationalism thesis, is sharply reduced on the Internet.

Because the production of Internet content is much more decentred, diversified and pluralized than the production of traditional media content, banal reproductions of nationalism through media can no longer be seen simply as a top-down phenomenon. Many instances of banal nationalism identified in Internet content have not been produced by journalists or politicians but the people who usually do not have much control over the content of traditional media, for example Kurdish bloggers (Sheyholislami 2010) or LGBTQs in Poland and Turkey (Szulc 2016). To be sure, this does not mean that the Internet universalizes banal nationalism. Shifman et al. (2014) show that the Internet could be used by non-elites in a similar way to advance what they call a 'user-generated globalisation'. Analysing the online translations of 100 popular jokes in English into 9 languages, they conclude that 'the ongoing process of joke translation formulates a global humorous sphere, even if its reach is often not evident to end users' (Shifman et al. 2014, pp. 739–740). Clearly, Internet users can easily reproduce either banal nationalism or banal cosmopolitanism. However, the key point is that both those phenomena no longer, if ever, simply originate in 'the elites' and are transmitted to 'the masses'. On the Internet, not only are 'the citizenry […] daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations', as Billig (1995, p. 8) explains, but also the citizenry themselves remind themselves and each other of this national place.

Moreover, it seems like the citizenry also tend to browse the web along national borders. In his theoretical paper on the Internet and national solidarity, Soffer (2013) points out that the ritual of simultaneous reading of newspapers, identified by Anderson (1983) as an

important practice for creating national consciousness, is decreasing online: people may still read the same content but 'the exposure to someone reading the same paper has been replaced by the exposure to people reading unknown content on their digital devices' (Soffer 2013, p. 54). At the same time, Soffer notes that banal nationalism is very much present online not only in Internet structure and content but also in user preferences. First, he points to the work of Halavais (2000) which examines hyperlinks on 4000 websites and concludes that most analysed websites tend to link to the websites within the same country. Thus, the topography of the web encourages Internet users to remain within national boundaries (though, it should be verified if Halavais' conclusion still holds true some 15 years after his original research). Second, he refers to the research by Best et al. (2005) and points out that the majority of Internet users in the US relied solely on US news sites when looking for information about the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (Soffer 2013, p. 61). Taking into account the gradual processes of multilingualism (Dor 2004) and localization (Postill 2011) of the Internet, we may predict that Internet users will increasingly browse websites anchored in their linguistic and national communities, though this prediction should be researched rather than assumed.

Conclusions

While traditional media have been recognized as key for the construction of nations and spread of nationalisms, the Internet tends to be perceived as the key agent of globalization. In this chapter, I aimed to critically evaluate the latter assumption and investigated the role of the Internet for banal reproductions of nations and nationalisms. First, I showed that online we could quite easily locate the instances of banal nationalism, reproduced both in traditional ways (symbols, deixis, language) and in new ways (ccTLDs). At the same time, I discussed some works which point to the instances of banal cosmopolitanism on the Internet. The existing literature, however, tends to present banal nationalism and banal cosmopolitanism as opposing rather than accumulative forces, suggesting a quantitative dominance of one over the other.

Second, I examined the role of the Internet for the national identity of groups which complicate the idea of homogenous nations and stable nationalisms such as diasporas, stateless nations and some LGBTQs. Research in these domains shows that those groups do not challenge the idea that the world is, and should be, a world of nations. The Internet usually becomes for them a kind of counter public (Fraser 1992), where they are allowed to articulate and legitimize their distinct national identities or their denied belongings to a particular nation, though in a more explicit rather than banal way. Third, I considered the common criticism of banal nationalism about the active role of audiences in consuming, interpreting and embracing banal national references in the media. I pointed out that, regarding the Internet, such criticism is problematic since online audiences often become not only receivers but also producers of content.

Reviewing research on banal nationalism and the Internet, I also identified two important gaps in this area of study. The first one is related to paying little attention to the 'centre', that is to the US. One of the most innovative aspects of Billig's book was that it shifted the focus from the extreme nationalism of 'others', that is of weak or new nations, to the mundane nationalism of 'ours', that is of the established nations of the West. As Billig (2009, p. 351) confesses: 'Having written *Banal Nationalism*, I hoped that others would then analyze in detail the banality of the world's most powerful nationalism—that of the United States. Instead, it has been the less powerful nationalisms that have attracted attention'. Indeed, it proved to be much easier for me to locate scholarship on stateless rather than established nations, diasporic rather than autochthonous citizens and marginal rather than central parts of the world. Most remarkably, the research on online banal Americanism as being reproduced in the US is virtually non-existent. The mechanism at work here is the exnomination of the US nationalism, that is the fact that US nationalism occupies the privileged position outside of naming: what is particular to the US becomes universalized. As Billig (1995, p. 149) explains, it is only Hollywood stars, like Meryl Streep, that can drop the confines of nationality and become universal icons, simply 'stars' or 'mega stars', rather than just Italian starts, like Sophia Loren. Similarly, it is only the US government that is allowed to use

the generic .gov domain, while all other governments are required to nationalize the domain by adding a ccTLD to it (e.g. .gov.uk for the UK government). The low visibility of banal Americanism is of course no excuse for neglecting it in our research. To the contrary, I agree with Billig (2009) that we should intensify our efforts to make the invisible visible and advance our understanding of how banal Americanism is being reproduced and universalized, also on and by the use of the Internet.

The second gap in the scholarship on banal nationalism and the Internet is related to paying little attention to audiences. Just as the research on traditional media, so too the works on the Internet in this area are largely confined to content analysis. It is true that the production of Internet content is more decentred, diversified and pluralized than the production of traditional media content, and that the Internet blurs the distinction between media producers and consumers. But this does not mean that we can give up on studying online audiences altogether. In general, as Livingstone (2004, p. 82) points out, audience studies are concerned with the experiences that are private rather than public, are regarded as trivial rather than important, are concerned with meanings rather than overt practices and are experiences of all society not just the elites. In that sense, audience studies clearly go hand in hand with banal nationalism thesis. Moreover, audience studies are also much preoccupied with the issue of context of media consumption or use, which I believe could add a new impetus to the study of banal nationalism or everyday nationhood. Hence, our questions should be not only about how audiences use the Internet to reproduce or challenge particular national identities or the world as a world of nations, but also about where, when and using which Internet devices or online platforms they routinely reproduce national symbols and meanings or more actively flag their nationality.

Banal nationalism is not necessarily a never-ending phenomenon. I agree with Billig who stated some 20 years ago that

> History has created nations and, in time, it will unmake them […] Maybe, nations are already past their heyday and their decline has already been set in motion. But this does not mean that nationhood can yet been

> written off, and its flaggings dismissed as pastiche or nostalgia. (Billig 1995, p. 177)

My short review of research on banal nationalism and the Internet, presented in this chapter, shows that the emergence and spread of the Internet itself will not tip the scales in favour of banal cosmopolitanism. While analysing the impact of any new medium on society and culture, we should take into account not only the affordances and limitations of that medium but also how its design already reflects deep social and cultural structures and, even more importantly, how that medium is being employed along or against dominant social and cultural discourses. The Internet does afford easier and quicker international connections, but it also fosters banal reproductions of individual nations and the world as a world of nations.

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Part II

Everyday Practices and Attitudes

The Name and The Nation: Banal Nationalism and Name Change Practices in the Context of Co-ethnic Migration to Germany

Gesine Wallem

When ethnic German migrants from the former Soviet Union arrive in Germany, they not only leave their country of provenance and former citizenship behind—some of them also dispose of their birth name to replace it by a 'German' equivalent. From *Evgeny* to *Eugen*, from *Vladimir* to *Waldemar*, from *Yadviga* to *Hedwig*, from *Elena* to *Helene*, or from *Dmitry* to *Dietmar*—the 'Germanisation' (*Eindeutschung*) of Russian names is in fact a collective experience shared by a considerable part[1] of the about 2.5 million *Aussiedler*[2] who have been migrating from the former Soviet Union to Germany since the end of the 1980s. Since its introduction into the Federal Expellee Law in 1992, the

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administrative practice of name change has become a part of the admission procedure taking place in the transit camp right after the migrants' arrival on German soil (Panagiotidis 2015a). During the encounter with an administrative officer, the newcomers are offered the possibility to adopt the 'German version' of their 'foreign-sounding' first or last name (*Bundesvertriebenengesetz* 2007 [1953]).

What can this practice of name change tell us about *banal nationalism*? After all, it seems to be the result of a very specific policy directed towards a particular category of people, ethnic German migrants from the former Soviet Union. Within the context of the very restrictive legal regulations regarding names in Germany, the possibility of name change constitutes in fact a great exception that is generally not an available option for members of the majority society (Panagiotidis 2015a).[3] In contrast, Michael Billig's (1995) concept of *banal nationalism* aims to describe practices and beliefs that pervade the everyday life of ordinary people. In his work, he pays attention to the unnoticed, seemingly insignificant habits through which nationalism is accomplished on a daily basis as something natural and taken-for-granted in a national society (ibid., p. 6). Following his argument, name change can thus not be considered as a *banal* practice happening to ordinary people in their everyday lives. Nor can it be analysed as an unnoticed, invisible practice through which nationalism is unconsciously reproduced on a daily basis. Name change rather seems to be a quite extraordinary event which is only relevant for a particular category of people in a very specific context.

Nevertheless, I argue in this chapter that it is precisely this *extra*ordinary practice that can tell us something about the banality of national belonging. In other words, it is the exceptional character of the practice of name change that reveals what, as Billig writes, remains most of the time literally 'unnamed, unnoticed and invisible' (Billig 1995, p. 6). In fact, considered as something intimate, personal or familial, a name is generally not perceived as a sign of national affiliation. For most people and in most contexts, a person's first and/or last names pass unnoticed. Through the arrival of people who are supposed to be Germans, but whose names apparently still need to be 'Germanised', this 'normal' reproduction of the nation is disrupted. Name changing thereby

challenges naming as a form of banal nationalism, but at the same time it also reveals its pervasive power.

In her comparative anthropological study of name change in history, Lapierre (2006 [1995]) has examined the issue of name change as a configuration allowing us to explore how the 'national takes hold of the nominal' *(emprise du national sur le nominal)* (ibid., p. 17). Following her reasoning, this chapter focuses on name change as a 'magnifying lens' (ibid.) through which questions of national belonging and identification become apparent. In this sense, the state practice of name change can be considered as a powerful act of 'banalisation', i.e. an act of 'national normalisation' (Antonsich 2016b), through which the belonging of the individuals being renamed is naturalised as a seemingly taken-for-granted fact. By changing their names, the migrants' foreignness is made invisible behind the facade of an unobtrusive 'German' name. On the one hand, the fact that many ethnic migrants accept the offer to change their names during the administrative procedure reveals how powerfully the impulsion of national normalisation acts upon them. The pressure to correspond to dominant conceptions of 'Germanness' and to hide their foreignness incites them to accept the 'offer' of name change. On the other hand, however, a look at everyday practices of individuals having been renamed highlights the room for manoeuvre that they have in dealing with this situation (cf. Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). By examining how individuals use their 'German' names in everyday encounters, strategies of 'identity management' (Goffman 1986 [1963]) can be identified which also speak to the nation. In fact, by actively deciding whether to reveal or to conceal information about their migration background in daily interactions, people contribute to redefine official conceptions of nationhood and to confer them a practical meaning (cf. Hage 1998). I would argue that the analysis of these management practices in daily encounters and interactions allows us to examine the interplay between mainstream conceptions of nationhood and individual agency.

This shall be addressed on the basis of empirical findings from ethnographic observations and semi-structured interviews conducted in the transit camp of Friedland/Lower Saxony and in Russian-speaking migrant associations in Berlin. Before discussing my empirical material

and methodological approach in greater detail, I shall first of all further elaborate my theoretical argument by relating it to the concepts of banal nationalism and everyday nationhood. Secondly, the procedure of name change shall be exposed, by situating it within the context of ethnic German migrations from the former Soviet Union. Finally, the last part will deal with the identity management practices of individuals in everyday life situations, showing how ethnic migrants use their names to display or to conceal information about their potentially discrediting migration background.

Normality, Stigma, and Management Practices of 'Spoiled Identities'

In order to theoretically flesh out the complex relationship between implicit constraints of national 'normalisation' and individual agency, it makes sense to rely on the concepts of stigma and identity management as they have been elaborated by Goffman (1986 [1963]). In his seminal work, Goffman introduces the notion of stigma as 'an attribute that is deeply discrediting for the person possessing it' (ibid., p. 13). By possessing such an attribute, the stigmatised person 'departs negatively from the normative expectations at issue' and thereby distinguishes herself from those considered as 'normals' (ibid., p. 14). In order to avoid being discredited in the eyes of the 'normals', persons whose stigma is not directly evident have an interest to conceal or to control the information that, if being revealed, would discredit them. In Goffman's words, a discreditable individual has to manage this information that deviates from normal expectations, by continuously deliberating about whether 'to display or not to display; to tell or not to tell; to let on or not to let on; to lie or not to lie; and in each case, to whom, how, when, and where' (ibid., p. 52).

If we translate this concept within a perspective of nationalism, immigrants are by definition discreditable, as their migration background negatively departs from the 'normal' expectations present in a national society (Antonsich 2016b). Within the nationalist logic of

homogenisation, the nation state seeks to destroy the migrants' deviance by erasing any sign that marks their foreignness (Lapierre 2006, p. 56). This 'nationalisation' is not necessarily forcefully imposed on the arriving immigrants. The expectations of 'normalisation' rather subliminally push them to make their potentially stigmatising attribute invisible in the eyes of the dominant society in order to avoid being discredited. Thereby, the nationalist aspiration to correspond to an ideal, 'normal' national identity and to hide any sign of deviance is internalised by the migrants. In this sense, name change can be analysed as an attempt to fix their 'deviance' and to conceal their foreign origin and affiliation by replacing the nominal stigma with a 'normal', German name. Through this act, their deviant biographies are seemingly repaired (cf. Bommes 2000), making it appear as if they had always been 'normal', native Germans.

However, this formal change of names during the admission procedure only superficially covers the 'damage' that marks their biographies as deviant. As pointed out by Hage (1998), the formal recognition of national belonging, materialised in this case by the change of names, does not necessarily indicate that members of the majority society will recognise the newcomers as co-nationals on a practical, non-official level (ibid, p. 50). Signs such as a foreign language accent and the lack of knowledge about how things are 'normally' done in the receiving society can constitute potential stigmatising attributes that might preclude a recognition as members of the national community in certain contexts. In this sense, their foreign origin continues to make the migrants potentially discreditable in everyday interactions with members of the majority society. In order to deal with this risk of being discredited, they have to manage the information that could possibly reveal their deviance from normality. This means that, in some contexts, the German name might be effectively used to conceal the foreign identity and to pass for a German, whereas in others, the stigma becomes apparent. In response to the expectations of mainstream society, immigrants manage the information they reveal to others in everyday life encounters, adapting to the specific situations, contexts, and interactions they are confronted with.

With regard to Billig's concept of *banal nationalism*, this supports the necessity to complement his framework with an *everyday nationhood* approach. Based on ethnographic field research, scholars of everyday nationhood have been emphasising the active role of the individual in reproducing and accomplishing nationhood in everyday practices (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Brubaker et al. 2008 [2006]). In this perspective, individuals are not merely passive 'recipients' of nationhood who are unconsciously exposed to banal nationalism (Thompson 2001; Skey 2009; Antonsich 2016a). On the contrary, they rather have to be considered as actors with their own agency who, depending on the context, 'creatively and self-consciously mobilise nationhood in their social interactions' (Antonsich 2016a, p. 33). Following this approach, the paper intends to analyse the practices of identity management linked to the question of names within the framework of *everyday nationhood*. It argues that, while people's actions are constrained by the 'normalising' pressure emanating from the nation state and by extension the dominant society, they still have a margin of freedom in accomplishing, re-appropriating, and sometimes redefining the meaning of national belonging in their everyday encounters. At the intersection between banal nationalism and everyday nationhood, this approach allows to investigate the subtle relationship between structural constraints of nationalisation and human agency, between unconscious dispositions of national belonging and conscious strategies of identity management in everyday practices.

In order to empirically examine the dynamics between imposition, internalisation, and resistance, the analysis relies on qualitative methods, combining semi-structured interviews and ethnographic observations. This methodology seems to be particularly suitable in this context, as it allows to grasp the subtleties of non-said, implicit or hidden ways through which the national traverses people's consciousness in social interactions (Chauvin and Jounin 2010, p. 145). Furthermore, the ethnographic method of observation has been chosen because of its advantage of being particularly attentive to the contextual dimension of nationalism, helping understand in which situations national categories become particularly salient (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, p. 556).

The findings presented in this analysis are drawn from two different phases of field research. The first was conducted in September 2015

in the transit camp of Friedland (Lower Saxony/Germany), where the admission of newly arriving *Aussiedler* applicants takes place. After having obtained permission from the administrative unit, I could follow the daily work of the administrative officers in charge of the admission for two weeks, thereby observing the direct interactions between officers and *Aussiedler* applicants during the admission procedure. These observations were completed by 12 semi-structured interviews with administrative officers working in the department during which they were asked about their tasks and experiences of interaction with the applicants. For ethical reasons, interviews with *Aussiedler* applicants were not possible within this setting. The second field research was conducted among *Aussiedler* associations in two different districts of Berlin during subsequent stays between September 2014 and December 2015. In the first stage, my regular participation in meetings and events of these associations enabled to build up a relation of confidence with the Russian German members of these associations, and to observe the use of names in daily interactions. In the second stage, 21 semi-structured interviews with Russian German individuals were conducted, during which the issue of naming was addressed.[4] The combination between observations in these associations and interviews with individuals allowed me to cast light on the differential uses of German names in everyday contexts.

The Administrative Procedure of Name Change as a Practice of National 'Normalisation'

Before discussing the administrative procedure of name change, the context of the so-called *co-ethnic migrations* (Čapo Žmegač et al. 2010) shall be introduced. The particularity of this type of migration is that the migrants are admitted in the receiving country as ethnic kin, on the basis of their ethnic origin being supposedly identical to the one of the majority population (Brubaker 1998). In contrast to other migrants, they are thus not labelled as foreign immigrants by the receiving state, but as co-ethnics 'returning' to their ancestral homeland, a nation they ostensibly always belonged to, but in reality never lived in. On the

basis of this ‘legal myth’ (Brubaker 1998, p. 1051), they are not only granted admission to the country of their kin nation, they also obtain citizenship, rights and benefits in the receiving state. *Co-ethnic migrations* are thus powerfully charged with assumptions about national belonging and nationhood. In the case of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, this official discourse of co-ethnicity refers to the history of expulsion, deportation, and forced assimilation of ethnic German populations in Eastern Europe in the context of the Second World War (Münz and Ohliger 2000).[5] According to this official discourse, the return to Germany is conceived as a compensation for the discrimination suffered in the name of German ethnicity. Based on this right of return that is legally codified in the Federal Expellee Law (*Bundesvertriebenengesetz, BVFG)* of 1953,[6] about 2.5 million people from the former Soviet Union have been admitted as *Aussiedler* until today, the majority of them arriving in the 1990s, in the course of the collapse of the USSR.

The ‘Germanisation’ of Russian-sounding first and last names needs to be understood within this context. Following the official logic of compensation, the name change can be conceived as one of the numerous measures stipulated in the BVFG that are destined to facilitate the ethnic migrants’ return to their ethnic homeland, by ‘repairing’ their ‘broken’ identities (cf. Bommes 2000). The attribution of German citizenship, the entitlement to pensions and insurances, or the recognition of professional qualifications obtained in the Soviet Union all range among these compensatory measures which are intended to restore the ethnic migrants’ ‘Germanness’. It is in the light of this idea of restitution that the introduction of the possibility of name change in the BVFG in 1992 has officially been discussed (Panagiotidis 2015a).[7] In this sense, the name change is not conceived as a ‘Germanisation’ of foreigners, but rather as a measure meant to restitute a German name that was lost as a consequence of discrimination and forced assimilation in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the analysis of the legal and administrative implementation of name change reveals an underlying reasoning that goes beyond this official logic of restoration. As stipulated in §94 of the BVFG, applicants can dispose of their originally Russian name and adopt the ‘German form’ of this name. This implies for

example the already mentioned transformation of Russian first names into German ones.[8] If a German equivalent to a Russian name does not exist, applicants even have the possibility to adopt a completely new name. This reveals that in the administrative practice, the name change reflects an intention to transform an originally Russian name into a German-sounding one, sometimes irrespectively of the existence of a former, 'original' German name.

This intention of 'Germanisation' seems to be guided by the belief that the name change will facilitate the ethnic migrants' integration into German society. This idea of name change as a means of integration reappears in the discourse of the administrative officers. During an interview, the administrative officer Mr. K. affirms that '*through the nomination, a German one, you can also pursue a better integration. Because you see that often (…), I hear that always on the radio, or I read it in the newspapers, that… applicants, who have a foreign-sounding name, they probably are worse off than the Germans*'. This indicates that the officer's idea of integration through name change rests upon dominant conceptions about what it means to be part of German society, and, in turn, what might prevent the recognition as a 'German'. According to this discourse, the name change is considered as a preventive measure destined to help applicants escape from discrimination and stigmatisation in the majority society and to be treated 'as Germans'. In a similar logic, the administrative officer Mr. M. explains that '*if someone arrives here with the first name "Ivan", I mean, you know, you might not want to walk around here…in Germany…as an "Ivan". Because eventually you came here to live as a German among Germans. So in this case, we can make a "Johann" out of him*'. Mr. M.'s discourse translates the assumption that wearing the name Ivan might be a disadvantage for an applicant, as it marks him as a foreigner in the eyes of the mainstream society. As a consequence, the name change is conceived as an 'offer', a 'service' proposed by the German state to help ethnic migrants get rid of their foreign name stigma and to fit the norms of 'German society'. In this sense, the idea that ethnic German immigrants with a 'foreign' name are to be blended into German society through name change appears as something natural and taken-for-granted in the officers' discourses.

To what extent is this reasoning transmitted to the *Aussiedler* applicants? How can it be explained that many of them accept the 'offer' of name change? While in the interviews, officers affirmed that applicants are never forced but always voluntarily choose to change their names, the ethnographic observations of the admission procedure allow us to draw a more nuanced picture. Even if it is true that name change is not presented as a requirement in the admission procedure, one has to take into consideration the context in which this decision takes place. The so-called 'oral procedure' during which the name change is proposed constitutes the first direct encounter of *Aussiedler* applicants with German administration officers after their arrival in Germany. Whereas a preliminary decision about their admission has already been taken in the country of origin, this decision is to be verified by the officers in the course of a so-called 'plausibility test'.[9] It is in this context resembling an interrogation that the name change is 'offered' to the applicants. As many applicants have been in contact with their relatives or friends already in Germany before their migration, they often have heard that the fact to accept a German name will be considered as a sign of credibility by the administrative clerks, as it shows their willingness to become German and to quickly integrate into German society. Being in a situation where they must prove their German ethnicity in front of the officer, the applicants are strongly incited to accept the name change. In this sense, the name change procedure is often not perceived as an offer or an accommodation, but rather as a 'necessary evil' that might increase their credibility in front of the state officials.

The preceding analysis reveals that the administrative practice of name change can be considered as an institutionalised act of national 'normalisation' which powerfully constrains the ethnic migrants' agency. In fact, their decision to accept or to refuse the offer of name change during the administrative admission procedure is informed by expectations about what it means to be a 'real', 'normal' German that are transmitted by administrative officers, but eventually emanate from mainstream society. The pressure to change names is conveyed through the implicit idea that a German name might allow them to make their potentially stigmatising 'foreignness' invisible and to be recognised 'as Germans among Germans' in the majority society.

Stigmatisation and Practices of Identity Management in Everyday Life

After having analysed the administrative dimension of this name change practice, this part will examine how ethnic German migrants deal with their 'Germanised' names in everyday life situations. As it has been demonstrated in the existing literature on ethnic German migrations, the expectations to blend into German society and to be considered as 'normal' Germans do not hold true for the majority of ethnic migrants. Based on surveys and press analyses, it has been emphasised that their official status as 'Germans' does not protect ethnic migrants from being perceived in the public opinion as a challenge and a problem for the cultural identity of German society (Eder et al. 2004, p. 61). As several quantitative and qualitative studies show, ethnic Germans have been exposed to discrimination and prejudices based on their foreign origin in daily interactions with members of the majority society (Dietz and Roll 1998; Silbereisen et al. 1999). Their socialisation in a Soviet, Russian-speaking context which mostly translates into a Russian accent and a lack of German language skills seem to be the most important factors that mark them as 'Russians' in the public perception (Matejskova 2013). This representation of ethnic migrants as a 'problem' essentially contributes to make the *Aussiedler's* foreignness visible and to mark them as a group with foreign cultural characteristics and 'defective capacities' (Rabkov 2006, p. 339). Through this stigmatisation, ethnic migrants are symbolically excluded from a legitimate belonging to German society (Eder et al. 2004, p. 62).

These results seem to be consistent with my empirical findings from the field research on ethnic Germans having changed their names. The prejudices and stereotypes about 'Russians' which are mentioned in the existing literature frequently reappear in the interviews with ethnic Germans conducted during the field research. This becomes particularly apparent in the statement of the 22-year-old Russian German Dietmar B., in which he recounts his experience of being discriminated and hassled at school: '*Yes, there are many people who talk behind your back. They don't even call you by your first name, they just say: "The Russians".*

(…) You face many stereotypes. That the Russians are here to take our jobs, that they cannot speak German, that the men are aggressive and drink a lot'. The 'German' first name does not seem to have any significance in terms of national affiliation in this context. It cannot prevent him from being exposed to prejudices and discrimination, as the migration origin remains visible through the foreign accent and the lack of German language skills. This confirms that the deviant characteristics which make ethnic migrants discreditable do not disappear through the change of name. Apparently, the facade of the German name in most cases cannot conceal the ethnic migrants' 'foreign' background during interactions with the majority society.

However, the results of the field research also reveal that many ethnic migrants do not passively endure this stigmatisation they are subjected to. In reaction to the risk of being discredited as 'foreigners', they rather strategically use their names to manage the deviant information which potentially makes them discreditable (cf. Goffman 1986). For the majority of the interviewees, the formal procedure of taking a German name does not necessarily mean that they will use their new German names in every situation or interaction they encounter in daily life. They rather choose to use their German name in some situations, whereas in other contexts, the Russian name is maintained. For example, several ethnic Germans continue to be called by their Russian first name or nickname by their Russian-speaking family and friends, while the German name is used in more official contexts, when they are in contact with (native) Germans, such as at school and at work. This switching between the Russian and the German names becomes particularly apparent through the sometimes differing information that was gathered from interviews and observations during the field research. While for example the 25-year-old ethnic German interviewee Hedwig K. presented herself with her German first name *Hedwig* in the interview, she was only known by her Russian first name *Yada* (an abbreviation of *Yadviga*) among her Russian-speaking friends in the association she was a member of. This reveals that the respondent apparently chose to use her German name in the formal situation of the interview with a (native) German interlocutor. On the contrary, in the interaction with

her Russian-speaking friends, she did not conceal her Russian background, as she did not fear being discredited in this situation.

This switching between Russian and German names according to different situations and interactions could also be observed in other configurations. Some of my respondents affirmed that they continued to use their Russian names in most situations of their daily lives, whereas the German name was used mainly during administrative encounters. Especially when it came to the rights linked to the status as 'German', such as issues of visa, insurances, and pensions, they would use the official documents indicating their German name to prove the legitimacy to be entitled to these rights. In this sense, the interviewee Eugen B. explains for example how he uses his documents indicating his German name '*so that the Germans do not understand that I am from Russia. When they talk to me, they hear it, of course. But in documents, this doesn't matter. So in these situations it is very useful to have a German name*'. In his statement, Eugen B. differentiates between 'official documents' in which the strategy to hide the foreign origin does work out, and personal encounters, in which the use of the German name cannot conceal his Russian accent. In these instances, the German name is reserved for situations in which the national status as a 'German' becomes materially salient. This confirms that when a national status is attached to material rewards, such as social benefits and prospects to improve a professional career, the strategical display of 'Germanness' in order to prove the legitimate entitlement to these benefits becomes particularly relevant (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, p. 543).

Finally, it seems that in certain contexts, the practice of name change can even become the object of re-appropriation. In the excerpt of the interview with the 20-year-old Elena K., it becomes evident how the respondent, 15 years after her immigration to Germany, has taken advantage of the possibility of changing name, as a consequence of her everyday experiences associated with her last name. During the interview, she justifies her decision to get rid of her Russian-sounding last name that she received from her ethnic Russian father and to take the German-sounding last name of her ethnic German maternal grandmother in the following way: '*It is such a difficult name (her Russian last*

name) (…) It is really annoying because people see immediately that you are not German. And then they mispronounce it, and they ask you: "Where do you come from?". And then there was a key moment, when I went to a job interview, and the employer asked me if I was unemployed. And she asked me three times if I was really not unemployed, as if I were dumb or something. And this only because she had seen my non-German name. And then I thought: "Ok, now I've got enough. I'll change my name." And it was very easy. And now I have the name of my grandmother'. Elena K.'s statement illustrates very accurately how she manages the stigma of her 'non-German' last name in response to the 'normalising' pressure that acts upon her. As she has been socialised since a very young age in a German-speaking environment, her accent does not mark her as a 'stranger' in her everyday experience. At the same time, the Russian last name continues to reveal her migration background and makes her discreditable in interactions with members of the majority population. She thus chooses to make use of the name change procedure to erase the stigma of a foreign name and to escape from discrimination on the job market. This case shows very clearly how the official practice of name change can become the object of individual appropriation, as it gets interlinked with rather pragmatic considerations of everyday life. At the same time, the empirical cases also demonstrate that the individuals' agency remains constrained by powerful conceptions about what it means to be a 'normal German'. In this sense, the 'banal' understanding of difference in terms of national belonging pervades people's everyday life and informs their actions.

Conclusion

What do you have to do to be considered as belonging to a nation? What makes someone a 'real' German or not German enough? The empirical analysis of the practice of name change in the context of co-ethnic migration presented in this chapter allows us to cast light on these fundamental questions of national belonging and identification. Through the magnifying lens of the exceptional, extraordinary practice of name change, the pervasiveness of banal nationalism grounded on

the daily use of people's names becomes apparent. The practice of name change thereby works as a short circuit which interrupts this unconscious constitution and reproduction of the nation through naming, but reveals at the same time its signifying power. Through the arrival of newcomers whose names are to be 'Germanised', the mostly implicit and unquestioned assumptions about what it means to belong to the German nation become actually visible.

On the one hand, name change as a state practice exposes the national demand of 'normalisation' (Antonsich 2016b) that both the state and the majority society direct on the ethnic German newcomers. On the other hand, the analysis of everyday practices by ethnic Germans having been renamed reveals how individuals deal with the normalising pressure they are subjected to. Through the use of names in everyday life contexts, individuals engage in identity management practices, deciding whether to display or to hide information about themselves according to the contingencies of their daily experiences. These practices show that, within the constraining framework of powerful conceptions of nationhood, individuals have a certain 'margin of freedom' in dealing with these constraints, allowing them to strategically switch between different categorisations and identifications. This happens as national categories interact with other practical preoccupations of everyday life, such as family life, economic welfare, professional life, or social advancement. It means that, while their life is importantly structured and constrained by national categories, people also have the capacity to *use* these national categories in order to escape from stigmatisation.

With regard to further research agendas after Billig's groundbreaking work on banal nationalism (1995), this analysis strongly argues for approaches that attach greater importance to the practical dimension of nationalism (Hage 1998). By focusing on practical nationality (ibid., p. 52), the practices of state representatives, members of the majority society, and immigrant 'newcomers' can be analysed within a common framework. In this sense, an emphasis on practices might be a way to bridge the gap between Billig's conception of banal nationalism traversing people's consciousness and the bottom-up, agency-based everyday nationhood approach. (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, Brubaker et al.

2008 [2006]) By studying how individuals 'do' and 'perform' nationhood in social interactions, we are able to better understand the close entanglement between the institutionalised power of 'normalisation' and individual agency in response to it. Within this logic, the study of interactions between the majority society and immigrant 'newcomers' seems to be a particularly insightful configuration to examine this intersection (cf. Fox and Jones 2013; Antonsich and Matejskova 2015). Through the arrival of people having been socialised in a different national context, the boundaries between those who belong and those who do not belong to the nation are questioned and need to be renegotiated. In this sense, there is a potential to fruitfully develop this research agenda in a broader, comparative framework, studying practices of everyday nationhood in the context of migration and population change.

Notes

1. As there are no official statistics about name change, the actual proportion of applicants opting to change names is difficult to measure. The examples cited here correspond to cases encountered during field research in the transit camp of Friedland, Germany.
2. Aussiedler (literally: 'out-settlers') is the legal term used in the German Expellee Law to define ethnic German migrants.
3. These regulations make it nearly impossible for a native German citizen to change name, demanding an 'important reason' from the applicant making the request. As explained by Panagiotidis (2015a, p. 5), this restrictiveness goes back to the 1938 Nazi name change law that was the result of anti-Semitic fears about Jewish 'name camouflage' (ibid.).
4. The context in which these interviews have been conducted (migrant associations mainly frequented by younger people) implies that the sample presented in this part contains only respondents aged between 20 and 30 years. This selection bias has of course an important effect on the results. To go further in the analysis and to differentiate between different contexts of socialisation according to socioeconomic background and age of immigration, a broader sample would be necessary.
5. The Stalinist deportations of 800,000 German settlers from the Volga region to Kazakhstan and Siberia in 1941 and the subsequent collective

repression and forced assimilation constitute the main source of legitimacy to include them within the scope of this policy (Rock and Wolff 2002).

6. The Federal Expellee Law (*Bundesvertriebenengesetz)* was originally directed towards expellees (*Vertriebene*) who fled the former German Eastern territories after the end of World War II. In the ideological context of the Cold War, this idea of expulsion in the name of German ethnicity was progressively expanded towards ethnic Germans living in countries of the Eastern Bloc that had never been part of German territory. The political and ideological reasons for this extension and the following restrictions have been the object of several studies in the literature on ethnic German migrations (cf. von Koppenfels 2001; Joppke 2005, Panagiotidis 2015b).
7. The political and ideological circumstances of the introduction of this legislation, especially with regard to the important influence of expellee associations, have been explored by Panagiotidis (2015a).
8. There is no official list about the correspondences between Russian and German names. In their daily practices, officers rely on name guides or on their experience to determine a German equivalent name.
9. During this encounter, the officer is supposed to check whether the information that the applicant submitted during the first stage of the admission procedure that took place in the home country seems 'credible' or 'plausible'. This implies questions about the applicants' ethnic origin, marital status, country of origin, family members, and the verification of the German language skills.

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Collective Charisma, Selective Exclusion and National Belonging: 'False' and 'Real' Greeks from the Former Soviet Union

Manolis Pratsinakis

Introduction

A large part of the sociological research on the settlement of immigrants hastened to mirror and reproduce the nationalist image of normal life according to which people are supposed to stay where they belong—that is, in 'their' nation states (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002); no sooner do immigrants arrive in the 'host society' than they are turned into 'ethnics' and scrutinized for 'their' cultural and social difference, especially when they are of lower class standing (Waldinger 2003). Integration is described more or less as a race between 'ethnics', belonging to bounded groups, competing to adopt the values of the native society and to catch up with the socioeconomic standards 'of the mainstream'. What is at stake is 'ethnic difference' conceived not as a relational phenomenon but as an attribute of immigrants and something

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that should be abolished. And mainstream sociology then falls in with this picture, setting out to measure 'the level of integration of ethnic groups' and inform policymakers and the native society whether they are doing well and whether social policy is succeeding in integrating them.

Why should we bother about ethnic difference from a sociological point of view? And what is the 'mainstream society' or 'dominant culture' into which immigrants are expected to integrate? These questions are rarely posed. Assuming the very ideas it should be questioning and analysing, much of the literature on integration has in essence remained preoccupied with providing descriptions of how the process of nation-building evolves in the face of 'the migration challenge' (Favell 2003). In its apparent neutrality, the functionalist metaphor of social integration masks the uncritical adoption and reproduction of the 'nationalist viewpoint' that underlies research assumptions. This viewpoint is not defined here as the radical expression of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others; it refers rather to a standpoint, widely held in the modern world, that takes for granted ideas about nationhood and the link between peoples and homelands, and about the naturalness of the world of nations, divided into separate homelands (Billig 1995: 61).

Overcoming the nationalist viewpoint in the study of immigrant integration requires developing analytical tools not coloured by the apparent self-evidence of a world ordered into nation states. At the same time, it requires assessing the degree to which those self-evidences still function as powerful signifiers for different actors and inquiring into the social implications of this function (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). The literature on everyday nationhood provides useful theoretical insights in that direction. Following Billig's seminal book (1995) on the neglected, less visible, banal expressions of nationalism that reproduce established nations in ways that allow their members to forget their own nationalism, an increasing number of scholars are studying nationalism from below as a major though largely unconscious ideological force in the contemporary word. Extending the enquiry beyond the workings of state institutions, national media and state officials' actions that formed Billig's focus, they show that the reproduction of ideologies of national belonging are not solely the outcome of top-down processes but equally

are enacted and contested through the everyday practices of 'ordinary people' in different fields of social life. In so doing, they highlight the workings and paradoxes of the everyday nationhood.

Several of those scholars (Fox 2007; Mann 2011; Jenkins 2011; Vassenden 2010; Skey 2011) have paid particular attention to migration and its role in that respect. Immigrants' presence in European states as well as the gradual acknowledgement that 'they are here to stay' has led to increasingly heated discussions on the question what it is to be German, Dutch, English, Norwegian and so on. The answers to such questions do not usually challenge received ideas about nationhood; they are rather used to reassemble the national self through discourses that are ultimately entangled with imaginaries of alterity: 'we are what they are not' or 'we are not what they are'. In this fashion, the threatened image of the national self (threatened in the sense that becomes the object of discussion) remains mystified and thus secure (Pratsinakis 2017). At the same time, it becomes a weapon of social closure and privilege monopolization for those who are able to define the conditions of belonging (Hage 2000; Skey 2013; Pratsinakis 2014).This is a critical point in the study of immigrant–native relations which merits closer examination.

Ideologies of national belonging are not only common sense belief systems that reproduce the unquestioned cultural and political dominance of the nation. They also help solidify the dominant position of certain groups within it. The literature on the everyday nationhood brought to the fore the collective narratives, political claims, symbolic representations and cultural schemas of such dominant groups and their internal paradoxes and struggles (Bonikowski 2016). It thus made the study of majority ethnicity groups an object of research in its own right rather than the invisible yardstick against which migrants (and other minority groups) have to measure themselves. However, limited research has treated both migrants and natives within a common framework in assessing how are ideologies of national belonging experienced, negotiated in their day-to-day interactions and most importantly on how they influence the figuration in which their mutual relationship is cast.

Understandings of who forms part of the nation, who may become a member and under what conditions and who cannot, as well as the

everyday contestation of those understandings are central in grasping the power dynamics underlying immigrant–native relations. And, as I argue elsewhere (Pratsinakis 2017), Elias and Scotson's established–outsiders model provides an appropriate theory with which to understand these dynamics allowing for a relational and processual perspective that situates interrelated processes of domination and resistance at the heart of the inquiry. By conceptualizing immigrant–native relations and the process of integration in terms of an established–outsider figuration, attention is redirected from the immigrants alone to the process of mutual entanglement that takes place between them and natives in different fields of life. It thus forces us to conceive of the established nationals as a constitutive part of the figuration, and as a result we can sidestep the trap of assuming their standpoint. It further helps highlight the power dimension of this process: how immigrant–native relations unfold through an unequal power struggle over native society's classifications about who may be a national, and perceptions about how immigrants should behave in order to qualify as members of the nation.

Adopting this analytical framework, in this chapter, I examine the practical deployment of ideologies of national belonging in immigrants–native figuration while focusing on a rather neglected case of migration—namely the migration of people who have always lived outside the borders of the nation but who are nonetheless officially regarded as co-nationals. Preoccupied with migrations framed as problems in national public and political discourses, the literature on integration has tended to ignore the often more positively framed migrations of co-ethnics. However, those migrations form an illuminating case in helping reconsider a number of conventional assumptions characterizing that literature and also exploring the issue of scale in the literature of everyday nationhood. Favourable reception by state institutions has often not led to harmonious interactions between native-born nationals and co-ethnic migrants (see also the contribution of Wallem in this book), thus raising questions about the role played by ideologies of national belonging at different analytical levels.

Concretely, drawing on a 14-month ethnographic research conducted in a neighbourhood in the outskirts of Thessaloniki (2013),[1] Greece, I here focus on the relationship between two categories of residents:

one comprising Greeks born and raised in the country, the other also being of Greek descent, but having emigrated from countries formerly belonging to the Soviet Union. I explore processes of social closure and selective exclusion by native-born nationals as ways to secure their perceptions of Greekness on which their claimed collective charisma depends. Before proceeding with the analysis of my case study, I first describe how Elias and Scotson's established and outsider model may be adapted to account for migrant–native figurations resulting from international migration, rather than from internal migration as was the model originally developed.

The Established–Outsider Model and the Study of Everyday Nationhood

The established–outsiders model explains social closure and stigmatization, together with its reverse process, that of collective self-praise, as outcomes of an uneven balance of power and the tensions inherent in it. It illustrates how power differences between groups permit the creation of polarized status distinctions between the group charisma claimed by the 'established', and the complementary communal disgrace that they attribute to the 'outsiders'. Speaking about power in the abstract is insufficient. Elias (1978) rightly argued that power is not a thing which individuals or collectivities possess. Power is by definition relational; it needs to be conceptualized as a fluctuating yet structural characteristic embedded in all human relations. The question in established–outsider figurations is how to determine the particular positions of power that the established monopolize, and through which they are able to denigrate the outsiders and secure a positive image of themselves.

Elias developed his answer to this question (1994b) drawing from his and Scotson's (1994a) study of Winston Parva, a community in England which comprised a core neighbourhood and two newer settlements around it. This community manifested a sharp division between the older and newer residents. The older residents who experienced the arrival of the newcomers as a threat to their established way of life closed ranks against them and stigmatized them. Interestingly, the two

groups did not differ in terms of nationality, religion, ethnic descent or class background. The only difference between the two groups related to their length of residency. Elias and Scotson argued that in Winston Parva, the conditions of the power imbalance were rooted in the established group's social cohesion, which in turn resulted from its age. Through the workings of 'praise and blame gossip', they were able to build their collective self-image by reference to their 'best' members, and attributed to the outsider group as a whole the 'bad' characteristics of that group's anomic minority (1994, xix). The figuration derived from Winston Parva may be summarized in the following way: processes of group collective self-praise and stigmatization were *initiated* by the established in response to subjective feelings of threat from the outsiders; they *became possible* due to the established group's social cohesion; and they *functioned* to perpetuate the local dynamics of power. Elias treated the Winston Parva case as an 'empirical paradigm' to be tested, enlarged and if necessary revised by enquiries into more complex figurations. He claimed that such an exercise would help 'understand better the structural characteristics they [the figurations] have in common and the reasons why, under different conditions, they function and develop upon different lines' (Elias and Scotson 1994: xvii). Yet, there are certain underdeveloped points in Elias' theory which become all the more obvious when one wishes to apply the model in more complex settings (Pratsinakis 2013, 2017). The first point concerns his lack of attention to the strategies of outsider groups to better their position. The second point concerns his partial explanation of the reasons why the established perceived the settlement of newcomers as a threat. Such perceptions do not only pertain to established group's fears of losing their ways of life but also their fear of endangerment of their monopolized resources. The third underdeveloped point in both Elias and Scotson's analysis and Elias' model concerns their lack of recognition of the wider social context of their local figuration which weakens their analysis of what constitutes the power imbalance in established–outsider figurations.

The established in Winston Parva cultivated their 'group-charisma' through identification with the more well-off older residents in the neighbourhood, aiming to reduce the distance between themselves

and middle- and upper class people living in, or in the immediate surroundings of, Winston Parva. Elias and Scotson rightly pointed to the fact that the ability of the dominant group to maintain an established position in the neighbourhood was not due to (actual) class differences from the outsiders. However, the established were able to legitimize their presumed superiority—in their own eyes and in the eyes of the outsiders—by successfully *claiming their belonging to a superior class*. Their social cohesion meant that they were able to control flows of communication through which to disseminate their negative categorizations of the outsiders (modelled against positive group self-perceptions) and impose sanctions and taboos against contact with them. But their capacity to construct and maintain a positive image of their group and to collectively denigrate the outsiders rested on their ability to present themselves as the norm by which others in the neighbourhood had to abide. The same mechanism is also central to the way through which natives are able to secure a dominant position vis-a-vis different migrant categories (Pratsinakis 2017).

Established and Outsider Nationals

Ideologies of national belonging, articulated by means of a widely shared common sense theory about humanity's division into 'peoples', do not only construct identities and communities but situate those within a supposedly naturally existing world of mutually exclusive nations (Billig 1995). According to those ideologies and the institutions that support them, immigrants are turned into de facto outsiders as soon as they cross national borders and start building their life abroad, away from their 'national home'. In most cases, they lack citizenship, which formally attests their outsider position and blocks them from equal participation in 'the host' society. Their outsider's status is also experienced in their everyday interactions with members of the native society. Even if citizenship rights are acquired, this does not necessarily bring about their acknowledgement as equal members of the national community by the native citizens who consider themselves as representing the national core. Prolonged stays by immigrants, especially

those of low class standing, are very often seen as a threat to the social cohesion and cultural homogeneity of the nation, initiating processes of out-group stigmatization and in-group collective self-praise by the established nationals.

The established nationals assume a managerial role in relation to what they imagine as 'their nation' in which they feel they have the right to decide 'how things work'. The arrival of immigrants is perceived as ruining their national-level intimacy and challenging their exclusive control over 'their' place. Newcomers are seen to be entering what they conceive as their collective private space and they feel they have to discipline them according to the 'rules of the house'. Disciplining or excluding them is necessary in keeping their status as the masters 'in their own nation'.

In this context, natives maintain an established position due to their ability to present themselves as standing for what immigrants have to become in order to gain national recognition. Claiming legitimacy via national ideologies that conceive of a 'national people' with common origins and a distinct culture and history, they present their national belongingness as something that is rightfully conferred to them by birth. Even though ideologies of national belonging are by no means static, in the short run, immigrants usually have limited abilities to alter them to their advantage. As a result, their behaviour is judged by the degree of their compliance with the native norms (Pratsinakis 2014; Antonsich 2012) and their frame of reference commonly comprises other groups with which they compete for national recognition. The established nationals view immigrants as candidate members of the nation and they ask them to prove their belongingness by attesting their 'practical nationality', namely the sum of nationally sanctified and valued social and physical cultural styles and dispositions (Hage 2000) they have accumulated. Ideologies of national belonging grant the established nationals the potential to construct a positive image of their collective national self as well as to authoritatively categorize others who enter their intimate national space (see Pratsinakis 2014; Skey 2013). But what happens if the newcomers are de facto part of the nation?

In the remainder of the paper, I turn to my ethnography in Greece focusing on the relationship between native Greeks and Greeks from the

former Soviet union (from here onward FSU Greeks). While for other immigrants, attesting their practical nationality entails them showing their willingness to fit in, for FSU Greeks, attesting their practical nationality is a necessary step to come to live according to the dominant expectations of them being Greeks. When this is done successfully, it has a different effect. It results in them demonstrating the national essence they are supposed to embody. By proving their Greekness, they immediately become respected Greeks, equals among others. What happens, however, if the established nationals judge that they lack the necessary practical nationality?

The 'Return' of the Greeks from the Former Soviet Union

Greece became a de facto immigration country during the 1990s. The steep increase in immigration during that decade was closely connected to the disintegration of the former communist bloc, and was caused by two distinct population movements: mass undocumented immigration from the Balkans, and immigration of people of Greek descent. In relation to ideologies of Greekness that define national belonging as a privilege deriving from descent, the perception and regulation of those two population movements has been markedly asymmetric.

On the one hand, the inflow and settlement of a significant non-Greek immigrant population has been treated as an undesired development. Immigration policies enforced non-Greek immigrants' exclusion from a multitude of social, political and economic domains by way of institutional obstacles. On the other hand, in line with the Greek state's perceived responsibility towards co-ethnics, the migration of people of Greek descent was treated more positively. The settlement of FSU Greeks was encouraged and facilitated by state policies,[2] at least during the early years of migration, and citizenship rights were granted to them through a summary mode on proof of Greek descent. Those state policies were legitimated by the official view that these are fellow nationals who are finally coming 'home'.

Officially, FSU Greeks were not categorized as immigrants nor counted among the immigrant population in Greece. The term 'immigration' (μετανάστευση), being rather negatively loaded in the political discourse, was considered by state officials as inappropriate to frame their movement. Instead, the vocabulary of repatriation was adopted. Although neither they nor their ancestors have ever lived in Greece, FSU Greek immigrants were termed 'repatriates'. Politicians and the national media portrayed them as rejoining their homeland driven by innate national feelings, and 'their return' was conceptualized as a resource for the country. Their social integration was also expected to be smooth, or at least much smoother than that of foreign immigrants who were arriving at the same time (Kokkinos 1991). However, the experiences of their day-to-day interactions with native Greeks challenged those expectations (Voutira 2006; Hess 2008; Popov 2010; Pratsinakis 2013). My study set out to look in detail at how FSU and native Greeks think about and associate with each other, while restricting attention to one neighbourhood where they cohabit, Nikopoli. The apparent contrast between the positive official presentation of FSU Greek migration by politicians and the media and the troubled experience of everyday interaction between FSU Greek migrants and native Greeks pointed to the complexity of the role played by ideologies of national belonging at different analytical levels. As such, it provided a privileged case to inquire into the relation between top-down state-led conceptions of nationhood and ordinary people's engagement with those conceptions.

Native and 'Soviet Greeks' in Nikopoli

Nikopoli is a working-class neighbourhood on the north-western outskirts of the city of Thessaloniki, Greece. It developed in the early 1960s through processes of unauthorized construction by internal immigrants that came to the city from neighbouring villages, and expanded rapidly after 1995 largely by and for immigrants of Greek descent from the former Soviet Union. At the time of my ethnographic research (2007–2009), it housed approximately 10,000 people, the majority being FSU Greeks, followed by native Greeks and a small number of non-Greek immigrants.

Most native Greeks living in Nikopoli talked in a derogatory way about their FSU Greek neighbours (Pratsinakis 2014). They held a negative image of the newcomers despite their common nationality and religion, their shared working-class background and even the common origin in Pontos[3] which many immigrants and natives shared. Negative attitudes were supported with reference to how they saw them use the neighbourhood's public space or were inferred from the stories people heard from others, usually concerning FSU Greek's alleged aggressiveness and delinquent behaviour. FSU Greeks in Nikopoli were thought by the natives living there to be aggressive people—a representation that was sustained, and augmented through gossip and the spread of rumours (Pratsinakis 2013). This representation impeded contact between the two communities since native Greeks expected FSU Greeks to react aggressively for minimal reasons.

Native Greeks also believed that some FSU Greeks engaged in criminal activities such as drug trafficking and that many keep guns in their houses. Several of my native contacts told me that they feel insecure in the neighbourhood. Nikopoli had not attracted much media attention and was not represented as a notorious district in local and national media. However, several native residents characterized their neighbourhood as an unsafe area because of the many FSU Greeks living there. In my talks with people living in adjacent areas, I noted that such ideas were widespread there too. Several people warned me that 'I should take care there' or described Nikopoli as a no-go area. Natives of Nikopoli and its adjacent neighbourhoods connected information about 'a Russian mafia' in the city, circulated in the press, with the category of 'the Russian' or 'the Russo-Pontic', and projected this onto the local FSU Greeks.

The category Russo-Pontic is a dubious one. It was originally employed as a term to distinguish the Pontics who immigrated from the former Soviet Union from the Greek-born Pontics who settled in the country with the 1920s forced population exchange between Turkey and Greece. However, the label gradually acquired a pejorative meaning signifying a low-class standing, embodying the stereotypes of the Soviet immigrants' alleged aggressiveness and indicating doubt about the Greekness of the categorized (Pratsinakis 2014). The words of Stathis are indicative:

> The Russo-Pontics… of course there are different ways to refer to them and I know that the proper one is 'same descent (homogenis) immigrants from the FSU'. However I call them Russo-Pontics because I know that they are not Greeks. The majority are Georgian, Armenian etc., only a few of them have Greek roots and Greek consciousness.

Similar to many of my informants, Stathis categorized those whom he excluded from the Greek national community as members of other nations as a way to justify his exclusion. As Billig (1995) argues, by categorizing oneself with a distinctive national label, one not only imagines her/himself as being a member of a unique 'we', but categorizes this 'we' in the universality of nations that comprises a world in which everyone belongs to one such community. In this logic, if someone is not Greek, she/he has to be a national of a different state.

Encounters in the Neighbourhood

From the first days of my stay in Nikopoli, it became apparent to me that native and FSU Greeks do not intermingle in Nikopoli. The lack of a neighbourhood centre, the spatial segregation of the two communities, to a large extent as an outcome of Nikopoli's history of expansion and local social infrastructure facilities hampered social life. As will be described, interaction was further constrained by the diverging attitudes towards leisure and out-of-house activities. During my first stay in the neighbourhood in 2007, there were two cafeterias and two restaurants owned by FSU Greeks, all of which had a very limited clientele. Native Greeks did not visit them. Alexis, an 18-year-old male native resident of Nikopoli told me:

> There is no place to go to in Nikopoli really. There are two cafeterias but you only see Russians going there. They even write the name of the cafeteria in Russian. You see this and you go off, you know…

In 2009, all but one FSU-owned cafeterias were closed down. At that time, there was still one tavern and four kafenía[4] all owned by native

residents from old Nikopoli. They attracted almost exclusively local native Greeks, as well as some Albanian immigrants. Yannis, the owner of a kafenio, mentioned that in fact FSU Greeks are not particularly welcome in his shop:

> What to do with them?… they have a different culture, ok a few of them do feel like Greeks… but why would I want a Georgian? …To have him come here and ruin my business? To flash his pistols? You can recognize the real Greek, that of Pontic origin, by his philotimo.[5] He will come and seek for his compatriots

Partly because their low income did not allow for frequent outgoing and consumption, and also due to different habits towards recreation (Pratsinakis 2013), FSU Greeks developed leisure practices mostly in the neighbourhood public space. They gathered on streets and pavements just outside their private domain of residence, or outside small shops to play cards, drink, eat and chat. Without permission from the local authorities, they also built shacks from all kinds of material (wood, sheet iron, cardboard). These shacks were erected in proximity to their homes and also further afield, in the plentiful free space of the neighbourhood. The shacks formed meeting places and were also used to store the chairs and sofas that people used outside. They brought together the elderly FSU Greeks, who spent much of their days there. During wintertime, on cold days, people stay inside them, while during the rest of the year they take the chairs and sofas outside. Middle-aged FSU Greeks meet and socialize outside their houses, or in front of convenience stores, where they can purchase alcohol. Youngsters also use the public space extensively, meeting in the playgrounds and sport fields.

For the native residents, the shacks constituted a major disturbance as they are seen to exacerbate the already degraded built environment of the neighbourhood and are an indication of what they perceive as the refusal of their FSU Greek neighbours to adapt. Stamatis, who owned a business in the neighbourhood, claimed that it is FSU Greeks' choice not to mingle with others and said that they themselves wished to stay in their own community. In his words:

> That's also the reason why they came to live in this neighbourhood all together. The grannies will go to those shacks they built, the grandpas will go there to play cards, others will gather in groups out in the streets to drink beer [μπιρίτσα]. It is their choice to stay separate from others.

The FSU Greeks themselves provided a different account of their frequent gatherings in open spaces; these are not aimed at avoiding native Greeks, but rather constitute a much more economical way of socializing and spending their free time, avoiding the premiums of cafeterias, bars and other commercial entertainment spaces. In their turn, the FSU Greeks were critical of the native Greeks' habits of frequently going out and spending a lot of money on leisure activities. According to two FSU Greeks in their 30 s:

– They [referring to native Greeks in general and not the locals in Nikopoli] are asking us how did you built a house? How? Through frugality… we are not out every night
– Greeks want to go out every night, eat outside, and take their wife for a drink. We are economical.
– […] In our free time we stay in our courtyard or outside this convenience store over there [στομαγαζάκι] [he points at the store], we also entertain ourselves at weddings, when they happen.
– The convenience store sells a half litre of beer for 1.2 euros; if you go downtown you will pay five euros for a 0.33 litre beer.

Several native Greeks criticized the FSU Greeks' extensive use of public space, and especially their habit of drinking in the street. They judged this practice to be indicative of alcohol problems rather than a form of socializing, and related it to stereotypes of people from Russia as being heavy drinkers. Drinking is a culturally defined action and, as such, different drinking habits are regarded as acceptable by native and FSU Greeks. The latter have looser social constraints on drinking alcohol; they are more tolerant towards drunkenness, and drinking in the street is more widely practised. In the public perception, drinking on the streets is characteristic of marginal social groups, and sustained drinking through the day is perceived as the mark of a drinking problem—especially if the person in question is drinking strong alcohol. For native

Greeks, strong alcohol or drinking in large amounts should be accompanied with food, the *meze*. Drinking *xerosfíri* (without eating—literally 'dry-hammer') is considered harmful. It is also considered unwise, especially when practiced by grown-ups 'who should know better'.

The 'False Greeks'

Most native Greeks felt that they were separated from FSU Greeks by a cultural gap. In their view, it was this gap, and what they claimed to be the FSU Greeks' sullen attitude and lack of manners, that prevented their intermingling. They were also critical about FSU Greeks speaking Russian and other non-Greek languages. FSU Greek communities have been characterized by an immense linguistic heterogeneity reflecting the diversity of their origins and the influences of different local populations among which they lived. However, Russian, being the lingua franca in the Soviet Union and the dominant language in education, gradually prevailed as the prime language of the Greek diaspora. In Greece, although the vast majority learned to speak Modern Greek and many of them spoke Pontic Greek in the former Soviet Union, their Russian language skills are usually more developed than their Modern Greek. As a result, first-generation FSU Greeks prefer speaking Russian to each other. Hearing FSU Greeks speak Russian and other non-Greek languages makes native residents doubt their Greekness. Their mistrust is further fed by the satellite discs on the balconies of the apartments and the rooftops of FSU Greeks' houses, the presence of Russian newspapers in local convenience stores and kiosks and the posts and banners in Russian language.

In the dominant native perception, Greek-descent immigrants comprise a minority in Nikopoli, estimated from 5 to 20% of the total immigrant population, an estimation that reverses the actual population composition in the neighbourhood. The Greekness of a large segment of the FSU Greek population in Nikopoli was denied by the native residents. Phrases such as 'if they were real Greeks, they would not be watching Russian television', '…they would not choose to speak Russian' and so on were commonly echoed by my native contacts.

These instances were not referred to as the results of acculturation or as indicative of the ties which FSU Greeks have developed with the countries in which they grew up and were socialized. Their cultural difference was thought of as expressing their supposedly 'non-Greek consciousness' and was taken as proof of their lack of actual Greek descent. Their Greekness was essentially challenged in racial terms. Thus, although several natives directly questioned the official top-down criteria of Greekness as applied by state bureaucrats, they did not go as far as to question the dominant ideologies of belonging that underlie them. Paradoxically, it were the very same (taken for granted and banally reproduced) ideas of Greekness as defined by descent that determined both state policy and its contestation by people in everyday life.

Concretely, the doubts of native Greeks about the Greekness of FSU Greeks responded to two beliefs they harboured. The first is the assumption that there is a universal Greek culture which characterizes all Greeks around the globe. The second is the conviction that a Greek who happens to have lost (aspects of) his or her Greek culture naturally feels the urge to regain it. According to this thinking, FSU Greeks who for instance 'prefer speaking' Russian to Greek in public cannot be Greeks. Information about a restricted number of non-Greek immigrants who managed to acquire Greek citizenship by passing as FSU Greeks, the so-called issue of 'illegal hellenizations', had already attracted some media attention in the 1990s. However, it was most probably the accusations for the alleged adulterations in the 2000s parliamentary elections (when the Greek Socialist Party PASOK was accused for granting Greek citizenship to non-Greek migrants to vote for this party) that had contributed to popularizing the belief that this was a widespread practice. This belief was widely shared by the native residents in Nikopoli, who in many cases discussed their views about their immigrant neighbours with reference to the state policy. Tasia, a middle-aged lady working in a family business and living in old Nikopoli, told me the following in the context of a conversation about her daughter's university entry exams:

> even in university the 'Russians' are prioritized (sic)[6] and elsewhere they are promoted. In the public sector… They have filled the civil sector, and they are not Greeks, they are Chechens, Armenians… Turko-phones, how

> do they call those? The postman was here the other day. I told him, 'you come everyday and you serve me, take a rest, let me offer you a cup of coffee'. He told me they all have identity cards with different names. They are the catastrophe of Greece, if they do not leave, the state will collapse, the funds will get empty. In fact they are leaving the country and they are taking pensions from here, how long have they worked in Greece to be entitled for a pension?[7]

Tasia challenged the authenticity of the FSU Greek immigrants' Greekness in order to question their entitlement to support by the state. Claiming belonging to a nation does only confer an identity that grants membership to a (n imagined) community but also entails a promise for privileged access to certain common resources. Tasia did not discuss the FSU migrant's right to receive state benefits with reference to their socioeconomic condition but challenged it with reference to their supposed lack of belongingness to the nation. Conversely, Fotini, a middle-aged native Greek lady of Pontic descent also living in old Nikopoli, attested to the Greekness of her older tenants to justify their benefits:

> they mentioned the word Greece and they got emotional, they even named their little girl Athena. They fully deserve [χαλάλι] the benefits they are taking in order to build their life here since they are Greeks.

For both Fotini and Tasia, the 'moral obligation' of the Greek state to support Greeks 'returning home' was not contested. It was its inability to prevent the inflow of 'false Greeks' that they condemned.

The 'false Greeks' figured prominently in discussions by native residents in Nikopoli about the immigrants in the neighbourhood. The alleged false Greekness of the immigrants in Nikopoli was flexibly used by native residents to justify negative attitudes about them. Speaking the Pontic Greek dialect, following Greek religious or national customs, as well as fluency in Greek were all referred to as convincing evidence of an immigrant's Greekness. Nevertheless, in everyday life, reference to the above-mentioned criteria was made in a very flexible way. Native Greeks used them selectively to exclude those exhibiting behaviours not approved by them. For instance, when a person speaks the Greek Pontic

dialect, this alone made him/her a repatriate from the former Soviet Union in the eyes of the natives. Proficiency in Pontic Greek is a very convincing proof of an immigrant's Greek descent since this language is not widely spoken in Greece and it is highly improbable that she/he could have learned it in Greece. But when she/he is seen (by others) speaking Russian in the public space and (as is common for male FSU Greeks) drinking beer with friends in the street, he/she is then labelled Russo-Pontic or simply Russian.

Maria, my neighbour during my first stay in Nikopoli, had a rather positive image about the FSU Greeks living in the immediate surroundings of her house. She had told me she has no complaints about any of her neighbours and that people are very friendly towards her. One day I met her by coincidence at an Internet café situated very close to her house. She told me she was facing some problems with her Internet connection. I offered to help her. When we went to her place, she told me in a very upset manner:

> The situation with the internet connection has caused me a lot of problems. I have to go and give my money to the Russians. I do not want to go there. I do not feel safe. Last night I was there and somebody came with an angry face. He told me to leave the computer I was using because he wanted to chat with his girlfriend.

Her 'good FSU Greek immigrant neighbours' had turned into 'Russians', or more precisely the misbehaving FSU Greeks had turned to Russian so as not harm her positive self-image about Greeks.

Similarly, Vasilis used the category of 'false Greeks' to defend his FSU Greek neighbours. Like Maria, he was among the minority of natives who favoured the immigrants in Nikopoli. Owning a business in a rather central location of the newer part of Nikopoli brought him in daily contact with many residents. In his view, it was the first settlers of Nikopoli who are closed and extremely prejudiced towards their FSU Greek neighbours whom he described as *philótimi*, helpful and honest people. He went on to explain to me that the rare negative behaviours, for which the whole immigrant community is criticized, are in fact perpetrated by the 'false Greeks'. I expressed my confusion about those

'false Greeks'. I told him that everybody is speaking about them but I had not met any, and I asked him whether he had. Vasilis replied positively, but the person he named was one whom he had just described as 'among the nicest guys in the neighbourhood'. In certain cases, the process of selective exclusion led my informants into inconsistencies and contradictions. However, these were not sufficient to challenge the ideologies of Greekness that shaped the contours of their thinking and framed their perceptions of the immigrants in the neighbourhood. In the mindset of the majority of native residents, the 'false Greeks' were the bad immigrants and the 'real Greeks' the good ones.

Conclusion

Similar to Winston Parva, neither their common nationality and religion, nor their shared working-class background provided the conditions for friendly coexistence between the members of the two communities in Nikopoli. Native Greeks, influenced by broader discourses linking the 1990s immigration to Greece with criminality and feeling separated from FSU Greeks by a cultural gap, reacted as established nationals by discrediting them and questioning their cultural practices. As Skey (2011) explains, common everyday practices and 'shared' habits in a nation construct a moral order and a sense of familiarity and mutual recognition by linking, no matter how tenuously, to other people across the country. They contribute to the stabilising of social structures and identities that people rely on to orientate themselves on a daily basis and are crucial elements in securing individuals ontologically. Importantly, they also come to form a sort of common cultural currency worth little when used year in, year out but growing exponentially in value when individuals perceive that their symbolic ownership of their nation is being threatened by 'others' whose practising of their own cultural habits they see as provocative behaviour and evidence of a lack of willingness 'to integrate' (Skey 2011: 91–94; Pratsinakis 2014).

On their side, FSU Greeks did not hide the influence of their upbringing in the former Soviet Union nor were they willing to change

their habits if those appeared foreign to native Greeks. They saw no reason to do so, despite the fact that native Greeks expected them to act in that way. Being more resourceful than other migrant groups in symbolic terms due to their official recognition as de facto part of Greek society, they were less eager to comply with the native norms. Paradoxically, it was their Greekness that provided them the resources to assert their difference from native Greeks (Pratsinakis 2014). In Nikopoli, aided by their numerical dominance, they were further capable of developing their own institutions, thus maintaining a social order that was compatible with their ways of life prior to migration. The negative attitude of the native Greeks towards the FSU Greeks may be partly understood as a spin-off from their disappointment at their inability to discipline them according to the dominant norms of conduct.

Native Greeks in Nikopoli categorized them as Russo-Pontics or Russians, labels which were rejected by the FSU Greeks. They suspected the local FSU Greek population of consisting in large measure of 'false Greeks'. Cultural difference was thought of as expressing the supposedly 'non-Greek consciousness' of FSU Greeks and was taken as proof of their lack of actual Greek descent. Native residents used the alleged false Greekness of FSU Greeks in Nikopoli to justify their negative attitudes about them, and adduced their perceived aggressive, associable behaviour as evidence of them not being Greeks. Simplistically, the dominant idea could be articulated as follows: they are not nice neighbours so they can't be Greek; they are not Greek and that's why they are not nice neighbours. The 'false Greeks' formed an imagined category that accommodated the negative attitudes of the natives about the local FSU Greeks without challenging either the official criteria of national belongingness or the dominant perceptions about the qualities of Greekness.

As Billig argues, imagining of the nation is part of a wider ideological, discursive consciousness that is banally inhabited but also shapes how people make sense and explain their world in their daily life. Excluding several FSU Greeks from the national community secured the idealized image of native Greeks about their national community. Yet, the exclusion of FSU Greeks was not only important for the self-image of the native residents. Their claimed collective charisma and their

ability to claim a dominant status depended on their monopolization of Greekness. Through a selective attribution of 'good characteristics' to 'true Greek' immigrants and bad characteristics to 'false Greeks', the evocation of the 'false Greek' category not only secured the ideologies of Greekness and native Greeks' collective charismatic beliefs but even helped reinforce them.

Notes

1. The fieldwork was conducted in two stretches in the period September 2007 to September 2009, when I lived in the neighbourhood. I collected the data primarily through participant observation in a variety of neighbourhood spaces and local institutions. In addition, I conducted informal interviews with approximately 50 residents and organized 10 focus groups. This methodology allowed me to compare opinions I recorded with practices I observed.
2. Despite the much more positive treatment of the FSU migration by the Greek state, state policies should not be overstressed. Rather, it should be noted that the inability of the state to carry out the promised measures effectively was a major reason of disillusionment on part of FSU Greeks.
3. Pontos derives from ÉfxinosPóntos, the (ancient) Greek name for the Black Sea. It denotes a geographical area across the eastern half of the southern coast regions of the Black Sea where Greek populations lived. The *Pontic Greeks* immigrated or were forced to leave the Pontic lands in successive waves from the mid-nineteenth century until the tragic events during and after World War I. At that time, the decimated Pontic people had to completely desert their ancestral homeland either fleeing to Russia or going to Greece as part of the forced population exchange between Greece and Turkey.
4. Typical Greek café where middle age and older mostly men visit.
5. This is a complex and rather flexible cultural concept denoting socially appropriate behaviour, self-restraint, and a willingness to subordinate selfish to collective interests (Triandis 1972).
6. Only a number of positions are reserved to foreign graduates of Greek descent, not only FSU Greek, and are given after written examinations in Greek language.

7. At the time of my research, FSU Greeks could not transfer their pension rights from the former Soviet Union. The elderly received a pension from the OGA, a public insurance company, which equals the minimum Greek pension.

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Humming Along: Public and Private Patriotism in Putin's Russia

J. Paul Goode

While nationalism in post-Soviet Russia receives a great deal of attention in its contentious and mobilizational forms, the ambiguities and ambivalence of Russian national identity since the collapse of the Soviet Union left it surprisingly under-studied from the standpoint of banal nationalism and everyday nationhood. The breakup of the USSR left Russia without empire for the first time in its history, while the dismantling of its Soviet-era trappings offered no clear national idea to replace it (Oushakine 2009; Tolz 2001). Emblematic of the vacuum left by the USSR's departure, Boris Yeltsin decreed the 'Patriotic Song' composed by the nineteenth-century composer Mikhail Glinka to be the national anthem for a new Russia. The anthem was a generically stately melody with no lyrics that satisfied nobody, though the writer Vladimir Voinovich considered the lack of words an appropriate expression for Russia's loss of national identity: 'what image can we have if

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we ourselves don't know who we are? We know what the Soviet Union was, and tsarist Russia also. But what is Russia today?' (Smith 2002, 183) By the mid-1990s, one of the co-authors of the Soviet national anthem, Sergei Mikhalkov, was tasked with choosing a new anthem from entries in a national contest as 'he could be trusted to recognize a suitable prayer for the nation' (Billig 1995, 86). However, no suitable choice was found and Yeltsin soon abandoned the effort. After Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency in 2000, Russia's parliament restored the Soviet-era music and adopted new words penned by none other than Mikhalkov (Kolstø 2006, 687). From the government's perspective, the point was not to have someone qualified to recognize a suitable prayer, but merely to have a recognizable prayer authored by someone suitable.

Russia's national anthem is an apt metaphor for the Kremlin's official patriotism: it is instantly recognizable, but nobody knows the words.[1] In his landmark study, Billig (1995) notes that the distinction between nationalism and patriotism is largely a matter of social categorization: though fundamentally similar phenomena, nationalism is generally seen as dangerous and extreme, while patriotism is beneficial, necessary, and quintessentially represents one's own nation.[2] While his study is directed at 'established' nations in the West, it is certainly true of today's Russia in which nationalism (*natsionalizm*) has become synonymous with extremism in ordinary parlance and in Russian law, while nationalist state policies—particularly the annexation of Crimea in 2014—are justified and celebrated in terms of patriotism (*patriotizm*). In this fashion, nationalism is stigmatized and bears an immensely negative connotation, such that ordinary Russians would consider calling the Kremlin nationalist to be nonsensical. By contrast, patriotism is unambiguously celebrated in the media and public politics (Gillespie 2005; Laruelle 2009a; Norris 2012). Russian President Vladimir Putin even declared that, 'We do not and cannot have any other unifying idea but patriotism' (Putin 2016). The Kremlin commands significant public support for its 'patriotic' stances in foreign policy and it has been successful in mobilizing that support (Alexseev and Hale 2016; Goode 2016a). While the fervour that accompanied Crimea's annexation dwindled in time, it is reinvigorated by episodes like the imposition of Western

sanctions in summer 2014, the killing of Russian pilots over Turkey in November 2015, and the banning of Russian athletes from the Rio Olympics in 2016.

Despite the state's efforts to *enhabituate* (Billig 1995, 42) the Russian public to patriotic consciousness, a public patriotic consensus masks a diversity of private understandings of patriotism and motherland that appear significantly at variance from official versions (Goode 2016b; Laruelle 2015; Le Huérou 2015). Indeed, only a quarter of Russians think schools need to produce patriots, while more than half favour preparing 'thinking people, capable of taking responsibility' (Analiticheskii Tsentr Iurii Levady 2014, 82). In short, Russians have their own notions of patriotism, motherland, and the nature of state–society relations, yet these everyday strains of patriotism do not percolate 'upwards' owing to an authoritarian political system that punishes dissent and encourages preference falsification. Rather than singing the national anthem with meaning or emotion, people simply hum along with the tune.

How is one to reconcile public mobilization in support for official patriotism and Putin's regime with these everyday differences in understandings about the meaning and role of patriotism in society? Billig's 'banal nationalism' approach is sometimes criticized for failing to capture this distinction, suggesting a categorical difference between 'banal' and 'hot' nationalisms (Skey 2009, 340–342) and neglecting the ways that 'cold' (or banal) nationality goes 'hot' (Culcasi 2016; Paasi 2016). In other words, it remains unclear how the production of 'groupness' (Brubaker 2004a) in daily life gets converted into political action or (equally important) inaction. Approaches focusing on 'everyday' ethnicity and nationhood seek to remedy this by drawing out the quotidian contexts that link to nationalist idioms and inform nationalist contention (Bonikowski 2016, 431–435; Brubaker et al. 2006; Jones and Merriman 2009). Nevertheless, one might criticize both 'banal' and 'everyday' approaches for failing to integrate the ways that nationalism is practised in public and in private, or to bridge the gap between self-identifications that are at variance with social categorizations (Antonsich 2016).

In this chapter, I seek to bridge between 'banal' and 'everyday' nationalism to account for the disconnect between public and private

patriotisms in Russia. Whereas the practices constitutive of individual identities are complex and multiple, social interaction simplifies them and replaces individualist or even oppositional orientations with collective and conformist repertoires. This analysis draws upon a combination of more than 60 in-depth interviews and four focus groups conducted in two Russian regions in 2014–2015 on the topic of patriotism. While individual interviews largely confirmed the findings of studies in other countries that many people (especially youth) are disinterested in, or even distrustful of, official nationalism (Brubaker et al. 2006; Fenton 2007; Fox 2004), the focus groups told rather different (if varied) stories involving the use of official patriotic scripts to shut down dissent or to resolve brewing conflicts over the principles of group membership. The resulting picture might be said to be less one of preference falsification than preference *compartmentalization*: individual and group identities are established simultaneously in relation to official patriotic tropes and idioms, but private patriotism is personal, apolitical, and lacking a competing political project. Consequently, one might privately feel (for instance) that politicians ruin patriotism while publicly embracing politicians' patriotic agendas.

These findings have important implications beyond the study of ethnicity and nationalism for understanding how authoritarianism succeeds in generating compliance and legitimacy. Much of the comparative literature on the 'new authoritarianism' focuses on a mix of elite competition and cohesiveness, material or status incentives, and coercion to explain the trajectories of authoritarian rule (Brancati 2014; Gandhi 2010; Hale 2014; Levitsky and Way 2010; Slater 2010). As authoritarian regimes proved increasingly durable in the post-Cold War era, scholars began to turn to ideational sources of power (like nationalism) and legitimation to account for regime dynamics and endurance (Jones 2015; Levitsky and Way 2012). With particular regard to Russia, Marlene Laruelle and others have written extensively on the convergence of regime, parties, and opposition on nationalist politics under the guise of patriotism (Iudina et al. 2012; Kolstø 2016; Laruelle 2009b, 2014; Popescu 2012). When nationalism becomes state policy, autocrats claim legitimacy by regulating the content, directionality, and participation of subordinates and opposition in nationalist politics

(Goode 2012). Yet, a crucial factor missing from such explanations is the people as the ultimate source of legitimacy.

While it is commonly observed that the Russian public is politically apathetic, there is little understanding of how Russians are complicit in the cultivation of regime legitimacy. As Connor (2002, 38–41) notes, there are a variety of reasons that citizens may accept or tolerate illegitimate regimes, arising from fear, habit, apathy, political and cultural isolation, and disorganization. Wedeen's (1999) study of Syria suggests that the guise of legitimacy masks a 'habitual obedience' enforced through popular participation in the regime's symbolic displays of power. When examining closely the ways that ordinary Russians explain and illustrate their understandings of patriotism and what it means 'to be a patriot', one similarly finds a curious mix of individualism and conformity. Most believe the government, media, and education system are effective in producing genuine patriotic sentiment, yet few believe patriotic duties as claimed by the state are ever fulfilled. At the same time that individuals suggest that they are outside of the influence of the state's patriotic propaganda, they are convinced that the vast majority of their fellow citizens are solidly patriotic. Having situated themselves as relatively isolated or marginalized in relation to fellow citizens, Russians privately embrace an individualist, localized, and apolitical patriotism that takes shape through daily practices related to loving the motherland, daily life, and sacrificing public choice. In social contexts, however, they readily approve of the state's patriotic repertoires. The result is the cultivation of a public veneer of regime legitimacy at the same time that individuals privately dissociate from the regime.

A Note on Method

The observations in this paper are drawn from over 60 in-depth interviews and focus groups conducted in Tiumen and Perm in 2014–2015.[3] The distribution of respondents by age group and occupation is depicted in Table 1.[4] Selection of respondents for the initial round of interviews followed 'snowball sampling', making use of initial contacts to reach wider circles of respondents with varied political views and

Table 1 Interview respondents

	Arts	Business	Education	Media	Non-profit	Politics	State employee	Student	Unemployed	Total
18–22	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	0	6
23–29	0	6	10	0	0	3	0	0	0	19
30–39	0	3	5	1	1	4	3	0	1	18
40–49	1	1	2	0	1	2	1	0	1	9
50–59	0	0	4	1	2	0	5	0	0	12
60+	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Total	2	11	23	2	5	10	9	3	2	67

socioeconomic backgrounds. After the first few interviews, however, respondents were less likely to be socially connected.

I was especially interested in the logics that Russian citizens use to account for patriotic practices—in other words, what citizens *do* with regime narratives and how they convert elements of regime narratives into meaningful aspects of daily life. This includes making room for off-script forms of patriotic practice that do not correspond to regime narratives but emerge from ordinary experiences. All interviews were conducted in Russian by myself with an assistant present, recorded on my phone using an external microphone with respondents' consent, and conducted in public locations (most often a coffee shop or park) unless the respondent requested an alternative locale. The interviews were transcribed for analysis using process coding (Saldana 2009, 77–81) in Nvivo to generate an initial list of patriotic practices. By 'practices', I mean the regularized, daily, practical acts that citizens undertake in the context of durable social dispositions or what Bourdieu refers to as habitus (Bourdieu 1990). While states proffer their own versions of patriotism and patriotic identification, recirculated through institutions like education and mass media, what citizens actually *do* with these official narratives in their daily lives is quite a different matter (de Certeau 1984; Palmer 1998). Some of the most frequently referenced practices are described in Table 2. I further used a series of focus groups conducted by local moderators as a way to verify whether the patriotic repertoires discussed in interviews would matter in a group setting.[5] The focus groups thus provided a useful means of recording patriotic associations and representations as well as observing points of contention.

In the following sections, I discuss briefly the official patriotic narratives promoted by the Russian state, after which I turn to observations from interviews and focus groups to understand how 'activated' and 'performed' patriotism is perceived individually and how it is invoked in social interaction. The chapter then approaches the 'everyday' understandings of patriotism. While Russians commonly define patriotism as 'loving the motherland', the ways one loves the motherland (and even what counts as the motherland) are idiosyncratic and apolitical. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of these simultaneously existing 'everyday' and official patriotisms for understanding Russian citizens' political subjectivity.

Table 2 Varieties of top-down and bottom-up patriotic practices

Bottom-up/everyday		Top-down/official	
Loving	Showing or claiming an emotional tie to the motherland	Activating	Mobilization by government, institutions, media, etc.
Living	Cleanliness, orderliness, appropriateness in daily life	Performing	Emulation or execution of state or cultural repertoires
Improving	Making one's surroundings better	Opposing	Defining identities and interests in terms of opposition to states, peoples
Choosing	Opting to stay in Russia for life or for travel	Defending	Military service, standing up to enemies
Comparing	Linking Russia to other countries, time periods	Organizing	Mobilization of citizens or youth for civic purpose
Nostalgizing	Linking the present to an idealized vision of the past	Symbolizing	Representing moments or objects of state, historical, cultural significance
Consuming	Buying or eating local products or brands		

Official Patriotism in Russia

The Kremlin's patriotic narratives concentrate on appreciation for Russia's enduring state history, spanning the Tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet eras. From the start of the Putin era, it placed particular emphasis on patriotic education programmes, memorials, and public remembrances of the Great Patriotic War and especially Victory Day (Sperling 2003, 2009).

In relation to domestic politics, official narratives characterize 'non-systemic' political opposition as attempting to organize a *Maidan* (in reference to the mass protests in Ukraine of 2004 and 2013–2014) in Russia, or alternatively of simply being a vocal, aggrieved minority of Western-sponsored malcontents, 'foreign agents', or 'fifth column'. With regard to foreign policy, patriotism for many is linked to

supporting the Kremlin as a bulwark against Western influence and meddling.

The state's expectations for ordinary citizens in accordance with its patriotic narratives may be found in the State Program for Patriotic Education (SPPE), which began in 2001 and has been renewed every five years since. According to the draft of the 2016 programme, patriotism is 'the foundational orientation of citizens' social behaviour, expressing a higher purpose in life and individuals' activities, showing duty and responsibility before society, forming an understanding of the priority of societal interests above individuals and self-sacrifice, [and] disregarding danger to one's life and health in the defense of the Fatherland's interests' (Gosudarstvennaia programma 2014).

Taken as a whole, official patriotism synthesizes the importance of service sacrifice for the state, particularly through military service and war; the unexceptional normality of the state and the current regime as inscribed in, and exemplifying, an unbroken arc of Russian statehood; the exceptionality of Russian culture and traditions, and the related importance of resisting alien (not exclusively foreign) influences to safeguard state and society; and increasingly the substitutability of Russian (*Rossiiskii*) citizenship with Russian (*russkii*) ethnicity (Teper 2016). The Kremlin's push to make patriotism an essential part of education, media, and politics represents a conscious effort to produce the nation in a way that resembles 'banal nationalism'. The crucial question is whether it succeeds in producing an unacknowledged and pervasive consensus about Russian national identity in relation to state and regime.

Banal or Activated Patriotism?

If 'banal nationalism' as a concept involves the extent to which individuals are unaware of the constant flagging of the nation in their daily lives and routines, my interviews in Russia suggest that the Kremlin may have achieved the opposite. Respondents viewed the state's patriotic practices as relatively obvious, artificially imposed, and lacking a

genuine affective tie. All interview respondents saw patriotism as 'activated', most often attributed to the government, the media, or education. Most believed government, media, and education were (or could be) effective in producing a uniformly patriotic view among Russians as a whole. For some, this was seen as natural and expected: the government or schools are supposed (to try) to produce patriots.

> I think the government's use of patriotism is positive. Again, this is because, I hope, that eventually through this patriotism society will come to love its place of residence – that is, not just self-sacrifice, but not littering on the street. Of course, I don't exclude that the government uses it for its own interests, but this is completely normal.[6]

For others, this 'activated patriotism' was expected but unsuccessfully executed by the state owing to a lack of funding, rampant corruption, or ordinary incompetence. Still others complained about official patriotism as artificially manipulating people:

> [Love] should come from the individual. That is, if they tell you from above, "yes, we should love the motherland," it's not faithful. Cultivating love for the motherland should come through understanding of that motherland, study of the motherland…[7]

Some respondents were more specific in connecting government and media with the effective and instrumental manipulation of patriotic messages to deflect opinion about the regime or domestic policies. But on the whole, respondents viewed the government's attempts to promote patriotism as obvious and heavy-handed.

Most striking was that respondents characterized the activation of patriotic sentiment as something that happens to *other* people, reminiscent of the 'third person effect' observed in communications studies (Davison 1983). In other words, few respondents were willing to claim to have been affected by the activation of patriotic sentiment, contrasting themselves with an imagined patriotic majority or, conversely, suggesting that the majority of people are engaged in public dissimulation:

> Putin's rating is about 90%, if you believe the surveys. Not even a rating but level of support for his actions. It's these people that drink in propaganda. I know people that never used to watch television, thinking that they were being deceived. But now they watch and believe that everything said is true.[8]

> I understood what the government could demand of me and that, at least, I'm not prepared to sacrifice my own interests and priorities. …Yes, I work in a government structure, so maybe that sounds peculiar. But I assure you, that the majority are like that. [*laughs*][9]

In this fashion, respondents conveyed the impression that they were isolated by the mass activation of patriotic sentiment. Hence, they privately distanced themselves from official patriotism and its presumed patriotic majority.

When it came to focus groups, however, most participants embraced official patriotic scripts. The initial associations of the present day with 'love for the motherland' suggested by each occupational group were telling: for the entrepreneurs, the first associations were the Russian flag, the ribbon of St. George, the Great Patriotic War (the Second World War), the Sochi Olympics, and Crimea; for state employees, the first associations were with domestic tourism, not going abroad, t-shirts with images of Putin, the 'polite people',[10] pro-government youth camps, and the pro-Kremlin youth organization Nashi; for pensioners, the first associations were with humanitarian aid (to eastern Ukraine), people choosing not to leave Russia, nature, and National Unity Day; and students' first patriotic associations with the present day were school courses on patriotism, Orthodoxy, patriotic competitions in school, language tests, the national anthem, and Putin and Medvedev.

Two instances which provoked some dissent in the course of making these associations warrant closer inspection. Among the state employees, an objection arose following the suggestion of t-shirts with Putin's image:

Participant A: T-shirts with Putin, t-shirts with polite people, movement 'Seliger', movement 'Nashi'.

Moderator: Ok.

Participant B: That's just for some people, not for everybody.
Participant C: It seems to me…we're supposed to choose some kind of object that many associate with patriotism, but *we can't choose such an object because patriotism and material objects are different things*. For instance, I love my house slippers.
Moderator: Ok, then we'll write down your house slippers…
Participant D: Personally, I am bothered by t-shirts with "I'm gay, and what of it?" It is a call to indifference and at the same time anti-patriotism.

In this exchange, two participants resisted the suggestion of specifically pro-Kremlin symbols, expressing an individualist and apolitical sense of patriotism. Another participant immediately used the opportunity to lodge a homophobic complaint, implicitly suggesting that there are boundaries to what legitimately counts as 'patriotic'—in effect, invoking the state's support for their personal prejudices. This shut down the debate and the exchange was followed by uncontroversial associations like fashion in Russian colours and style, folk crafts, and sports victories.

In the second instance, the suggestion of Orthodoxy as patriotic provoked significant discussion in the student group. Initially, a number of students objected on constitutional grounds that Russia is a secular state. The conversation quickly turned to the media's portrayal of Putin's relationship to the Orthodox church:

Participant A: But again we watch television, especially the news, where they show the president. He appears often enough…precisely at those events at the Russian Orthodox church.
Participant B: Well if he practices that faith…
Participant C: It seems to me, it's no secret, that the president has very good relations with the patriarch. You could call him his right hand. That's why.
Participant D: You can pray for your sins without leaving home.
Participant A: But his personal affairs are shown on all channels.

Participant E: But they show it because people want it.
Participant F: They show the patriarch in the first instance, not the president.
Participant E: It's all very simple: the program is PR. If he does something, it is positive.
Participant G: The president is a guarantor of the Constitution, as head of state. If he commits any kind of religious act, it is a sign of government support in the first instance.
Participant B: And why not? If he…
Participant C: I don't agree. I can do that, right? Maybe he goes [to church] not as president, but as a person.
Participant E: But if he drinks beer on camera, it's not an act of propaganda in support of drinking alcohol.
Participant G: It's an act of him trying to be closer to the nation.
Participant E: He is trying to be closer to the Orthodox nation.
Participant H: Well to me, just now G said that it's done to be closer to the nation, but it is the ordinary person [*obyvatel'*] that makes Putin closer to the nation. But for those who are more attuned to such matters, it is PR. Because a person will see it and it raises Putin's rating.

Significant in this exchange was the subtle, yet unquestioned fashion in which the argument over whether Putin supports Orthodoxy concealed a shared understanding that public patriotism is determined politically by association with Putin. The notion that ordinary people are unquestioning patriots also went unchallenged even as students set themselves apart. As the discussion reached an impasse, the group set the matter aside and returned to official patriotic repertoires: patriotic poetry in school competitions, the national anthem, Putin, and Crimea.

The focus groups demonstrate the gulf between public and private patriotisms in Russia. In private, participants emphasized the artificiality of the state's patriotic propaganda and claimed they were unaffected in contrast to the majority of Russians. In public, however, they gravitated towards those same official patriotic repertoires that they privately characterized as inauthentic. The focus groups also suggest the kinds of political dynamics that sustain the distinction between public and

private: the shared understanding that patriotism is activated and politically directed; the willingness to invoke the state's authority to claim one's preferences as patriotic; and the public acceptance of official patriotic repertoires for restoring order following conflicts.

Private Patriotism in Russia

If the discussion to this point emphasized the gap between privately individualist and apolitical notions of patriotism in opposition to official and publicly pro-government displays, it remains a question as to how citizens reconcile the simultaneous exercise of both types of practices. Digging deeper into interview responses, one discovers a sense of patriotism that is private and practical, though ultimately resigned to the gap between state and society.

When asked to define patriotism, virtually every respondent answered the same way: to love the motherland (*liubov' k rodine*). This is largely consistent with Levada Center (2014, p. 35) survey results but also opaque in meaning. As one respondent put it, 'you don't even have to think about it before you say it'.[11] This almost mechanical answer suggests a banal form of nationalism but actually conceals a range of private orientations. Respondents struggled when pressed to explain *how* one should love the motherland, or even to describe it.

Insofar as patriotism involves loving the motherland, its authenticity or sincerity is determined by way of emotional connection. Yet, it is also established through acceptance—that is, loving the motherland 'as is', rather than in accordance with some sort of ideal:

> Traditionally, patriotism is love for one's fatherland (*sic*). If you ask, "why do you love your mama?" or "why do you love your daughter?" I cannot answer. I'll say, "Because she is [my] mama," or "because she is [my] daughter." You ask me, "why do you love your motherland?" I'll also say, because it is [my] motherland.[12]

In this fashion, the imperative to love the motherland takes priority over judgements of regime and leadership: loving the motherland does not require one to love the state or regime.

Moreover, accepting the motherland does not even mean that it needs well-defined or stable borders:

> For the older generation the motherland, more than likely, is connected with the USSR. Right now a new understanding is spreading. Thus the motherland is the Russian Federation plus Crimea, plus something else, maybe some part of Ukraine…[13]

Rather, changes in state borders associated with the motherland are to be accepted and loved with equanimity (though expanding the motherland's borders appears preferable over their contraction). This approach to loving the motherland is at once personal and apolitical, similar to other objects of love that are impervious to individual agency such as culture, history, and Russia's government. The absence of choice combined with emotional content means that loving the motherland sometimes feels to Russians like a dysfunctional relationship. As one respondent put it, 'that's what patriotism is: love for the motherland. Though it would be nice if it were mutual'.[14]

For most respondents, everyday patriotism finds expression through the ways people live their daily lives, raise their children, do their jobs, and even through the simple fact of survival.

> For me, as a simple citizen, I think that my patriotism is shown in the fact that I work here, I spend my money here, I raise my child here and plan my future here, because I don't want to go anywhere else. It's my home.[15]

For some, simple survival or day-to-day existence was not enough. Instead, they associated patriotism literally and metaphorically with cleanliness. Littering in this sense is emblematic of hypocrisy, in that one cannot legitimately claim to be patriotic if you are noisy or throw trash on the street:

> Of course, it in no way means that I should watch Channel One and in listen in awe to the president's address because it's the President of Russia and he will tell me what I should do. [Patriotism] is when I don't throw trash out the window, but when I carry it to the designated place for it. Or when I tell my child about his relatives, it means…our city has some

> meaning for Russia, how her great grandfather fought or other kinds of things that are completely unrelated to government policy.[16]

The juxtaposition of shouting or yelling and littering with being a patriot is a pointed (if implied) contrast with 'patriotism for show', especially in relation to official patriotic displays (parades or street celebrations) involving lots of noise and litter.

Understood in this fashion, patriotism can be a form of dissent that individuals exercise through private (rather than social) approbation. In evaluations of politics, respondents characterized this approbation through a simple test of whether one has done anything to *improve* the motherland:

> There are two aspects. First, it's one's profession: doctors are supposed to heal, politicians should make laws that are comfortable for the people. Second, insofar as they were chosen by the people, they should feel grateful to the people for their election and they should somehow meet their expectations. Theoretically, a person goes into government not because he wants power but because he wants to help people. He goes into government to improve the life of the people.[17]

Hence, patriotism is realized through living clean, doing one's job, staying quiet, and improving one's surroundings. In this important sense, everyday patriotism dovetails with a withdrawal from active participation in public politics, perhaps explaining in part the often-observed apolitical tendencies of Russian citizens.

To the extent that this form of everyday patriotism serves as a basis for evaluating the work of politicians, it cannot escape notice that this collection of personal qualities is most often embodied by Vladimir Putin in the popular imagination (Cassiday and Johnson 2010). Authentic patriotism, like Putin, is above politics. In practical terms, of course, this puts every other politician in the country in an impossible position: they are expected to display their patriotic credentials to show their loyalty to the regime and provincial officials tasked with implementing patriotic projects are evaluated on such criteria as mass

turnouts for parades. At the same time, this bureaucratized and heavy-handed 'patriotism for show' drives a wedge further between citizens' private sense of patriotism and public displays.

There has been little discussion of agency in relation to patriotism to this point, though opportunities for agency do emerge in pointed contrast to the kinds of public displays associated with 'activated patriotism'. In particular, respondents characterized patriotism in terms of making hard choices rather than visible displays of support for the government:

> See, if a person has gangrene, then you have to cut off the limb. You can't put it off. That's how it is in Russia. You have to resolve the problem. It will be painful, but you have to do it.[18]

In most cases, making the hard decision means simply choosing not to leave Russia when one has the means and opportunity to do so, or simply not wanting to leave but to continue living in Russia.

> I had the chance to live outside Russia. I can live in the US, [but] I chose to live in this country. That is, I live here not because that's how it is, but because I chose to do so. …the majority of people live in this country not because they chose it, but because they live here and they don't have a choice. They lost their point of reference for what to love here.[19]

In terms of choice, then, authentic patriotism is expressed privately by making tough or possibly even irrational decisions. In political terms, to adopt unpopular but needed reforms could be considered patriotic, though respondents often opposed politics to patriotism. Choosing to work or provide public goods in the absence of worthy pay is patriotic but not if one seeks recognition. And, ultimately, choosing to stay in Russia when one has the means to leave is patriotic. It bears observing that the latter two aspects of choosing are not really about choice or action, at all, so much as they are about private acceptance and rationalization. In essence, when the time comes to make a hard choice, the patriotic 'choice' is the private decision not to choose.

Conclusion: Humming Along, for Now

When it comes to the Kremlin's brand of patriotism, it becomes clear that (figuratively speaking) most Russians are simply humming along. In interviews, respondents associated 'activated patriotism' or 'patriotism for show' with inauthenticity. They tended to view these inauthentic practices as privately unconvincing and yet seemingly effective in manipulating most other people. Invoking patriotism for political gain or profit was often linked to ritualized support of the regime. In focus groups, however, the discussion and representation of public patriotic performances shifted from inauthentic to authentic with only occasional dissent. This contrast between interviews and focus groups suggests that Russians are disdainful of (or just immune to) officially sponsored patriotism in private while openly supportive in social settings.

The fact that focus group discussions gravitated towards official practices that interview respondents privately judged to be inauthentic tells us something about the extent to which regime type and especially authoritarianism plays a significant role in mediating between public and private identities. With few exceptions, the literatures on banal nationalism and everyday nationhood tend to neglect the effect of regime type or treat regime dynamics as a background condition. In studies of ethnic politics, political instability or regime transition directly influences the forms of contestation, conflict, and violence (Kaufman 2001; Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2004; Wimmer 2002). For Brubaker et al. (2006), however, everyday ethnicity manifests in pointed contrast to nationalist regime politics. Further, most studies in the 'banal nationalism' tradition tend to involve either democratic cases or micro-political settings like the family.

In today's Russia, private patriotic practices relating specifically to regime support are conspicuous by their absence in ways reminiscent of the Soviet era (Vujačić 2015). An ambivalence towards regime also coincides with the delegation of freedoms and sovereignty to the Russian presidency, which was originally conceived as being 'above politics' (Huskey 1999; Yeltsin 1994). Once again, the contrast between interviews and focus groups serves to illustrate this dynamic: whereas not a

single interview respondent named Putin as patriotic, he was mentioned in every focus group (though in two cases, accompanied by knowing laughter). Patriotism for Russians is about accepting the motherland as it is, accepting Russia's history as normal, and accepting a limited scope of agency in authoritarian Russia.

The distinction between public and private patriotic practices is replicated in the subtle differences in usage between 'patriotism' and 'being a patriot' in conversational speech. The practices related to 'patriotism' tend to be individual, local, and normative. Respondents talked about 'my sense of patriotism' as an ideal, though not necessarily as something shared by all Russians. They associated patriotism in their daily lives with living clean, raising one's children properly, not making trouble for others, doing one's job, and improving one's surroundings. For the most part, these practices are not 'activated' and instead tend to be reproduced through family circles and friendship. By contrast, 'being a patriot' is public and political, denoting both loyalty and collective membership. 'Being a patriot' is not self-defined in the same way as patriotism because it involves the subordination of one's own opinions and preferences to that of the collective. Rather, the default understanding of 'being a patriot' signifies loyalty and membership in accordance with official patriotic scripts and repertoires. In other words, 'patriotism' entails self-identification, while 'being a patriot' involves social categorization.

The distinction between 'being a patriot' and 'patriotism' bears some similarity to preference falsification, suggesting not merely that patriotism masks a privately held sense of the regime's illegitimacy but that a breakthrough moment could provoke a popular political response and cascade into regime change (Hale 2013; Kuran 1991). The crucial difference, here, is that the privately held sense of patriotism is deeply personal and apolitical. Not only does it lack an alternative political project for mobilization, it views politics as generally opposed to patriotism. Consequently, it might be more accurate to call this public/private distinction a form of preference *compartmentalization*—or a way of managing the cognitive contradiction of simultaneously being a patriot despite one's own suspicion of patriotism—rather than falsification. In other words, official and everyday patriotisms co-occur, with the essential discontinuity provided by social context.

It is not that official patriotism in Russia succeeds in producing banality (much less regime legitimacy) so much as it produces and regulates public displays of regime loyalty, even when individual displays appear to others to be conspicuously ritualized or inauthentic. In this regard, it bears a striking resemblance to autocratic states in the Middle East and Central Asia (Adams 2010; Wedeen 1999). The resulting perception among individuals is that society is comprised of loyal, activated patriots—a perception reinforced by the narrowing of public space for the airing of dissent. Yet, when placed in a social context, inauthentic official practices are rendered authentic and sometimes even invested with meaning derived from everyday practices. To a certain extent, public displays still afford opportunities to appropriate and challenge official practices or performances in ways reminiscent of Scott's (1990) 'hidden transcripts' and everyday acts of resistance, though such opportunities are diminishing: soon it may no longer be sufficient to hum along with the national anthem, as new legislation threatens citizens with up to a year in prison for getting the words wrong (Gromov 2016).

Notes

1. Fifteen years after its adoption, well less than half of Russians know the anthem's lyrics. 'Opros: gimn Rossii znaiut tol'ko 43% rossian' [Survey: only 43% of Russians know the national anthem], Gazeta.ru, August 20, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pj4TaVw46V8 (October 9, 2016).
2. This stands in contrast to (mainly quantitative) studies that treat nationalism and patriotism as related but fundamentally different socio-political phenomena. For instance, see: Brubaker (2004b), Druckman (1994), Huddy and Khatib (2007), Kemmelmeier and Winter (2008), Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), Mummendey et al. (2001), and Skitka (2005).
3. Funding for this research was provided by a Fulbright research grant. I am grateful to Ekaterina Semushkina (Tiumen') and Valeriia Umanets (Perm') for invaluable research assistance, and to Dr. Oleg V. Lysenko and his team at Perm State Pedagogical University for organizing and

conducting the focus groups. All errors and omissions are my own responsibility.

4. The gender distribution of respondents was 64% male, 36% female.
5. On combining interviews with focus groups in this fashion, see Goode and Stroup (2015, p. 14–15). It might be objected that focus groups are an artificial social context. However, even observing 'natural' social interaction is never really natural because the observer's observations are never independent of the context. In this sense, the nature of context is less a matter of observing daily routines and more a matter of the ways that social identities organize interaction concerning daily practices.
6. Respondent 173010, Tiumen, August 8, 2014.
7. Respondent 122134, Perm, November 24, 2015.
8. Respondent 154510, Tiumen, August 7, 2015.
9. Respondent 182619, Perm, November 19, 2015.
10. This was a common reference to the anonymous Russian soldiers who occupied Crimea prior to its annexation without identifying insignia. They have since become iconic in Russian popular culture.
11. Respondent 112556, Tiumen, August 12, 2014.
12. Respondent 110231, Perm, December 3, 2015.
13. Respondent 175248, Tiumen, August 13, 2014.
14. Respondent 175747, Perm, November 27, 2015.
15. Respondent 145822, Tiumen, August 15, 2014.
16. Respondent 121427, Perm, December 4, 2015.
17. Respondent 112556, Tiumen, August 12, 2014.
18. Respondent 133514, Tiumen, August 6, 2014.
19. Respondent 160136, Perm, November 26, 2015.

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Nationhood as Cultural Repertoire: Collective Identities and Political Attitudes in France and Germany

Bart Bonikowski

For decades, nationalism research had been dominated by historical approaches that viewed the nation state as the product of economic and political forces channelled by elite actors. Once institutionalized, nationalism was seen as a *fait accompli*, except in unstable states, where fringe radicals and separatists occasionally disrupted the national equilibrium. This scholarly consensus was challenged by the publication of Michael Billig's (1995) seminal book on banal nationalism, which persuasively argued that the reproduction of the nation's hegemony is a continuous accomplishment, even in established nation states. Alongside emerging Bourdieusian approaches to nationalism (e.g. Brubaker 1992), Billig's thesis helped shift the focus of research from elite-driven politics to bottom-up identification processes, thereby motivating scholars to ask when and why people think, talk and act with the nation in their everyday lives.

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The bottom-up orientation of the new nationalism research has been particularly sensitive to the contextual salience of national identification in everyday situations (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). While sociologists have also been concerned with variations in the meanings commonly attached to the nation, they have been sceptical of reductive generalizations that ascribe homogeneous identities to entire national communities. The reluctance towards essentialization stems in part from a reaction against the functionalist perspective that had all-too-often mistaken dominant nationalist narratives for lived reality. Rather than assuming that nations possess core values shared by most citizens, contemporary studies of nationalism have come to see the nation's meaning as constructed and fragmented (Bonikowski 2016; Brubaker 2004; Skey 2011).

The rejection of reductive understandings of national identity poses particular problems for comparative research. Functionalist models had provided simple comparative rubrics that distinguished between alternative models of nationalism and unproblematically assigned countries to the resulting categories. The most dominant of such schemes was the ethnic–civic typology popularized by Hans Kohn (1944), which depicted Western nations as political communities based on elective criteria of membership and Eastern nations as cultural communities where ethnicity defined national belonging. This simplistic depiction of national cultures has since been widely discredited as normatively and analytically problematic and empirically inaccurate (Brubaker 2004; Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002). While these critiques have been persuasive, their unintended consequence has been the abandonment of country-level comparisons. This has weakened the analytical power of nationalism research, as most analyses have descended to the individual level, focusing on attitudinal variation without much interest in overarching macro-level patterns of difference.

The ability to carry out systematic comparative research is of central importance to the study of banal and everyday nationalism. The key thesis of banal nationalism is that the cultural and institutional dominance of the nation is reproduced through the same cognitive and symbolic processes regardless of national context. Research on everyday nationalism accepts that claim, but further suggests that these

universal processes result in heterogeneous cognitive representations of the nation across (and possibly within) countries. While the hegemony of nationalism in contemporary society is widely recognized, how people understand their nations and how they deploy those understandings in practice require careful empirical study. Given the tension between the universality of the national idea and the specificity of its cultural manifestations, such research must attend to both within- and between-country differences, which requires a comparative research design.

I suggest a middle ground solution to the problem of comparison in nationalism studies. Consistent with much contemporary research in this field, I reject the notion of coherent national cultures and absolute between-country differences, instead viewing national identities as multifaceted, heterogeneous and contested. At the same time, however, I propose a systematic way to study patterns of variation within and across countries by drawing on past research on national cultural repertoires (Lamont and Thévenot 2000) and multiple traditions of nationalism (Smith 1997). Using survey data from two exemplary cases in nationalism research—France and Germany—I demonstrate that aggregate country differences on a range of nationalism variables mask the existence of four distinct dispositions towards the nation within each country, which I call liberal, disengaged, restrictive and ardent (cf. Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). With some notable differences, these repertoires of nationhood share a common cultural logic across the two countries. I further show that the manner in which respondents in both France and Germany understand their nations is associated with their views on immigration, economic protectionism and European integration, as well as their support for radical right parties.

While this chapter relies on quantitative methods that have not been widely used in the study of nationalism (but see Bonikowski 2013; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016), its contribution is not solely methodological. The analytical approach taken here has broader theoretical implications for how nationalism scholars should think about cultural similarity and difference. My findings suggest that not only is the idea of the nation state deeply institutionalized across countries, as argued by banal nationalism research, but also that the repertoires of meanings attributed to the nation may themselves be uniform across otherwise

distinct political cultures. By mapping these beliefs both within and across countries, the chapter furthers the objective of everyday nationalism research to attend to micro-level meanings, while taking advantage of the ability of survey analysis to make distributional claims about popular attitudes.

Varieties of Nationalism in Comparative Research

The traditional comparative approach to nationalism research was primarily interested in the identification of nations' core values, which were thought to be widely shared within national communities, endowing their members with a sense of collective distinctiveness and common solidarity. In this vein, scholars of the US placed at the core of the nation's political culture the key tenets of the American Creed, such as individualism, liberty and scepticism of political authority (Hartz 1955; Lipset 1990; de Tocqueville 1969 [1835]). Sincere belief in these principles was seen as the main prerequisite for membership in the nation, far outweighing any ascriptive criteria, like native-born status and ancestry. While the specific mix of national values was uniquely American, the idea that the nation is primarily a political community was seen as typical of a civic variety of nationalism, which scholars identified with English-speaking settler societies and the oldest of Europe's modern nation states, where the state came to exist first and the nation followed (Kohn 1944). Among the latter, France was a frequent exemplar: a nation based not on ancestral lineage but on a common belief in republican values, which placed active participation in the political sphere at the core of its members' citizenship duties (Brubaker 1992).

Against the example of French republicanism, scholars often placed the German *Kulturnation* (Meinecke 1970 [1907]), where common descent and shared traditions served as the primary bases for national belonging. This ethnocultural form of nationalism was theorized and advocated by von Herder (2002 [1792]) and came to occupy a central role in Kohn's (1944) ethnic–civic binary typology, according to which

Germany was an example of a broader, non-Western nationalist tradition. The ethnic–civic dichotomy animated nationalism research for many years, as did the broader scholarly tradition of distilling essential properties of national political cultures (Schulman 2002; Smith 1997).

Over time, however, this approach became increasingly unpopular, not least because of the contradictions observable in seemingly exemplary cases. The US, an ostensible paragon of civic nationalism, had a long history of racial domination from slavery to legally sanctioned segregation to contemporary discrimination and systemic racism (Smith 1997). France was a nation of civic republicanism, but also of Vichy-era persecution of Jews and other ethnic and cultural minorities and of contemporary anti-Muslim sentiments (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014; Marrus and Paxton 1981). Germany had a long and tragic history of ethnoracial violence, but it reckoned with its Nazi past after the Second World War and opened its door to migrants from Eastern Europe and Turkey in more recent decades (Joppke 2007). Such examples led Brubaker (2004) to declare that when taken seriously, the ethnic–civic categories constitute 'empty sets' (p. 137). While the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism may retain some utility for describing individual-level attitudes, its empirical validity for characterizing entire nations or geographic regions has been further challenged by survey research (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002).

The decline of the ethnic–civic typology has been further aided by a general distrust towards essentialist cultural claims. The overarching project of identifying core principles of national political cultures came to be seen as an uncritical perpetuation of myths that were themselves the product of nationalist ideology (Brubaker 2004). The result has been a movement away from cross-national comparisons and towards individual-level analyses, which privilege lived experience, the situational contextuality of identification processes and unpatterned variation (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). This tendency has been no less pronounced in survey-based research than in qualitative work. While interview-based studies seek to uncover the mechanisms of nationalism-in-practice (e.g. Miller-Idriss 2009), survey analyses tend to focus on specific nationalism variables, which are abstracted from individual

respondents and correlated with a range of outcomes of interest (e.g. Schatz et al. 1999).

Among the many strengths of these approaches has been their commitment to rigorous empirical analysis, their ability to demonstrate nationalism's importance (and lack thereof) in everyday interactions and their attention to the implications of nationalist beliefs for other domains of social life. These advances, however, have come at the cost of a reduced ability to carry out meaningful cross-national research.

Cultural Repertoires: An Alternative Comparative Framework

If we accept that nationalism in everyday practice is more heterogeneous and messier than classic accounts of uniform national identities had assumed, how might we conceive of macro-level comparisons in a way that attends to this underlying cultural complexity? Comparisons of average responses to attitudinal surveys are overly reductive, while inferences about popular beliefs from public narratives risk reproducing dominant nationalist ideologies. An alternative solution is suggested by comparative research in cultural sociology. Instead of essentializing cultural differences to the national level, scholars can look for heterogeneous cultural repertoires within countries and ask whether those repertoires resemble what is observed in other national contexts (Lamont and Thévenot 2000). Researchers have demonstrated, for instance, that in producing moral evaluations of social groups, American and French respondents have access to similar discursive options, relying either on a market-based logic or that of civic solidarity (Lamont 2000). What differs across the countries is the relative prevalence of these evaluative frames. Similarly, Ferree (2003) shows that what distinguishes abortion discourse in the US and Germany is not the content of the arguments but rather the relative prominence of competing narratives in the public sphere: what is mainstream in the US is radical in Germany and vice versa.

This suggests an approach to nationalism that identifies multiple patterns of beliefs within countries and then compares their content

and relative prevalence across countries. Indeed, there is precedent for this type of analytical strategy. Though it does not engage in comparison and emphasizes legal decisions instead of popular attitudes, Rogers Smith's historical research (1997) disaggregates US nationalism into three distinct traditions (liberal, civic republican and ethnocultural) that have competed with one another throughout the country's history. The struggles and occasional compromises between elites espousing these ideologies have produced a complex and contradictory collection of immigration laws that combine elements from each of the three traditions.

While revealing different belief structures than those identified by Smith (1997), my past work has shown that the multiple traditions approach can be adapted to the analysis of survey data in order to identify subnational communities of thought that conceptualize the nation in distinct ways (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). Americans combine beliefs about the nation's symbolic boundaries, feelings of pride in the nation and the state and attitudes towards other countries in patterned ways that reveal four underlying cultural schemas (I refer to these as disengaged, creedal or liberal nationalist, restrictive nationalist and ardent nationalist). In the present chapter, I employ a similar strategy to examine popular nationalism in France and Germany, the two countries long held up as exemplars of civic and ethnic nationalism, respectively. I demonstrate that, much like in the US case, each national sample contains four distinct orientations towards the nation, which are similar in overall structure across the countries. Moreover, espousal of these nationalist beliefs is associated with important political attitudes—in this case, those related to support for radical-right parties. These findings suggest that meaningful, bottom-up and person-centred cross-national comparisons are possible, but they require a shift away from standard variable-based methods of survey analysis. While broadly consistent with the theoretical orientation of qualitative studies on everyday nationalism, the survey-based approach proposed here makes it possible to inductively identify patterns of beliefs based on nationally representative samples, to systematically measure their prevalence across groups and to examine their associations with other social and political attitudes.

Data and Methods

To examine the variation in popular understandings of the nation in France and Germany, I rely on data from the National Identity III Supplement to the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The ISSP is a cross-national survey based on representative samples from over 30 countries, which has been administered annually since 1985. The national identity module contains a wide range of questions about the nation, as well as items concerning political preferences, immigration, economic and cultural protectionism and supranational institutions. The surveys were administered in France in 2013 and in Germany in 2014, resulting in sample sizes of 2017 and 1717 respondents, respectively. After listwise deletion of missing data on sociodemographic covariates, the sample sizes were reduced to 1049 French respondents and 858 German respondents.

The usual strategy in survey-based studies of nationalism is to hone in on a specific variable or item scale and correlate it with other social attitudes and policy preferences. Scholars have typically focused on the intensity of national identification (Li and Brewer 2004), ascriptive and elective criteria of national belonging (Kunovich 2009), domain-specific national pride (Smith and Kim 2006) or hubristic comparisons of the nation with the rest of the world (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). Indeed, these topics constitute four groups of questions within a 23-item battery that has been featured in multiple waves of the ISSP. My analyses rely on these same items, but in contrast to past research, I simultaneously include all of them in my models, based on the assumptions that people's cognitive representations of the nation are multifaceted and that the meaning of any given item is a function of its relationship to other items (DiMaggio 1997; Mohr 1998).

The method I employ to analyse the distribution of responses within and across countries is latent class analysis (LCA) (Hagenaars 1993). This approach makes it possible to identify clusters of respondents who share similar response profiles across multiple survey questions. The

analyst selects the appropriate survey items to include in the model and chooses a target number of clusters (referred to as 'latent classes'); an iterative algorithm then divides the sample into the predetermined number of clusters in a manner that maximizes their internal homogeneity and mutual differentiation. Multiple models with different numbers of latent classes can be compared based on fit statistics in order to determine which model most accurately describes the data. Once the optimal model is selected, the LCA procedure generates class membership probabilities for every respondent, assigns each respondent to the class with the highest membership probability and produces descriptive statistics for the variables of interest (in this case, nationalist attitudes), which can be used to interpret the content of the classes. The result is a set of discrete groups of respondents, each characterized by a particular distribution of attitudes.

If we take survey responses to be indicative of beliefs, then patterns of responses that appear to 'hang together' within latent classes can be interpreted as indicative of distinct orientations towards the nation (importantly, this does not imply that respondents belonging to a particular class are part of a self-conscious group or even that they hold shared beliefs for the same reasons). We can then ask whether the similarity of nationalist beliefs among these subsets of respondents is systematically associated with other social and political attitudes, particularly if those attitudes relate closely to the nation. It is also possible to determine what sociodemographic variables predict membership in each latent class.

It is worth emphasizing that the latent class approach is fundamentally person-centred, even if my supplementary analyses rely on regression analyses: the nationalism profiles are derived entirely from the co-occurrence of attitudinal responses within individuals and each respondent is assigned unambiguously to one of the nationalism profiles. This makes it quite different from variable-based methods that abstract specific cultural and demographic traits from individuals and look for net associations after controlling for other predictors.

France and Germany: Aggregate Differences

In order to orient the analyses, it is worthwhile to consider what differences we might expect to find between France and Germany at the aggregate level in 2013–2014. The simplest predictions come from Kohn's (1944) ethnic–civic model: on average, Germans should favour more restrictive definitions of the nation's symbolic boundaries, while the French should be more inclined to define the nation in primarily civic terms (Brubaker 1992). This distinction is likely to be muted, however, as a result of Germany's gradual shift towards more permissive citizenship regulation, which culminated in major reforms in 1999 (Joppke 2007). Indeed, past studies have found Germans to be less supportive of ethnic definitions of the nation than expected (Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002).

On national pride, we would expect Germany to score lower than France due to continued legacies of the Second World War in German collective memory and national identity (Smith and Jarkko 1998; Smith and Kim 2006). These differences should be particularly marked on questions related to the military and history but much less so on items related to the economy and the welfare state (Blank and Schmidt 2003; Evans and Kelley 2002). For the same reason, we should expect Germans to be less likely to express chauvinistic attitudes towards the rest of the world.

Finally, expectations concerning differences in the overall strength of national identification are less obvious. Neither country has strong regionalist movements that challenge the national project and both are economic and political leaders in the European Union, which should result in relatively similar pressures towards supranational identification (which is generally quite weak across Western European countries [Fligstein et al. 2012]).

To evaluate these predictions, one can simply compare the variable distributions across the two countries. The country means, standard deviations and significance tests of between-country differences for the 23 nationalism variables are presented in Table 1. Contrary to expectations, the French sample placed stricter restrictions on national

Table 1 Nationalism variable means by country, 2013 ISSP

	France		Germany			
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	|z|	Prob > |z|
How close do you feel to [France/Germany]	3.44	0.71	3.18	0.68	15.85	0.00
Some people say the following things are important for being truly [French/German]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?						
To be a Christian	1.60	0.96	1.96	0.98	10.39	0.00
To have [French/German] ancestry	2.45	1.12	2.32	0.99	2.81	0.01
To have been born in [France/Germany]	2.88	1.10	2.70	0.95	4.46	0.00
To have lived in [France/Germany] for most of one's life	3.01	0.94	2.93	0.87	2.74	0.01
To be able to speak [French/German]	3.71	0.56	3.64	0.62	4.01	0.00
To respect [France's/Germany's] political institutions and laws	3.78	0.49	3.46	0.68	18.81	0.00
To have [French/German] citizenship	3.47	0.78	3.17	0.84	12.09	0.00
To feel [French/German]	3.55	0.70	3.04	0.86	20.51	0.00
How proud are you of [France/Germany] in each of the following?						
The way democracy works	2.51	0.84	2.87	0.72	9.48	0.00
[France/Germany]'s economic achievements	1.91	0.73	3.16	0.67	39.08	0.00
Its social security system	3.13	0.82	3.00	0.70	8.55	0.00
Its political influence in the world	2.46	0.79	2.77	0.74	7.95	0.00
Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society	2.36	0.88	2.55	0.77	3.34	0.00
[France/Germany]'s armed forces	3.05	0.76	2.18	0.84	27.91	0.00
Its history	3.30	0.70	2.19	0.89	33.03	0.00
Its scientific and technological achievements	3.09	0.67	3.30	0.64	8.44	0.00
Its achievements in the arts and literature	3.11	0.69	3.03	0.69	3.07	0.00
Its achievements in sports	2.79	0.73	3.08	0.78	13.25	0.00

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

	France		Germany			
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	|z|	Prob > |z|
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?						
I would rather be a citizen of [France/Germany] than of any other country in the world	3.79	1.14	3.71	1.11	4.25	0.00
Generally speaking, [France/Germany] is a better country than most other countries	3.04	1.14	3.42	1.08	8.14	0.00
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like [the French/Germans]	2.55	1.18	2.91	1.11	8.73	0.00
There are some things about [France/Germany] today that make me feel ashamed of [France/Germany]	3.62	1.23	3.11	1.20	9.73	0.00
People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong	2.78	1.28	2.55	1.13	5.49	0.00

Note All variables are ordinal
Means are used for ease of presentation
Z-scores and *p*-values are from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sample tests

membership on all but one indicator: religion. While the contrasts were the most marked for elective criteria of belonging, all differences, including those for ethnocultural criteria, were statistically significant. That is, while both countries favour civic over ethnic bases of national membership, on average, the French appear to be more exclusionary than the Germans. That religion would be an exception to this pattern is understandable, given the dominance of secular republicanism in French political culture (but note that this item has the lowest mean in both countries).

On measures of pride in the military and in history, the results are consistent with expectations: on average, Germans are much less likely to express pride in these aspects of their country than the French. The same is true of pride in the social security system, achievements in the arts and literature and three of five chauvinism questions (preference for the country's citizenship, lack of shame in the country and unconditional support for the country). On the remaining pride and chauvinism questions, however, Germans score higher than the French, contrary to predictions based on past literature. The contrast is the greatest for pride in the country's economic achievements. Finally, on general identification with the nation, the mean for the French sample is higher than that for the German sample.

These results challenge arguments that classify these countries as belonging to two distinct types of nationalism. In general, respondents in both countries exhibit similar patterns of beliefs: they privilege civic over ethnic criteria of belonging, express moderate pride in their nations (more so in its intellectual achievements than institutions) and moderate levels of chauvinism and feel close to their nations. Because these analyses are carried out at the national level, however, they cannot estimate the heterogeneity of national self-conceptions within the countries. To do so, it is necessary to rely on methods that simultaneously enable within- and between-country comparisons. Latent class analysis is one such approach.

Repertoires of Nationhood in France and Germany

To identify clusters of respondents with similar dispositions towards the nation within each country, I performed separate latent class analyses (LCA) on the two samples. In both cases, a cross-model comparison of the approximate weight of evidence (AWE) criterion, which evaluates model fit while taking into account parsimony and classification error, suggested that a four-class solution represented the most reasonable fit to the data.[1] The distributions of the 23 nationalism variables across the four classes in each country are illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.

Despite some cross-national differences in the class-specific response probabilities, the four varieties of nationalism yielded by LCA appear to have a similar logic in both Germany and France (and to also bear resemblance to those found in the US [Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016]). In both countries, two of the classes appear to occupy opposite ends of a continuum between a general rejection and general endorsement of most of the nationalism items in the survey. The first of these classes, whose members I call *the disengaged*, is characterized by low levels of national attachment, strong disavowal of ethnic criteria of national membership, relatively low levels of pride in the nation and disagreement with most of the chauvinism items.[2] It accounts for 19% of the sample in France and 13% in Germany. The second class, which I call *ardent nationalist*, expresses the opposite pattern of attitudes: strong national identification, an embrace of all barriers to national membership (of which religion receives the lowest support), a high degree of pride in all aspects of the nation (including the military and history in Germany) and relatively high levels of chauvinism. Ardent nationalists represent 21% of the sample in France and 13% in Germany.

The remaining two classes do not fall on the same continuum. Respondents assigned to the first, which I call *liberal nationalist* (cf. Tamir 1993), largely reject ethnocultural criteria of national membership, but exhibit strong national identification and moderate levels of pride and chauvinism. Liberal nationalism is the most prevalent of the four classes, representing 46% of the French sample and 50% of




Fig. 1 Latent class composition in France

the German sample. The second class, which I call *restrictive nationalist*, groups together respondents who embrace ethnocultural criteria of national membership, but who exhibit only moderate levels of national identification (especially in France), low levels of pride in political institutions (again, this is especially true in France) and moderate levels of chauvinism. It appears then that restrictive nationalists, who account for 13% of the sample in France and 25% in Germany, draw sharp symbolic boundaries around the nation, but have relatively less regard for the state, particularly when compared with ardent nationalists.




Fig. 2 Latent class composition in Germany

It is possible that this response pattern is a result of discontent with the direction in which the country has moved and a desire to restrict national membership, perhaps in an effort to restore its past demographic composition. If so, we may expect members of this class to be particularly supportive of populist radical right parties.

These results clearly demonstrate that nationalism is not a unitary phenomenon within these two nations and moreover that beliefs about the nation cannot be arranged on a continuum from less to more nationalistic. On the contrary, the four types of nationalism are not

only discrete, but also cross-cutting in their attitudinal composition. As we shall see, adherence to these contrasting cultural models has important implications for people's political attitudes.

Despite the overall structural similarity between the four classes in France and Germany, there are some notable differences between them. The French liberal nationalists are much more adamant about the importance of civic criteria of national membership (language ability, respect for institutions, citizenship and subjective feeling) than German liberal nationalists, which is consistent with the dominance of the civic republican model in France. On ethnocultural criteria of belonging, the differences are more complex and reveal underlying differences that were not visible in the aggregate analyses: while the restrictive nationalists and the disengaged are somewhat less ethnonationalist in France than in Germany, French ardent nationalists (and to some degree liberal nationalists) exceed their German counterparts in favouring ancestry, native birth and lifelong residence as criteria of national membership. It is the higher prevalence in France of this particularly exclusionary type of nationalism that explains why the French sample is more ethnonationalist in the aggregate. Consistent with the aggregate analyses, religious definitions of the nation are less common across all four classes in France, though the differences are the smallest among the ardent nationalists.

Levels of national pride and hubris evidence some differences among the classes as well. The restrictive and ardent nationalists (but not the liberal nationalists and the disengaged) display higher levels of pride in Germany than they do in France, especially when it comes to the country's economic achievements. As was suggested by the aggregate analyses, the two exceptions to this are pride in history and the armed forces, both of which are likely affected by Germany's collective memory of the Second World War. Chauvinism is distributed similarly in both countries, except among the restrictive nationalists in France, who are less likely to view other countries in a disparaging manner than their German counterparts.

The above differences point to some country-specific features of nationalism, but these are overshadowed by the overall structural consistency in the attitudinal patterns that constitute the four classes.

Nationalism in both Germany and France is a heterogeneous phenomenon, composed of four distinct attitudinal orientations towards the nation that appear to share more in common across national borders than within them. At a minimum, this finding lends credence to the view that 'far from being uniformly distributed in time and space, carrying an equal, banal meaning to all the members of the nation, nationalism might be consumed, articulated and mobilized differently by […] different subjects' (Antonsich 2016: p. 33). The meanings with which people understand and enact their nationhood appear to vary considerably within nations, but do so in patterned ways. This opens the possibility of seeing everyday nationalism as reflective of underlying cultural cleavages that may shape social interaction and political mobilization.

The similarities in nationalism *across* the two countries suggest that there may exist a common repertoire of dispositions towards the nation that transcends national boundaries. If it is the case that a randomly selected French citizen is likely to imagine the nation in a manner more consistent with a similarly disposed German citizen than with another French compatriot, this calls into question the adequacy of analyses that treat culture as nationally bounded (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Moreover, this points to a possible extension to Billig's (1995) work: not only is the nation itself pervasive and deeply institutionalized, but the same may be true of the range of options available to everyday people for conceptualizing the nation's meaning.

Nationalism and Political Attitudes

The identification of multiple varieties of nationalism is relevant only to the degree that these attitudinal clusters affect other politically and socially relevant outcomes. Among the most widely discussed development in European politics of the past decade has been the rise of radical right parties that combine anti-immigration positions with Euroscepticism (Mudde 2007; Berezin 2009). In France, the National Front has received considerable support in local and regional elections and its leader, Marine Le Pen, has been a contender for the country's presidency. In Germany, the radical right has been more muted in

institutional politics, but the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the National Democratic Party (NPD) have been gaining ground in state and European elections; furthermore, radical social movements have long been a prominent feature of German society. Given that nationalist appeals are central to the success of these parties, the four types of nationalism found in both countries should have implications for radical right politics.

The ISSP is not ideally suited for predicting support for radical right parties, however, because the survey only asks respondents about their voting preferences in general elections, rather than those held at the municipal or regional level. The German NPD and AfD have received only modest support in elections to the *Bundestag*, so the sample representing their voters is not large enough to enable meaningful analyses (only 10 German ISSP respondents report voting for the NPD and 54 report voting for the AfD). The National Front has been more successful in national elections, so the size of relevant French sample is larger, consisting of 179 respondents. The ISSP does not ask about support for radical movements outside of institutional politics. Consequently, I will analyse the association between nationalism and radical right support in France but not Germany.

Whereas data on party preferences are limited in the ISSP, the survey does allow for an examination of two sets of political attitudes associated with radical right support: anti-immigrant sentiment and negative perceptions of the EU. Questions measuring the former are available for the French and German samples, while the latter were only asked of the French sample. In addition, I will examine another correlate of nationalism, which is distinct from anti-immigrant sentiment: economic protectionism. Like anti-immigrant sentiment, economic protectionism is concerned with the penetration of nation state borders, but its focus is on capital and goods rather than people.

Immigration attitudes are measured by five items that probe respondents' agreement with statements about immigrants increasing crime rates, being good for the economy, taking away jobs from the native-born, bringing in new ideas and cultures and undermining national culture. All the items were recoded so that higher values indicated less favourable opinions of immigration; the variables were then summed

into a continuous scale of anti-immigrant belief (Cronbach's alpha: 0.80 for France, 0.74 for Germany). In addition, the survey features a number of EU-related questions; the present analyses rely on the most general of these, which asks respondents whether they agree that the country (in this case France) benefits from being a member of the EU. Finally, the economic protectionism item asks whether the country should limit foreign imports.

Figure 3 presents the results of models that predict anti-immigrant attitudes and economic protectionism in France and Germany. In addition to cluster membership (corrected for misclassification error [Bakk et al. 2013]), the models control for a range of covariates, including gender, citizenship status, religious denomination, religiosity, ethnicity, age and household income. The immigration attitudes are modelled using ordinary least-squares regression, while economic protectionism is modelled using logistic regression (the point estimates are expressed in terms of odds ratios). In both cases, a clear pattern emerges: the four varieties of nationalism are distinctly and significantly




Fig. 3 Results of regressions predicting anti-immigrant attitudes and economic protectionism in France and Germany

associated with the outcomes of interest. The disengaged express the lowest levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and economic protectionism, the ardent nationalists express the highest levels and the liberal and restrictive nationalists, respectively, occupy the middle ground. The effect sizes are larger in France than in Germany, but the same overall pattern holds in both countries.

Results from models predicting anti-EU attitudes and support for the National Front (both in France only) are presented in Fig. 4. Here, the patterns are somewhat different than in Fig. 3: the disengaged are no less likely to favour the EU than the liberal nationalists, while restrictive nationalists are more likely to express opposition to the EU than the ardent nationalists. It appears that the low institutional pride of the restrictive nationalists extends to supranational bodies, which they view with the greater scepticism than other French respondents. If both Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiments drive support for radical right parties (Ivarsflaten 2008; Taggart 1998), then we should expect restrictive nationalists and ardent nationalists to express similar levels of support for the far right: the restrictive nationalists due to their strong anti-EU sentiments and weaker anti-immigrant attitudes and the ardent nationalists due to their strong anti-immigrant attitudes and weaker Euroscepticism. Indeed, this is what we observe in the right panel of Fig. 4: among centre-right and far-right voters, the difference in the probability of voting for the National Front between restrictive and ardent nationalists is not statistically significant (the standard errors are large due to the small sample size).




Fig. 4 Results of regressions predicting anti-EU attitudes and vote for the National Front (FN) among center-right and right voters in France

Together, these results suggest that nationalism is a robust predictor of political attitudes, even when controlling for sociodemographic covariates. Ardent nationalists, whose views are characterized by strong national identification, exclusionary definitions of national membership and high levels of pride and hubris, are the most likely to hold anti-immigrant and protectionist attitudes, while restrictive nationalists, whose exclusionary definitions of the nation's boundaries are not accompanied by high levels of national pride and hubris, are particularly critical of the EU (in France). Despite these differences, in the French context, both groups are equally likely to support radical right politics. In contrast, the disengaged are consistently more positively predisposed towards immigration and trade and more strongly opposed to the radical right (in France) than not only the restrictive and ardent nationalists, but also the liberal nationalists. It is only on attitudes towards the EU that the disengaged and liberal nationalists exhibit similar response patterns.

In sum, the nation continues to serve as a central point of reference for the French and for Germans, but its meaning varies within each population. Whether considering the role of supranational institutions or policies towards migrants, the policy preferences of citizens in both countries are, at least in part, filtered through their particular understanding of their nation in terms of its demographic composition, its institutional and human achievements and its place in the world.

The Path Forward

By inductively identifying clusters of survey respondents with shared attitudinal profiles, this paper has demonstrated that conceptions of nationhood are heterogeneous within France and Germany, the two nations often cited as exemplars of distinct nationalist traditions. Some cultural differences between the countries persist, to be sure, but once the within-country variation is accounted for, these differences become a matter of degree rather than of kind. For all their historical and institutional uniqueness, France and Germany are characterized by

strikingly similar repertoires of nationhood, which correlate in similar ways with other political preferences, especially attitudes towards immigration and economic protectionism.

The approach employed here demonstrates that it is possible to engage in cross-national comparison without resorting to country-level cultural reductionism or to its converse, variable-based individualism. Latent class analysis and related sample decomposition methods allow for the detection of patterned variation in nationalist beliefs without making strong assumptions about the logical consistency of belief structures or their homogeneity within national populations. It then becomes an empirical question whether the resulting repertoires of nationhood differ more within countries or between them. In the case of France and Germany, within-country differences appear to be paramount.

If political beliefs and behaviours are partly shaped by the meanings people attach to the nation, as scholars of everyday nationalism have argued, then systematically mapping those understandings across countries is an essential first step in developing insights about the role of nationalism in modern democracies. To the extent that the lines of cultural cleavage related to nationalist beliefs are similar across countries, they may suggest similar explanations for common social and political outcomes, like intolerance towards ethnic minorities and support for radical-right parties. If so, the approach taken here promises to connect the micro-level of everyday nationalism with macro-level outcomes and to do so in a way that transcends the methodological nationalism of much research on this topic.

While this study illustrates the potential profitability of a repertoire-based approach to the study of nationalism, its findings raise further questions for future research. If nationalism is indeed characterized by discrete conceptions of the nation that coexist—and potentially compete—within countries, it becomes important to ask how these cultural models change over time. Are the repertoires of nationhood stable in their attitudinal composition or do the constituent attitudes vary with socioeconomic conditions? If the content of the repertoires is stable, what kinds of events might produce shifts in the relative prevalence of

their component parts? Moreover, how do the tensions between these alternative definitions of the nation affect political change? Is it possible to think of these repertoires as indicative of deeply seated cultural cleavages that can be mobilized by nationalist elite discourse or that can pose challenges to existing political narratives of nationhood? Finally, are there circumstances under which the repertoires themselves undergo major change, possibly calling into question the logic of nationalism itself? To begin answering these questions, what is needed are more systematic longitudinal data on nationalist beliefs and political preferences, and also in-depth qualitative studies of the mechanisms that link conceptions of nationhood with politics.

This chapter began with a reference to Michael Billig's seminal work on banal nationalism, so it is fitting to conclude by asking how the perspective adopted here builds on Billig's insights. In the most general sense, this project is motivated by Billig's emphasis on the need to study nationalism in established rather than emergent nation states, in relatively settled times rather than moments of institutional upheaval and among everyday people rather than elites. The nation is a fundamental and deeply institutionalized object of political and cultural affiliation, but it is also a cognitive, affective and discursive frame through which people perceive and understand their reality and thus, with which they think, talk and act.[3] But institutionalization does not imply cultural homogeneity and consensus. All members of a national population may take for granted the existence of the nation state, but they need not agree about that nation state's meaning. Indeed, such disagreements may fuel ongoing political contestation within countries, which may—under particular circumstances—lead to eruptions of nationalism's more volatile manifestations (what Billig calls 'hot nationalism'). If so, it is imperative that social scientists gain analytical purchase on the varieties of popular nationalism prevalent among national populations. This chapter demonstrates that survey research, when carried out in a manner that takes seriously the relationality of meaning, offers a useful complement to qualitative studies of everyday nationhood by enabling the identification and systematic comparison of cultural repertoires across social groups.

Notes

1. Another frequently used model statistic, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), favoured baseline models with greater numbers of classes, but the four-class model provided a superior fit to the data after accounting for local dependencies among pairs of indicators with large model residuals (Vermunt 1997).
2. While it may be tempting to interpret this attitudinal profile as indicative of respondents' cosmopolitanism, I refrain from doing so, because disengagement from the nation could be a product of other beliefs, such as multiple competing national attachments, strong ties to the local community or a more general reluctance to strongly identify with a collective community.
3. Of course, the analyses in this chapter do not attend to all the dimensions of everyday nationalism. How cognitive representations of the nation may be activated by affective states and how they may structure discursive practices are important topics for future research.

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Author Biography

Bart Bonikowski is Associate Professor of Sociology at Harvard University and Resident Faculty at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. Relying on surveys, textual data, and experimental methods, his research applies insights from cultural sociology to the study of politics in the United States and Europe, with a specific focus on nationalism and populism. His research has shown that meanings attached to the nation are fragmented within national populations but consistent across them, that the nation and the state evoke distinct cognitive constructs with differential affective loadings, and that national identification fluctuates in patterned ways within national communities. In studying populism, he has sought to reframe the phenomenon as a dynamic feature of speech acts rather than a stable ideological property of political actors. This research has demonstrated that populism is as prevalent on the political left as it is on the right, both in Europe and the US, and that variation in populist claims-making is a function of political actors' shifting positions within and across political fields. Bonikowski's most recent work has appeared in the *American Sociological Review, Social Forces,* and the *Annual Review of Sociology.*

Part III

Affect

On Affect, Dancing and National Bodies

Elisabeth Militz

I hesitate, unsure of what to do. Elnara's[1] cousin Nigar is inviting me over and over again to join her on the dance floor. I am sitting at 1 out of 14 decorated tables in an elaborately decorated, ornamental hall. It is Elnara's daughter Leyla's first birthday and I am celebrating her special day together with about 100 other adults and a dozen children. Judging from the size and the glamour of the birthday party, the combination of elegant evening wears, a four-course meal, the announcements, the music and the dancing, this evening event feels like a truly special occasion.

> Nigar flashes me a smile and beckons to me. While gently tripping from one foot to the other, she is swinging her arms gracefully to the rhythm of the music. The music is fast and the sound drowns any table talk. My inner voice tells me that I should join the other women on the dance floor; out of respect and to feel more like a proper part of the celebration.

[1] All names have been changed.

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It's not just Nigar who started to dance a few minutes ago. Among some people I don't know, I see her mother, Elnara's mother and their sisters dancing as well. They hold their heads high, swinging light-footed from left to right. From time to time, they look at each other; from time to time, they stare into space. Even though everybody seems to dance alone—no touching, no coming closer, no moving back—the synchronised movements feel like a collective endeavour. Every dancing body blends in at its proper place.

I smile sheepishly back at Nigar and rise from my chair. I walk slowly towards her joining her at the verge of the dance floor. Concentrating on the instrumental sound, I try to bring my moving feet in line with the rhythm of the music. I look up and make an effort to copy Nigar's leg and arm movements. While alternately and slightly lifting my feet to the rhythm, I extend both my arms and hands sideward, and start rotating my wrists inward. My fingers are stretched out and both my middle fingers draw an imaginary circle in the air. I am not quite convinced by my performance but I continue to dance. Maybe I will get better the longer I try? Yet, I don't feel I fit in with the other dancing bodies.

Nigar brims over with enthusiasm for my dancing. She smiles at me and is clapping her hands to the rhythm. I enjoy how she approves of my dancing. I instantly feel more confident. Yet, an incomprehensively feeling of discomfort and lack of authenticity lingers inside me. I cannot strip away my tension and my doubts. Will I ever get rid of this sense of awkwardness when taking part, in what I label as, an Azerbaijani way of female dancing?

(field notes from 07 February 2014, Baku)

At first sight, my experience of female dancing at this birthday celebration in Baku, Azerbaijan, might not qualify as an example of Billig's (1995) banal nationalism. Nigar and I are moving our bodies in a way that I signify as dancing. In order to justify my feelings of embarrassment, I suggest that our bodily movements signify a style of female dancing specific to Azerbaijan and thus unfamiliar to me, a German, white, female researcher from Switzerland. But, why and how do I interpret the dancing as an Azerbaijani way of dancing? This chapter is dealing with subliminal mechanisms that made me employ the category of the

nation during my fieldwork in Azerbaijan in order to make sense of corporeal practices in a specific situation and my feelings about it. I argue that, in the vignette above, affect—describing a relationship between bodies and objects connecting and disconnecting them (Woodward and Lea 2010)—incites my experience that this way of female dancing in Azerbaijan is nationally specific.

Through an analysis of dancing in Azerbaijan that unpacks the ways in which feelings of national belonging and alienation emerge in moments of bodily encounters, the chapter makes the affective dimensions of banal nationalism—that are implicit to Billig's reasoning—explicit. Whereas Billig (2009: 349), in form of 'a psychology of the unnoticed', embraces affective and emotional aspects in his analyses of how what feels national is represented, he does not investigate how these subliminal mechanisms shape our sense-making of the lived experience and constitute banal nationalisms. Endorsing his intellectual advancements, Wetherell (2014: 147) concludes that 'a great deal of public, social and cultural interpretative activity and negotiation over meaning surrounds affective experience and is essential to it'. The aim of this chapter is thus to advance affect—and in particular the relationship between affect and embodied practices—as a conceptual perspective to explore the 'more-than-representational' (Lorimer 2005) constituents of banal nationalisms. I argue that it is important to attend to the affective dimensions of banal nationalism if we want to understand the virality, persistency and power of feelings of national attachment and detachment.

Focusing on the relationship between affect, bodies and the ordinary performance of the nation, my analysis draws on scholarship that explores the affective dimensions of (banal) nationalism (Berlant 2008; Closs Stephens 2015; Crang and Tolia-Kelly 2010; Militz and Schurr 2016; Wetherell 2014). Following feminist accounts of affect (Ahmed 2010; Blackman 2012; Braidotti 2011) and informed by an autoethnographic research methodology (Anderson 2006), I focus on the affective emergence and constitution of banal nationalisms through female dancing in Azerbaijan. Concentrating on the ways in which bodily movements and sensations activate national categorisations, I intend to complement the existing scholarship addressing the connections between affect and nationalism. Wetherell's understanding of affect as

'embodied meaning-making' (2012: 4) is central to my analysis that emphasises bodies, their situated materialisation and the emergence of feelings of national belonging and alienation through affective liveliness.

The first part of the chapter addresses the conceptual and methodological settings of the research presented. I argue that attending to a concept of affect and the methodology of autoethnography enhances analyses of banal nationalisms. In the second part of the chapter, I return to the vignette at the beginning of the chapter on female dancing in Azerbaijan and account for the ways in which my own positionality and bodily experiences produced national categorisations and constituted my experiences of national belonging and alienation.

Research Context: Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

Before delineating the conceptual and methodological framing of the research, I briefly introduce the study context. The research for this chapter draws on three months of fieldwork conducted between January and April 2014. This research stay was a part of my doctoral research project that explored how people reproduce, contest and invent the Azerbaijani nation in everyday life. The project unravels the ways in which feelings of national belonging and alienation are constituted beyond language and representation. As one of the successor states of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan matters as interesting case to investigate everyday national identification processes because of the powerful presence of debates around national ideologies (Tokluoglu 2012), the myth of origin and the recent reinvigoration of national cultural traditions, such as in music and carpet weaving (Naroditskaya 2005).

Successor states of the Soviet Union are often subject to analyses of nationalism and national reframing processes (Beissinger 2002; Young and Light 2001). Brubaker (2011: 1785) marks the break-up of the Soviet Union following 1989 as 'a transition to a new kind of nationalist politics' whereas the newly independent states as 'organizational shells […] had to be filled with national content'. Fostering people's identification with those newly independent nation states, for example

through discourses of fear and danger (Megoran 2005) or through mass sport events to make people worship their country (Koch 2013; Persson and Petersson 2014), is a central topic in nationalism research in the region.

Despite the corporeality of identity politics, research on nationalism and nation-building practices in the successor states of the Soviet Union and, in particular, in Azerbaijan focus on the way governments and social and political elites develop national myths and regulate nation-building processes (Luscombe and Kazdal 2014; Sattarov 2009; Tokluoglu 2012). Even though few studies take the people constituting the Azerbaijani nation seriously (De Waal 2003; Heyat 2002; Tohidi 1996), the everyday encounters between different people and the ways in which bodily sensations complement the sense-making of the felt reality remain largely absent.

To thwart this disembodied research on nation-building dynamics in Azerbaijan, I take inspiration from feminist scholarship on nationalism that reveals the entanglement between discursive representations of nations, on the one hand, and the felt experience and embodiment of what it means to be part of a national community, on the other hand (Mayer 2004; Nast 1998; Smith 2012; Yuval-Davis 1996). Bodies constantly generate, rework and mediate nationalisms—as processes that sustain and develop the foundation pillars of nations—such as when bodily movements validate national boundaries (Smith et al. 2016). Bodies constitute nations and incite negotiations on national values through embodied performances of dancing in support of nation branding (Yessayan 2015), at beauty pageants (Faria 2013) or by means of veiling or not veiling (Gökariksel and Mitchell 2005). By exploring the affective dimensions involved in interpreting bodily movements as national, the present analysis of female dancing in Azerbaijan further expands this work on the bodily constitutions of nationalisms.

Dancing in Azerbaijan

Even though collective folk dancing strikes me as a major constituent of everyday life in Azerbaijan, most of the academic literature on nation-building ignores its importance with the notable exception of

Yalçın-Heckmann's (2008) investigation of the economy of Azerbaijani weddings. She points out how traditional folk dancing in Azerbaijan is essentially gendered and used as a means to express social power. In her analysis of an Azerbaijani wedding, collective yet gendered dance performances emerge as central elements of the non-verbal communication displaying social rank and power relations through, for example, the temporal length of the dances and the diversity of dancing figures. My own experience of doing ethnographic research in Azerbaijan since 2007 ties in with the observation that gendered dancing—that means women and men are dancing in separate groups and maintain different dancing styles—materialises as a major activity before and during weddings, engagement ceremonies and birthday parties. Inspired by scholarship pointing out the ways in which dancing and the constitution of national identities intertwine (Reed 1998; Zhemukhov and King 2013), I turn to the affective mechanisms that perpetuate feelings of national belonging and alienation through dancing and ask how ordinary dance performances engender ideas of national collectivity.

Affect as Conceptual Perspective

What I propose in this chapter is to look at the connection between dance performances, the identification of these movements as national and feelings of comfort and discomfort through a conceptual lens of affect. Following Seigworth and Gregg (2010: 2) who suggest that 'affect is in many ways synonymous with force or forces of encounter', my understanding of affect is that of a mechanism that drives any kind of interaction such as interaction between people, or between people, places and objects. Following this, affect research is primarily concerned with the relationships between bodies, whereas the body is understood as 'beyond the body-as-organism' (Blackman 2012: 5). Following Ahmed (2004, 2010), affect takes effect as an 'impression' a body makes and receives. Affective experiences, however, do not reside in bodies but are being activated in encounters with different bodies and shape those encounters and 'how things make an impression' (Ahmed 2010: 44). Affect is thus functioning through bodies and with bodies in form of a 'capacity to affect

and to be affected' (Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 2). Historicity and situatedness are crucial in understanding the ways in which affect works, generating different affective capacities in different bodies.

In line with a Spinozist-Deleuzian interpretation of affect, the body is no longer understood as a specific 'form-content mold' (Braidotti 2011: 186) but as a set of relations. In moments of affective encounter, bodies do not emerge as existing substances such as a human body, a flower bud or as a ship's hull. Neither do affects circulate through embodiment and bodily sensations between distinct organic creatures. Rather, bodies emerge as a feeling of corporeality, or, to be precise, 'intercorporeality' (Blackman 2012: 12). Bodies materialise as processes of interrelated embodiment in the moment of, for example, touching velvet or smelling vanilla. Within these processes of embodiment, bodies take effect as operating mechanisms in affective relations constantly congregating and dispersing the lived experience of the world. As 'device that reveals' (Pile 2010: 11) the world as we unknowingly and knowingly understand it, embodied experience arranges what we feel is happening to us and around us. It is thus through modes of embodied affect that something such as a distinct object, a place or a body attracts our attention, irritates us or passes by unnoticed. It is through affect that an unforeseen sequence of situations is developing and how we feel the atmosphere of a situation is changing.

Although not made explicit, Billig's (1995: 125) work foreshadows the affective dimensions of nationalism. In a reflection on his research he confesses that, 'if a citizen from the homeland runs quicker or jumps higher than foreigners, I feel pleasure' (ibid.). Yet, he stops short of explaining why and how his feeling of pleasure emerges. I suggest that his feeling of pleasure emerges in the moment he connects with the successful athlete from his homeland through affect. In simplified terms, it is through affect that he becomes aware of the athlete and the athlete's success, and it is affect that activates his identification as fellow citizen that finds expression in his feeling of pleasure. Affect, in other words, activates bodily histories through (dis)connecting different bodies, objects and places and renders them (ir) relevant in a specific situation. By paying attention to feelings of comfort and discomfort when encountering national representations, the conceptual perspective of affect helps to decipher the more-than-representational constituents of banal nationalism. Interpreting what affect does in moments of

bodily encounters helps to understand the ways in which the experience of nation becomes possible through affect as the ordinary experience of national belonging reinstates national categories. Analysing one moment of my field research, I demonstrate the ways in which I reinvigorated categories of national belonging and alienation through dealing with my own feelings of discomfort.

Autoethnography as Research Methodology

In order to comprehend what affect does in moments of bodily encounters, I draw on autoethnography as a research methodology. Autoethnography understands the researcher as central element in the process of producing scientific knowledge as this research methodology connects personal experiences with the social relations they are situated in (Taber 2010). According to Anderson's (2006) 'analytic autoethnography', a major component of doing autoethnographic research involves a reflection of the researcher's own bodily and emotional responses to what is happening. This means, for example, to pay attention to irritating, pleasant and painful moments characterising the research experience. Autoethnography asks me to remain sensitive to the randomness and elusiveness of research interaction and to deliberately reflect upon my visceral, fleshly and emotional experiences in the research process. Autoethnography is well suited to investigate the emergence and continuity of banal nationalisms as it heeds the embeddedness of nationalising practices in everyday life, and respects that bodies have different capacities to affect and to be affected (Tolia-Kelly 2006)—that means the degrees to which encounters stimulate bodies and shape their emotional responses.

My autoethnographic methodology implied that during fieldwork, I lived most of the time with one family in Baku, the capital city of Azerbaijan. Apart from leaving the family on occasion for interviews and meetings with informants outside the family's realm, I spent most of my time with the women of the family such as my host mother Elnara and her daughter Leyla, her mother and mother-in-law, her sister and sisters-in-law, her cousins and aunts. I spent my everyday life with the family and exposed myself to whatever was happening and to whatever they were

planning on doing. I always carried a voice recorder, a camera and my field diary with me. On average, I invested two to three hours every evening for narrative entries in my diary. Expanding these journal entries, I have crafted vignettes that are brief anecdotes illustrating central moments of the field research (Pitard 2016). I conceive of vignettes as the written output of a thick description of moments central to my research. To reveal the mechanisms of how nationalism is affective, the vignette disassembles the bodies, objects and places involved, at the same time as it conveys ideas of how to make sense of the bodily relations.

Having laid out the context of the research and my conceptual and methodological perspective, I turn to the vignette I introduced at the beginning of the chapter in order to decipher the doings of affect in constituting banal nationalisms. I examine the ways in which I marked bodies as Azerbaijani and connected and disconnected with them in order to deal with my own bodily discomfort. The described situation, I argue, invokes a banal nationalism, in Billig's sense of the term, as the feeling of attachment or detachment to the idea of national collectives emerged through the banality of dancing. As Billig (1995: 6) asks to investigate 'the ideological habits, by which "our" nations are reproduced as nations', I suggest to explore the ways in which these ideological habits become and in what ways they unfold unconsciously and seemingly automatic through affective encounters.

Legitimising National Difference, Reinforcing Banal Nationalism

While I usually like moving my body to music, in the vignette at the beginning of the chapter, I have to force myself to join Nigar and the other dancers on the dance floor. I identify the music as 'mewling' and noisy. I dislike it. But, is it really my disapproval of the music that makes me reluctant to dance during this birthday celebration? Why do I isolate myself from the other people dancing? How come I feel unfitting at the same time as I observe the other dancing bodies contributing to a 'collective endeavour'?

Whereas I feel uncomfortable, the people on the dance floor give themselves up to the music—at least following my description of the

dancing guests. Elnara's and Nigar's mothers and sisters keep their bodies with the rhythm of the music. Their dancing is smooth, elegant and pleasing my gaze. Although I do not enjoy the music very much, I enjoy watching the ways in which the people connect with the music. The sight of choreographed moving body parts, such as tripping feet, circling fingers and shyly swinging hips adds another dimension to the sound of the music. Bodies and music form a mutually intensifying unity. The moving bodies and the music seem to belong together like the pieces in a puzzle. I, however, feel excluded from this puzzle of matching sounds, gestures and bodies. The ways in which the people on the dance floor enjoy their movements and Nigar's enthusiastic and affirmative reaction to my attempt to dance indicate that female dancing in Azerbaijan 'possess[es] libidinal value by virtue of [its] organization by the symbolic order' (Bratsis 2006: 94). Sharing or not sharing this symbolic order makes bodies connect and disconnect with practices, routines and representations of nation. Not sharing the enjoyment for the dancing, then, helps me understanding my difficulties to embrace the music and the dancing.

In contrast to Nigar, who is *just* dancing and enjoying herself, I 'get "stressed" in [the] encounter' (Ahmed 2007: 156) with her, the music and the bodily movements, because my dancing, imitating Nigar's corporeal movements, strikes me as deviant. In the vignette, I explain that I remain unconvinced by my dancing and that my body feels tense. For me, this style of dancing is exceptional as it jeopardises my 'taken-for-granted sense of (national) identity and place' (Skey 2010: 721). In order to feel less bizarre and to compensate for my lack of genuineness, I mark the bodily movements as Azerbaijani. I identify Nigar's and my own corporeal moves as an Azerbaijani female dancing style as I include our bodily practices into my system of meaning-making, a system which almost unreflexively, and thus in very banal terms, uses nation as a medium of signification. I justify my distress with lacking authenticity through not belonging to an Azerbaijani community constituted of bodies that unexcitedly inherit this style of female dancing. Askew (2002: 221) emphasises the ways in which 'authenticity […] distinguishes those who know (e.g., a dance troupe […]) from those who don't, and thus constitutes a technique of differentiating people and bestowing symbolic capital on a select group'. The degree of feeling authentic in doing dance performances becomes

a central element in separating bodies that belong to a community of shared national dance practices from those who do not belong. My wish to dance authentically, then, validates my imagination that certain corporeal moves are national specific. I feel uneasy and uncomfortable as I realise that I fail to be authentic.

In distancing my non-Azerbaijani female body from the other bodies that I identify as Azerbaijani female bodies, national differentiation becomes my strategy to assess my dancing as *not quite* matching the corporeal performances I observe. In this moment of affective encounter between the music, my body, the gestures of the other dancers and the situation and place of celebrating a first birthday in Baku, nationalism unfolds as the banal way of creating difference.

Being immersed in everyday life in Azerbaijan, I often feel that my bodily sense of self does *not quite* match the idea of Azerbaijani femininity. I feel odd being taller and more athletic than the mainly petite and slender women I see in Azerbaijan. I feel I stand out wearing my thin brown hair short, compared to women in Azerbaijan who often wear their thick dark hair long. I also dress casually compared to young women in Azerbaijan, who dress fashionably. Walking on the street, waiting for the bus or strolling around a public park, I often feel people, in particular younger men and women, gaping at me. Yet, my feelings of difference do not unfold through the peoples' gazes but through my 'ways of seeing the world' (Brubaker 2004: 81). In moments of affective encounters with bodies and objects that irritate in striking me as different, my 'diffuse self-understanding as a member of a particular nation crystallizes into a strongly bounded sense of groupness' (Brubaker 2004: 47). Thus, while I mark the young people staring at me as different, as Azerbaijanis, I identify myself as non-Azerbaijani. To be more precise: in order to cope with my feelings of difference, I make sense of my *looks*, my *corporeality*, as non-Azerbaijani.

Seeing Nigar dance activates my feeling of deviating from the normalcy of Azerbaijani feminine corporeality, of being a non-Azerbaijani woman. At the same time, her corporeal performance strikes me as familiar. I remember how her dancing resembles the dance performances that I have often seen on TV and at past weddings. Through the subliminal activation of past experiences, I know that politeness demands for me to dance. The actual performance of the dancing, however, makes me feel uncomfortable.

Nigar's apparent effortlessness and fluency in moving her torso, legs, arms and hands to the sound of the music in contrast to my sense of discomfort prompts me to interpret her bodily movements as habitual in Azerbaijan. In dancing, 'bodies express already existing normative ideals' (Cresswell 2006: 58). The moment of affective encounter thus yields Nigar's corporeal movements as the conventional and appropriate way of moving on the dance floor during this birthday celebration. At the same time, I experience corporeal alienation through feeling and moving inappropriately and through not sharing this national normalcy of dancing.

It is affect as 'embodied meaning-making' (Wetherell 2012: 4) that incites me to make sense of the dance performances as female dancing in Azerbaijan in order to justify my corporeal discomfort as 'movements are intimately choreographed and patterned with […] words' (Wetherell 2012: 80). Affect conditions my experience of hearing the music, seeing Nigar dancing, moving my own body and feeling awkward. In fact, realising my bodily discomfort is crucial in understanding the role affect plays when I recognise structures of corporeal moves as Azerbaijani way of female dancing. It is through irritation, that means deviation from the known and expected, that I become aware of the moment. The meeting between Nigar's and my bodies, our corporeal moves, feelings and the sense of place develop through the affective encounter. Yet, my experiences of dancing and of feeling inappropriate are not rooted in the body. 'While attention is routed through the matter of corporeality', notes McCormack (2003: 494), 'it is never contained by or limited by the form or position of the body'. Hence, banal nationalism in the form of unnoted, embodied knowledge on national dancing in Azerbaijan gets activated, appropriated and unfolds within affective encounters during this birthday celebration.

My embodied experience of discomfort while dancing marks the ways in which different bodies have different capacities to affect and to be affected, and thus respond differently to national representations. Past experiences and social dispositions influence and effectuate encounters between bodies as they make them resonate differently to affective stimulations. Affective encounters activate bodily histories and make bodies acquire particular qualities (Ahmed 2004). In the vignette, I identified Nigar as an Azerbaijani woman dancing a popular female Azerbaijani dance. I interpreted her movement as a female Azerbaijani dance because

I have observed the same style of dancing of other women during weddings that I have attended in the past and on TV. Somebody else, though, might have gotten interested in, for example, the dress she wore and might not have interpreted her bodily movements as a nationalised style of dancing. 'Various bodies through their racialized, gendered and sexualized markedness, magnetize various capacities for being affected' (Tolia-Kelly 2006: 215). Bodily markedness, somatic experiences and historicity shape the qualities of affective encounters and thus if and how something attracts my or somebody else's attention and makes people reproduce nations. Accordingly, banal nationalisms are not all encompassing. Rather, moments of affective encounters between different bodies generate various reactions in people through rendering bodily histories relevant or irrelevant for a feeling of sharing and connecting with a national collectivity. In fact, a 'national "we" […] expands or shrinks according to the context and the positionality' (Antonsich 2016: 39) of encountering bodies.

Apart from different bodily capacities to affect and to be affected, the specific place and context of the meeting between our bodies conditions the affective encounter as well. My immersion in the family in addition to the atmosphere of the ballroom, the arrangement of chairs and tables, the music and the decoration inspired me to experience the birthday celebration as a specific space to experience Azerbaijani culture that triggered feelings of national belonging and alienation; echoing Navaro-Yashin (2012: 174), different objects constituting a sense of place 'discharge' affects. Yet, I suggest that it was in particular the dancing or corporeal movements on the dance floor that prompted the reproduction of national knowledge. Dancing as an affective device, thus, not only relates different dancing and not dancing bodies, corporeal moves, sounds and places. It is also 'through dance [that] performers and audience members have the potential to experience and witness embodied knowledge' (Barbour and Hitchmough 2014: 64) about the nation.

The moment of affective encounter described in the vignette activates a banal nationalism, in Billig's sense of the term, because the dancing as such emerges as an ordinary corporeal move that I signify as a style of female dancing in Azerbaijan. Whereas I do experience the occasion, the birthday party, as an extraordinary event, the dancing rather adds a feeling of familiarity. I recognise in the style of Nigar's dancing or to be more

precise, in the specific rhythmic coordination of moving the torso, legs, arms and hands, an ordinary feature of everyday life in Azerbaijan. The nationalised ambience this evokes remains at the same time unnoticed in signifying the nation through the everydayness of dancing, yet discernible in attracting my attention through the obviousness of the dancing bodies.

Conclusion

In the first part of the chapter, I quoted Billig (1995) as he admits that he feels pleased when watching a fellow citizen succeeding in international sport's competitions. While I agree with Billig on the observation that nationalism is powerful and persistent because it manifests unnoticed in everyday life, I think his feelings of enjoyment reveal much more in instigating banal nationalisms. I have proposed to attend to more-than-representational manifestations of banal nationalisms such as bodily comfort and discomfort in order to understand its pervasion and persistence in everyday life.

Inspired by feminist scholarship on affect and embodiment and following the methodology of autoethnography, I have revisited a moment of collective folk dancing during my field research in Azerbaijan. I have argued that in moments of affective encounters, bodily performances incite national categorisations through making sense of the felt reality and through dealing with bodily discomfort. Affect activates bodily histories, making different bodies respond in different ways to national representations, such as being more or less affected by the 'unwaved flags'—a recurring topic in Billig's *Banal Nationalism*—or female dancing in Azerbaijan. Attending to corporeal performances and bodily sensations, in particular also of our own bodies as researchers, adds insights onto how nations are reproduced within moments of encountering bodies, performances, routines and places. Disclosing the affective dimensions of banal nationalisms helps to understand the ways in which feelings of national belonging emerge and persist even in moments representations of the nation remain absent. Autoethnography qualifies as insightful methodology to study the affective emergence of different responses to banal nationalisms as it asks the researcher to reflect upon her own bodily dispositions.

In view of current trends calling people to return to alleged national values and traditions all across the globe, research on the emergence of feelings of national belonging and alienation seems more than timely. A conceptual perspective of affect, as I suggest, helps comprehending the ways in which different people are drawn to ideas of national collectivities through bodily, visceral and, in fact, affective experiences of positioning and being positioned in the world.

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Making Sense of Everyday Nationhood: Traces in the Experiential World

Shanti Sumartojo

Introduction

Both representing and reinforcing the nation, national signals take many forms: from banknotes to weather maps, public holidays to school curricula, memorials to parliamentary constituencies, road rules to supermarkets (Billig 1995; Skey 2011; Edensor 2002). In this chapter, I take up the notion that the nation is quietly but persistently reinforced by banal national symbolssymbols by considering how it emerges through the experience of the everyday spaces in which we dwell and through which we move. In doing so, I draw on recent investigations into the role of atmosphere in constituting and inflecting our experiences, asking how this might open up ways of thinking about nationhood in terms of our sensory, imagined and perceived environments.

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One of Billig's most powerful contributions was to draw attention to a sample of symbols that quietly signal the nation, providing a means to understand our own identities and those of others. However, such symbols can also be understood as material objects that afford a range of possible actions or relationships to come into being as they are encountered, perceived and experienced in everyday life. Such 'things' are sticky (Ahmed 2010) in the sense that affective meanings, associations and feelings—pride, embarrassment, nostalgia—can be thought to cling to them and in turn help structure our lives as national, normalising these structures. Such things also structure our relationship with the state, with each other, and with those we are invited to think of as either co-national or foreign. Our encounters with these national symbols are material, spatial and experiential ones. Accordingly, in response to the notion of nations as constructed or imagined, Olsen (2010: 5) insists that 'societies or nation states are not cognitive sketches resting in the minds of people; they are real entities solidly built and well tied together'. The physical realness of nationhood, and our encounters and engagements with it, therefore require ways of thinking nationally that draw together the spatial and temporal.

Indeed, it is impossible *not* to experience the national as a spatial and temporal reality, because almost everywhere is somehow nationally defined. Any of us might think of our homes as primarily about our closest circle of our families, or private spaces kept only for ourselves, but a postal address, local council area, parliamentary constituency or named landscape feature all have official and national meaning. Thus, as Billig argues, in multiple and unavoidable ways that often escape our focused attention, the nation structures how we engage with the world, even if it is not the uppermost aspect of how we understand ourselves and our surroundings. Antonsich (2015) accordingly offers 'everyday nationhood' as a way to recognise the experience and agency of individuals in constituting the nation, arguing that 'the everyday becomes the locus where people creatively and self-consciously mobilise nationhood in their social interactions'. This can also be extended to include the more-than-representational and sensory elements that are part of how we all make sense of our surroundings and their meanings for us. Building on scholarship that treats the nation as atmospheric and

affective, I draw the notion of everyday nationhood together with a focus on experience, its spatialities, temporalities and sensorial qualities, and suggest an approach to the nation that attends to how we trace through, perceive and make sense of it as part of our everyday worlds.

Accordingly, I will explore how the nation is not so much its own category of experience as one part of many of our daily experiences. Indeed, Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008: 537) insist that the nation 'is not simply the product of macro-structural forces; it is simultaneously the practical accomplishment of ordinary people engaging in routine activities'. Lived and experiential, the nation is also therefore messy, contingent and always-already an aspect of everyday life. Nationalism is in this sense an 'act of production' (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008: 550) that is ongoing and emergent through our daily experiences. Furthermore, as Closs Stephens (2016: 2) remarks, 'nationality is often—if not mostly—experienced as a feeling', highlighting the affective and atmospheric aspects of nationhood which can also be revealed by attending to everyday experience.

I therefore want to treat everyday nationhood as something that we make sense of as part of our emergent, everyday activities. To do so, I respond to the notion of banal nationalism—evidenced in those ubiquitous national symbols that help to remind us that the nation structures our everyday lives—with scholarship on how we perceive and make sense of the environments that we move through and in. My analysis is spatially anchored, based on ways of understanding our subjectivities as very much in and of the world, shaped and reshaped by our encounters and entanglements with it. Crucial here is the idea that experience of the world and how we understand these experiences are co-constituted sensorially. This chapter begins with a short vignette of everyday nationhood as it unfolds in my weekday morning routine and the activities, objects and sensory experiences that it emerges as part of.

Most weekdays, my morning begins when I turn on the radio next to my bed. I slowly wake up with a cup of tea listening to the news on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's Radio National. The voice of the usual presenters are familiar and comfortable, and I have an immediate sense of the time (and how urgently I need to get out of bed) by their different voices and subject matter—sport, culture or political

stories are all inflected with different tones and come at the same time in the morning broadcast. I notice different accents, mostly Australian variants, as they switch from speaker to speaker. This is especially evident when the usual breakfast presenter talks to someone without an Australian accent—all of a sudden her normal, unaccented English and familiar vernacular becomes identifiably, undeniably Australian.

By 8.30, I'm urging my son out the door to school, a walk with a schoolmate that takes him along an inner-city creek, planted with native trees and shrubs, where you can see and hear bellbirds and small, hopping fairy wrens. In the early spring, the wattle flowers bloom, their bright yellow puffballs subtly perfuming the air. The colourful display makes the wattle trees stand out from the background foliage for a few weeks, before the flowers fade and the grey-green leaves blend in with their neighbours again. About 10 min after he goes, I leave the house and walk a short distance to drop my daughter at her primary school gate on my way to work. I often notice the sound of pigeons as we walk, because the cooing calls remind me of my mother-in-law's house in rural Bedfordshire, and invoke an physical memory of jet-lagged early mornings and soft, watery English summer light. Other sounds prompt other reactions—the chirpy squawks of the wattlebirds recall beach holidays in southern New South Wales, and there's a quick embodied flashback of bright light on sparkling gum trees and the gentle, even sound of waves. My daughter and I dart over a busy road to the school. The playground is dotted with gum trees, including big logs that have been cut up and left for the children to play with. There has never been a lawn, just dirt and soft fall tan bark that makes the children grubby.

Once or twice a week, I leave the school and pick up a takeaway coffee to drink on the tram on the way to work. On the way to the café, I walk past gardens and street trees—bottlebrush, gum, wattle. I anticipate and slow my pace at the corner with two large she-oaks that make a peculiar, spooky swishing noise as the wind blows through them. If it has been raining, the footpath beneath the thick, needle-shaped leaves is usually a bit dryer, creating a brief change sensed underfoot to accompany the change in sound. I pass a well-known Greek restaurant on the



Fig. 1 The street art mural on the side of a well-known Greek restaurant in Lygon Street, Melbourne. *Photo* author

corner, owned by a celebrity chef. It reminds me of the local history of Greek and Italian immigration to this neighbourhood still evident in the productive fruit trees in the front yards of many gardens on the area, and the surnames of the other boys on my son's football team. On the side of the restaurant is a big mural of battling ancient Greek warriors with improbable abdominal muscles (Fig. 1).

On other days, I ride my pushbike from the school to my office in the city, a distance of about seven kilometres. Along the way, I pass along Amess or Canning Streets, names of former Australian or British politicians that evoke the country's colonial past. Many of the houses are former workers' cottages and some have the early twentieth-century year of their construction embossed on their facades. The vernacular architecture calls to mind the lives of the people who built and lived in them. I pass a public swimming pool, the Carlton Baths, and notice the use of the word 'bath' which I always stumble over a little, thinking it both cute

and particular to the time and place in which it was built. I cross over Lygon Street, a street with a well-known history as a gathering place for post-war Italian immigrants, with its restaurants, delis, gelaterias and pasticcierias where Italian is still spoken and I usually try to use a few little words (ciao, grazie) in a clumsy attempt to be polite. Then I turn left into Swanston Street, and coast down the hill past multiple Chinese, Korean and Indonesian cafes which by lunchtime will be full of overseas students and local workers. I pass my current favourites where I eat with colleagues or take visitors to give them a sense of contemporary, urban Australia.

This brief example begins to demonstrate the encounters and experiences of everyday nationhood that emerge from my typical morning commute. In this account, I have described a trace I make through the world and the things, histories, buildings, people, plants, animals and physical sensations that enliven it. I have hinted at how the nation is implicit in how I move though my surroundings, and how I perceive and feel about this. It shows how the nation is both noticed and unnoticed, including how it emerges in contrast to other national signifiers in accents, names, cuisines or sensory elements like the sound of the wind in the trees, bird calls or the colour of foliage. It demonstrates its entanglement with other ways of scaling experience—the bodily and intimate, familial, local and regional—and the ways that these might inflect and help us make sense of the nation.

Methodologically, it also shows how autoethnography can surface the banal qualities of the nation that Billig's main arguments rest on: that it has become so commonplace that it effectively disappears, at least until it springs into notice. He contends that this is a process of being activated, sometimes to political ends, such as when it is transformed into 'hot' nationalism in times of national conflict. But it could also happen around international sporting events like the Olympics (Closs Stephens 2016), commemorative anniversaries (Sumartojo and Wellings 2014) or in a range of different encounters with 'foreignness' such as tourism (Edensor 1998; Crang and Tolia-Kelly 2010) or food (Longhurst et al. 2008).

Such encounters are, of course, relational moments, that pull the nation into view because something is shifted or disturbed that throws it into sudden contrast. Indeed, Billig (1995: 8) comments that 'having

a national identity also involves being situated physically, legally, socially as well as emotionally: typically it means being situated within a homeland, which is itself situated within the world of nations'. When this comfortable position is unsettled, even in small ways, the nation is framed for us anew (Edensor 2002). Thus, by opening with such an account, I turn to Pink's (2015) call to be attentive to the sensoriality of experience as one way of framing the everyday moments of change, contrast or intensity that push the nation to the foreground. Here, I am 'using the body as an instrument of research' to attend closely to experiences and how they feel, but also to remain reflexive about research 'knowledge', as 'being and knowing cannot be easily separated' (Longhurst et al 2008: 208; Closs Stephens et al n.d.). As I have presented it here, the emergent experience of my journey to work mixes national symbols, knowledge of history and individual choices to generate a unique but also commonplace account of everyday nationhood.

In the rest of this chapter, I use the account above, and the experience of the sensations, thoughts and sense-making that accompanied it, to explore everyday nationhood from two perspectives. The first is how nationhood can be understood as an emergent trace through the world, and the ways in which this can help us surface how the nation is felt as much as how it is reflexively understood. I will discuss the entanglement of the national with other scales of perception and understanding, arguing that these inflect each other to such a degree that it is not necessarily sensible to separate out the national from any other scale of experience or identity. Instead, I will show how an experiential orientation that attends to the sensory can precisely demonstrate the inseparability of the national from other aspects of our everyday lives. A second, related perspective is how we notice, or do not notice, the nation, and the moments when it suddenly becomes visible. Here, I will contrast the everyday with 'eventful' moments when the national is explicit and foremost. To do so, I will draw together and contrast the different spatial and temporal dimensions of special national events with experiences of everyday nationhood by way of recent research on 'atmospheres' that seek to account for how the nation comes to affect us collectively and individually.

Tracing an Emergent Everyday Nationhood

My account described a journey through the world that might vary, but with contours that remain broadly the same every day. The route, the time of day and many of the sensations I experienced were familiar. But at the same time, the perceptions and thoughts that I experienced were not uniform or boring. Instead, the experience emerged as I walked down the footpath or moved along the road on my bike, as I perceived and responded to traffic, other people, animals and plants, light and sound, the weather; in short, all the elements comprise my experiential world. Rather than forming a static or unchanging background, the habit of this route is 'prone to different kinds of modulation', 'thereby changing the lived experience of place as a result' (Bissell 2015: 128). This includes representations and symbols that signal the nation. These are located in emergent, processual experience, allowing us to reach beyond the representational to consider the more-than-representational in comprising everyday nationhood.

This is to treat everyday nationhood as an experiential, temporal and spatial category. As an entry to thinking about how we experience and make sense of the world in this way, I work from place defined as a temporal event, 'the coming together of the previously unrelated, a constellation of processes rather than a thing' (Massey 2005: 141). These are moments of temporary coalescence, a 'throwntogetherness' that are the outcome of encounter and negotiation, an articulation of different elements coming together to shape particular experiences of a distinctive 'here-and-now', even when many of these elements are already well known. Indeed, one of Massey's best-known examples is her sketch of London's Kilburn High Road. She briefly describes the features of this neighbourhood in terms of its connections to other places that often touch on national categories: the allusions to Irish nationalism in place names and event advertisements; the longstanding sari shop; the Muslim shop owner 'silently chafing at having to sell the *Sun*'; planes flying overhead to distant destinations (Massey 1994). All of these traces and trails in and out of the High Road build a picture of things and people that occur in a particular location as part of ongoing processes of history and globalisation.

Massey's depiction of Kilburn has similarities with Ingold's subsequent treatment of place as an open process. However, he instead turns place inside out, proposing that 'lives are led not inside places but through, around, to and from them, from and to places elsewhere' (Ingold 2011: 148). Here, people experience the world as traces through dynamic environments and surroundings, rather than in bounded spatial 'containers' of activity. Ingold's particular focus rests on the trace, and how we make sense of and craft meaning from our lives through embodied movements in, through and around our surroundings. He uses the term 'wayfaring' to characterise this movement, a process that creates traces, paths or trails that emerge and unfurl in response to the changing everyday conditions of our environments. Our experience is thus emergent and processual, always unfolding in a relationship between our bodies, perceptions, thoughts and environments, as in my account above. This metaphor of the trace enables us to consider a phenomenology of the everyday that treats space as relational, subject to multiplicity, and perpetually unfinished. How we make sense of our everyday world is a result of our surroundings, how we encounter and engage with them, and what subsequent experiences and relationalities they afford. This extends to nationhood because the environments we move through, and that we use to make sense of ourselves in the world, are replete with the national things that Billig identified. How we relate to these is how our nationhood is expressed, understood and felt. Accordingly, Merriman and Jones (2016: 4) invite us to consider nationhood as ongoing and processual in affective terms:

> Relational and processual approaches to nationalism and national identity have the potential to facilitate more nuanced accounts of the continual backgrounding and foregrounding of relations and tensions, the intermittent flagging and emergent qualities of expressions of nationalism and national identity, and the inter-subjective relations, tensions and affects associated with national and nationalist sentiments and feelings.

For example, the sensory aspects of my walk, such as the sound of doves or the wind in the she-oaks, suddenly thrust me into an *explicitly* national awareness. This then fell away as my attention was distracted

by an uneven stretch of footpath or a sudden, awkward burst of speed to catch the approaching tram. Here, everyday nationhood intensifies and dissipates according to the other sensations, perceptions and experiences of my trace through the world. This recalls Bissell's (2015: 128) comment on habit and how its 'changing intensities…alter the way that places are inhabited and experienced'. Even in routine activities, when bodily habit is imbricated with nationhood by the way of sensory experience, as in my account, noticing and not noticing become subject to the small flows, bursts and lulls of the intensity of unremarkable, everyday experience. This builds on Edensor's (2002: 21) exploration of 'how reflexive awareness can result from disruption', when we are outside our everyday patterns of behaviour, perception and interaction. He describes how unreflexive ways of understanding and acting in the world—from a culturally shaped sense of privacy to the way we move and how we eat—can be challenged in new and unfamiliar spatial and cultural surroundings. However, in my account, this also happens in smaller, less dramatic circumstances; as I describe my everyday morning routine, for example, I only notice the mainstream, metropolitan Australian accent of the radio presenter when she speaks to someone with a different accent. It also highlights my own immigrant accent, invoking reflection on the complexities of my own national identity and relationship with Australia.

My account thus broadly accords with Billig's (1995: 8) remark that the nation is always present, that there is a 'continual "flagging", or reminding, of nationhood…[but that] this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding'. However, rather than thinking of nationhood as the background of the everyday life, always present and just waiting to be noticed if only we become conscious of it, instead I want to suggest that the nation is *emergent* through our everyday encounters with and through our surroundings. In other words, in our everyday lives, we come to know and understand the nation by means of the trace and the contingency and dynamism it implies. Thus, the nation is not outside or beyond us somehow, but knotted into experience. We come to know it by way of the intensities that occur when representation (schools, paintings, street names) tangles with sensory experience (sound, wind, bodily movement), cognitive

knowledge (history of immigration) and personal memory and reflexivity (my own accent, Bedfordshire doves). This is the relationality that Merriman and Jones remark on: the nation is deeply subjective *and* external, affective *and* representational, and always background *and* foreground.

This means that we must take seriously and attend to how nationhood 'feels', expanding the focus from what we think about national symbols to what emotional responses accompany them. Indeed, Closs Stephens (2016: 4) asks, what can attention to the "banal' feelings—moods that we 'simply go along with" of a national moment (her example is the Olympic games)—bring into focus about how we experience nationhood and the implicit power and potential resistance to this power bound up in this relationship. Such feelings result from our encounters with other people and things that knot us into meshworks of experience that become denser and more meaningful over time. Feelings such as pride, nostalgia, shame, sadness or excitement can be said to accrue alongside national meaning to particular sites, objects, things, rituals and texts (Nora 1989), a part of what Dwyer (2004) calls 'accreted symbolism' that can then be deployed to political ends and that can carry implications of inclusion and exclusion (Sumartojo 2016). An example of this can be found in national events and the atmospheres they engender, which I turn to in the next section.

National Atmospheres: The Eventful and the Everyday

Recent work on national atmospheres, much of which is based on human geography, is situated in particular locations or events, many of them related to explicitly national days. For example, recent studies focus on state commemoration at memorial or public urban sites (Closs Stephens et. al 2017; Sumartojo 2015, 2016); the nationally specific manipulation of light in domestic interiors (Bille 2014; Tanazaki 1977), or at festivals or other events (Edensor 2012; Sumartojo 2014); and through music and sound (Wood 2012; Marshall 2004). All of these attend to the experience, perception and sense-making that occur

within particular surroundings as they are experienced by participants. They explore how the practices that seek to design or constitute atmospheres are in turn understood as national, and unpick the different scales at which nationhood is emergent, from the individual to the state. For example, in a recent work on the commemoration of the 2005 London bombings, Closs Stephens et. al (2017) note the individual gestures and small-scale ceremonies at each of the four bombing sites and the much larger event in Hyde Park as all moments when the national was evident in different ways. This account also pulls together the representational and the affective to build a way of thinking about nationhood as something we feel—in both a sensory and emotional sense—as well as self-reflexively understand. Elsewhere, I have drawn these elements by way of the notion of 'commemorative atmospheres' to try and understand how such events feel to participants, and how this in turn reproduces and reinforces that nation in particular ways. I have argued (Sumartojo 2016) that national atmospheres matter because:

> individual and collective anticipation and sensory perception mix with memorial landscapes and built environments to co-constitute such atmospheres. In turn, these can help explain the affective impact of commemoration and how it connects individuals to historical narratives, collective memory and national imagined communities.

Thinking about the nation in atmospheric terms demands that we attend to the physical locations in which it is experienced, its particular temporalities, the individual subjectivities of the people who experience it and the ways in which they move through, sense and perceive the nation, as I have discussed above. One aspect of how understanding and feeling come together is in the conditions in which the nation is noticed; indeed, Billig's account of banal nationalism rested on symbols that were so commonplace that they became virtually invisible. In a similar vein, Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008: 549) contend that 'monuments as inconspicuous as trees or lampposts are effective not because they attract attention but because they don't attract attention. These symbols stealthily concoct and legitimate a world of nations without inviting critical engagement'.

However, such symbols can suddenly appear when their social or spatial context changes. As an example, I have written elsewhere (Sumartojo 2013) about public artwork in Trafalgar Square, in London. In 2010, a new contemporary sculpture, Yinka Shonibare MBE's *Nelson's Ship in a Bottle*, was installed on the Square's fourth plinth. It depicted the Admiral Nelson's *HMS Victory* with its sails fabricated in colourful Dutch wax fabric. This fabric is a feature of Shonibare's contemporary art practice and in the Trafalgar Square work, it acted as a subtle visual reminder of the economic, cultural and social entanglements of imperialism. Of this work, at least one commentator remarked that it caused her to 'pay attention to the original reason for this square's existence' (Higgins 2010), as it highlighted the history represented in the Square itself. However, the overt and representational symbols of the nation in things such as public monuments are only one obvious example of how the nation might be all around us if only we notice it. Treatments of national atmospheres (including my own) that look to spectacular or unusual events only account for the nation at times when it is obvious, perhaps at the forefront because of a national holiday or sporting event, or when we are asked to engage directly with state structures when crossing borders, voting or enrolling our children in school. Instead, what I am arguing for here are additional accounts of the nation that locate it in the emergent and quotidian traces that we make through our surroundings in our everyday lives.

In terms of how national atmosphere might imbue everyday experience, a processual approach to nationhood that locates the 'feel' of the nation as relational between bodies, things and environments is helpful. In his discussion of 'affective atmospheres', Anderson (2014: 9) calls for an 'understanding of the body-in-the-world which locates lived experience as an intersubjective space between perception and the body', asking 'How are bodies formed through relations that extend beyond them and how do bodily capacities express and become part of those relations?' In my own account above, everyday nationhood is evident in the sensations and relations that emerge as I move through the world. The unpredictable eruption of affective and sensory memory is evident, for example, in the sound of a dove cooing in Melbourne that prompted a return to the jet-lagged perception of daylight in southern England.

This is akin to what Muzaini (2015) calls a 'memory return', an unanticipated and involuntary intrusion of the past into present that is an affordance of our surroundings. However, in my narrative, the national aspects of my surroundings are as much sensorially and affectively *felt* as they are cognitively *understood*. These intensities matter in terms of nationhood because they remind us of the nation, but also because they prompt feelings to emerge (in my case of an awareness of distance mixed with nostalgia and bodily tiredness) that work to render this reminding more powerful and lasting.

Indeed, recent scholarship that has begun to explore how national identity can be understood as affective and atmospheric focuses on how the nation 'feels' as a way to analyse its capacity to cohere political communities around shared feelings and the implications for national dynamics of inclusion and exclusion (Merriman and Jones 2016; Sumartojo and Stevens 2016; Sumartojo 2016; Closs Stephens 2016; Militz and Schurr 2015). This includes the way the nation can evoke strong feelings and how these might move between people; the continual success of the national rallying call to action; and the way it can justify political decision-making by way of belief or feeling. Affect and atmosphere thus help us to see how nationhood works at different scales. At the national event, affects can be understood as shared in a particular space and time in ways that exceed the event's individual participants and environments. As people participate in choreographies of commemoration, such as two-minute silence or singing anthems or hymns, they demonstrably reproduce national rituals. At the same time, if we approach nationhood on the scale of the individual, these affects are revealed as less robust and monolithic, and more partial and contingent, as Antonsich and Skey (2016) point out. Experiential accounts, including those offered by auto-ethnography, allow nationhood to emerge as much more varied and individual, something that unfolds within and as part of national structures, cultures or landscapes, but not uniformly or even predictably.

In addition to revealing its contingency, locating national identity in experience in this way allows us to understand it as individual, shared amongst different groups or promulgated through state structures, all at the same time. For example, in my account above, the voice of

a radio presenter—and the feelings and thoughts that her narrative prompted—was a shared point of reference, connecting me to other Radio National listeners, which is in turn a subset of the state broadcaster that reaches all of Australia and beyond (see Skey 2014). This question of scale—and the entanglement of different scales—is a crucial one for the account of processual, experiential nationhood that I have outlined above. Indeed, the identification of the national as a distinct category of identity separates it out from the many other locations of our identities that frame our everyday experience. For example, in his study of Italianness in students at a multicultural vocational school in Milan, Antonsich (2015: 7) shows how the category of an Italian 'we' is a contingent and fluid category taken up variously: 'Rather than a single, homogeneous national "we", evenly reproduced through the banality of nationalism, nationhood appears as a much more complex phenomenon when looked through the ways people make it meaningful in their everyday'. Similarly, Jones and Fowler (2007: 388) identify the 'mutual interpenetration of different scales at which the national might be evident, making it difficult conceptually 'to separate out one from another'. Thus, a focus on how the nation is *felt* in our banal activities and sensory experiences allows us to grapple with the question of scale because it shows how everyday nationhood emerges precisely through the interaction and mixture of different scales of meaning and representation.

Conclusion

Thinking about nationhood as emergent and processual allows us to attend to it as a relational practice—it is not simply the bird call, school or Greek restaurant itself, but how we relate to and understand it, the feelings, thoughts and bodily and sensory experiences that emerge in our encounters with it. It follows that nationhood cannot be separated out from other ways of thinking about our surroundings and ourselves in them, or indeed from other scales of individual and group identity. The entanglements of everyday life do not adhere to tidy categories—mother, middle-class, heterosexual, mixed-race, urban—and so to try

and distinguish everyday nationhood from the contexts in which it emerges risks stripping it of meaning and nuance. Instead, attending to nationhood through the lens of everyday experience opens ways of thinking about it as fluid and emergent that also leaves space for it to prompt diverse political outcomes. In other words, rather than Billig's conclusion that the continual background flagging of the nation can lead to potentially violent and 'hot' forms of national mobilisation in war, for example, a more emergent version of everyday nationhood leaves space for nuanced and individual reactions, even while recognising its structural presence.

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Doing Affect Around National Days: Mundane/Banal Practice or the Call of 'Another Space'?

T. McCreanor, E. Muriwai, M. Wetherell,
H. Moewaka Barnes and A. Moewaka Barnes

Introduction

Billig's (1995) work on 'banal nationalism' brought conceptual innovation into the study of the association between 'hot' and 'cold' variants of nationalism, informing debates about national narratives, identities and nationhood in ways that have become ever more salient in a globalizing world. Along with other offerings (Billig 1994, 1996), his work socializes human behaviours, actions and events in their everyday settings in ways that can help account for seemingly ephemeral, pre-verbal, affective identity practices that could otherwise remain mysterious, unexplored and uncanny. However, while Billig's work is broadly inclusive of the social and psychological dynamics that underpin the interplay

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between the orchestrated political performance of national identity and the mundane, everyday identity practices of citizens, affect, emotion, feelings and spirituality were never his specific focus.

This chapter focuses on the role of affect and emotion in national commemorations seeking to develop this aspect of Billig's work. Although we reject the claim that affect is non-representational while emotion is cultural and discursive, it is nonetheless sometimes useful to maintain some distinction between affect and emotion. For us, affect is the broader, generic and more-encompassing term. Affect includes myriad ways of being moved, such as for instance ways recognized in indigenous societies that do not easily fit Western formulations of emotion or the conventional cultural categorizations that define distinct emotions.

We draw from a publicly funded research project in Aotearoa, New Zealand that has centred on affect and a related Māori concept, *wairua*.[1] Our methods are qualitative. Affective–discursive modes of analysis (Wetherell 2013) have been adapted to describe, interpret and disseminate our findings and a *wairua* approach has been developed (Moewaka Barnes et al., forthcoming) to capture the fluidity of this concept that covers, but is not limited to, emotions and connections in time and place. We gathered observational data from 'go-along' video interviews in a range of settings commemorating the nation, collecting participant meaning making at live events. In addition, we conducted focus groups and key informant discussions, and studied a corpus of media materials to tap into the everyday understandings around national identity in circulation in this supposedly bicultural society (Wairua Affect and National Days 2016).

We are interested in the affective dynamics and *wairua* involved in acts of commemoration and celebration and their mundane antecedents and sequel. National events, such as Waitangi Day (6 February) and Anzac Day (25 April) in Aotearoa New Zealand, are condensed and overdetermined moments in the life of the nation. These public performances in discrete sites bring together many threads and themes in social relations (Wetherell et al. 2015), histories, tensions and futures. Commemorations of the nation build from, and reciprocally infuse, everyday experiences, revealing some of the texture of banal nationalism (Billig 1995).

The 'high days' are focused on and shaped by constructed built environments—monuments, inscriptions, statuary—and entail gatherings, speeches, flags, banners, military displays and civic mobilizations (Mitchell 2003). They draw upon, refresh and recreate the 'background of felt dispositions' (Gilroy 1993), and 'communities of feeling' (Berezin 2002, p. 48) that recursively feed into personal positioning, collective identities and 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983).

Acts of commemoration and celebration are significant because their particular unfolding has major implications for identity, well-being and social cohesion (Ashley 2016; Elgenius 2011; McCrone and McPherson 2009). As the history of Waitangi Day, an annual national commemoration in Aotearoa, New Zealand demonstrates, the events are sites where difference and otherness are overtly managed and where the boundaries and limits of inclusion and exclusion are often explicitly marked, debated and struggled over. They articulate and make salient the politics, emotions, discourses, practices and conflicts that are often submerged in mundane practice, vividly and emblematically demonstrating what is at stake (McConville et al. 2016)

We survey in this chapter some of the broad points that emerge from our investigations. We explore the ways in which affect is built, choreographed and positioned, becoming a powerful and canonical influence on the ways in which people are 'moved' at national commemorative events. We end the chapter with a brief consideration of resistant affective practices in the Aotearoa, New Zealand context. First, however, what do we argue about the nature of affect and emotion? How do we understand their role in commemoration and how do we make feelings amenable to social research investigation?

Affect and Social Practice

In recent years, as part of a generalized 'turn to affect' in cultural studies and social theory (Clough and Halley 2007; Thrift 2008), researchers have formulated affect as a kind of extra-discursive force, intensity or excess. Affect has been understood as the undifferentiated hit of events upon bodies, sparked, for instance, by atmospheres (Anderson 2009).

Affect has been conceptualized as 'wild', immediate and untamed, while, in contrast, emotion has been understood as the cultural packaging. Emotion becomes affect that is mediated, domesticated and imbued with discourse (Massumi 2002). It is certainly the case that national commemoration can be turbulent, intense and deeply felt, but we have argued (Wetherell 2012; Wetherell et al. 2015) that it is unhelpful to distinguish affect as different in kind from emotion and to set up affect as a force beyond representation. We have not found this perspective on affect (and by extension *wairua*) to be a useful way of investigating the flashes of rage, lumps in the throat, visceral upsets, narratives of indifference, the sense of connection with ancestors and other felt phenomena of national commemoration.

Affect as excess becomes mystified in our view and the connections between feeling, meaning making, habit, distinction, power relations and processes of validation and legitimation become obscure. We have argued that, for affect and wairua, processes of meaning making are always central. As psychological research (Barrett 2009; Russell 2003) maintains, there is no pure, unconstructed moment when bodies and brains are recruited prior to the process of making sense. To feel something is always to engage in human cultural history. Methodologically, then, our interest turns from the moment when events intersect with bodies to the patterning of affect and *wairua* across individuals and collectives, and time, along with the social implications and consequences of those patterns.

We approach these patterns through the lens of social practice (Wetherell 2012; Wetherell et al. 2015) extending ways of conceptualizing and investigating discourse practices to what we understand as the affective–discursive. As Schatzki (2001) argues, a practice is a 'nexus of doings and sayings': embodiment and meaning-making are entirely entangled. Practices are both solid and fragile. Solid in the sense that they can become habits, familiar body/mind routines, automatic, non-conscious, repetitive and thus constraining future conduct. But fragile in that practice is also flexible, open to modification, always instantiated in context and thus variable, shifting and subject to both rapid and evolving change. Our focus then is on the affective–discursive practices of national commemoration. All social practices (shopping, leisure,

work-based, etc.) are, of course, affective (include some relation to emotional investment). Affective–discursive practices, however, are those classes of practice organized more substantially and primarily around the feelings (mourning, celebrating, indignation) where affect is more centre stage.

Our interest is in the regular and ordered ways national feeling is practised in Aotearoa, New Zealand. We are interested in the ways material and built spaces articulate with designed rituals and informal assemblies, in how affecting spaces are built and choreographed. We are also interested in the subject positions (affected and affecting positions) affective–discursive practices make available, and how these are taken up, enacted, resisted and reworked. Amongst this, we are particularly interested in what becomes canonical and untroubled, the taken-for-granted forms of mild and strong affect, and what this tells us about social relations between settlers, indigenous Māori and new migrants. Our brief survey begins by introducing the two main national commemorations in Aotearoa.

Waitangi Day and Anzac Day

Waitangi Day and Anzac Day are the two most widely recognized events in the national calendar of Aotearoa, New Zealand. Generally, each evokes very different responses for two key groups of citizens: indigenous Māori and settler Pākehā (those of European origin).

Waitangi Day commemorates the 1840 signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi.[2] This treaty was the precursor to the entrenchment of the colonization in Aotearoa, New Zealand that continues to visit damage, harms and injustice upon a hitherto sovereign people (Ballara 1986; Belgrave et al. 2004). For these reasons, while accorded respect as the decision of ancestors, it is also seen as marking the beginning of official British settlement, involving Crown breaches and loss for Māori. In the contemporary setting, commemoration of the events of 1840 presents opportunities for dissent from the imposed social order and celebration of Māori resistance and identity (McAllister 2008). For Pākehā, different forms of complexity arise around the

legitimation of their presence offered by Te Tiriti, despite the manifest breaches. In official rhetoric, for instance, Te Tiriti o Waitangi is often represented as the 'birth of the nation', or our 'founding document'. Continuing issues from the colonial history mean that, especially in Pākehā accounting, Waitangi Day is a contested space, seen as a day of tension, conflict and recrimination (McConville et al. 2014) that divides rather than unites, and often as an 'unsuccessful' vehicle for building and maintaining national identity.

Anzac Day originated in 1915 (The Dominion 1915) as a celebration of the apparently successful invasion of Turkey at Gallipoli on the 25 April by British imperial forces including New Zealand and Australian troops. As the actuality of that disaster emerged however, it became a mourning of the dead, a commemoration and acknowledgement of bravery and carnage and later, an honouring of those who served in subsequent conflicts. Despite the losses, grief and contradictions, for longstanding settler peoples in particular, Anzac Day is now seen as a stable, consensual national commemoration marking a defining moment in the history of Aotearoa, taking on the status of the 'coming of age' for the new society and, in this sense at least, a celebration of national identity. While Māori actively engage in Anzac Day events, their marginalized, subaltern status is mirrored in the management of the events that cannot recognize their particular identity, aspirations and grievances, and generally subsume them within the established commemorations. There are departures from this, particularly in rural areas with high Māori populations where commemorations take on a quite different form.

These characterizations of two central national commemorative days are necessarily stripped of their complexity, vitality and nuance, but, nevertheless, we hope it is clear how these reflect the deeply ingrained inequalities and conflicts that pervade every aspect of life in Aotearoa salient to relations between the indigenous inhabitants and the waves of settlers who have arrived since 1840. The Pākehā colonial project (Bell 2004; McCreanor 2012), through its imperialist aspirations, arrogation of executive power, foundationally racist assumptions and discriminatory institutional infrastructures, has in less than two centuries established a 'European' society in Aotearoa. Here power, wealth and

privilege largely lodge with the settlers, while disenfranchisement, dispossession and disparity are the legacies for Māori.

One marker of this unjust regime is the control of decision-making, policy and resourcing reflected in the vastly differing investments of state funding and resources in the two days that are out of balance by orders of magnitude. Anzac Day receives considerably more government funding and official support than the more contested Waitangi Day. These differences and everyday tensions over the recognition, primacy and popular support of commemorations producing and reproducing legitimacy, potency and dominance, are pivotal to particular forms of personal and national identity.

Building for Affect

Wairua, emotion and feelings at these national day events are easily perceived and are easily seen as primary, spontaneous, non-rational and asocial, appearing to 'break out' as happiness, anger or as embodied moments of identification, belonging or marginalization. As in Australia, Anzac Day crowds attend dawn services in small towns and larger cities in reverential silence (Sumartojo 2015), wearing medals family members, marching to the stark military memorials to lay wreaths, their voices swelling to the national anthem.

For Anzac Day, there are both central and local monuments that provide the physical focus for remembrance ceremonies. As well as the official events, these often involve gatherings of descendants of soldiers who died or otherwise served. Newly commissioned for the centenary of the Gallipoli landings in 2015, the National War Memorial, Pukeahu, in the capital city Wellington is a key location, supplanting the Cenotaph (built in 1931 on the approximate site of 1915 celebration), as the national centre of commemoration. Many regional centres and local communities have produced memorial structures that include museums, churches, obelisks gateways and gardens. Some are humble, little more than aides-de-memoire, while others are imposing and storied with explanatory plaques, perhaps intended to inspire awe, humility or gratitude. It is commonplace throughout the country in April to find

both city sites and standing stones at lonely rural crossroads adorned with freshly laid wreaths, and other marks of respect.

Waitangi Day is also marked in multiple sites, some events acknowledging the meaning of the day in name only, focusing on performances and market-type stalls. At Waitangi itself, where Te Tiriti was first signed, commemorations cover the gamut, from ceremony, discussions of nation and the meaning of the day, including state breaches and failures to enact Te Tiriti, to 'family fun', stalls and bouncy castles. The media focus on this site, particularly on a *marae*[3] anticipating and eagerly reporting any sign of protest or 'threat' to notions of national unity and family enjoyment of the day.

As Mitchell (2003) and others have noted these places are materially constructed and embedded in historical discourses. The location, ritual time and commemorative actions assemble together in a choreographed and carefully managed display. The national Treaty Grounds at Waitangi, originally Māori land, encompass the location of the first signings of Te Tiriti o Waitangi between the Crown and tribes and subtribes in February 1840. From about 1940, particularly under the guidance of Māori leader Sir Apirana Ngata, it was a site of great celebration with spectacular performances by both Māori and Pākehā, of iconic cultural practices, speech-making, feasting and other nation-building activities. Other *marae* up and down the country are also used for local or regional events. These spaces are deeply infused with textures of feeling about Te Tiriti, the Māori world and the relationships between Māori and Pākehā. Similarly, regional and local gatherings at *marae* acknowledge Te Tiriti, the wisdom and aspirations of those signing it and both the benefits and the harms that have arisen from it.

These diverse, formal and informal, places cohere as memorial networks, produced through the collaborative initiative of communities in social and material constructions that become vehicles for the carriage and transmission of wairua and feelings about events of national significance. To assemble in these places, especially with solemnity and purpose in the company of like-minded others, evokes the affective investments they represent. Like Billig's waved and unwaved flags, the monuments never sleep, speaking always into the mundane, everyday pursuits of citizens as they work their daily round. *Marae* and

pou whakamaharatanga,[4] church and memorial are steadfast reminders, mostly whispering, sometimes shouting the stories of our troubled, intertwined histories, telling us who we are, who we are not and who we could be.

In the weeks before these national days, Anzac venues such as cenotaphs wake from their everyday state and other sites begin their passage to becoming an active platform for affective ceremony and commemoration. Committees are convened, grant applications are written, events are planned and tasks allotted in a determined social bustle that reconstitutes the annual activities. These cooperative ventures, patterned but unique, are the social wheels upon which our national days run forward, the wind beneath their affective wings. Routine-like social practices, each with their historical context of people, ideology, power relations, institutional players and localized cultures, go about the business of adaptive, flexible, context-dependent unfolding and remaking a new Waitangi Day or Anzac Day. The assemblages of the historically entrenched elements are married with current contingencies, problems arise and solutions are generated, until a prospective image of the day, recognizable from its precursors, beckoning to days to come, emerges through the hard graft of socially mediated affective–discursive work. Politicians and administrators of all stripes influence such initiatives by spending or withholding local funds for events that they perceive will gain the approval of their constituents. These annual temporal cycles connect the past, the present and the future, intensifying the sense of the nation as a collective, moving together through history (Anderson 1983).

In parallel and connected to these efforts, mass media steadily begin to increase their outputs, projecting their particular orientation to the topics onto pages, screens and airwaves at volume and scale. In relation to Anzac Day, they run 'hero profiles', community engagement stories, intergenerational identity sagas as well as relatively uncontested views of governing politicians and community leaders, as a multifaceted endorsement of the notion that the commemorations are an untroubled good for the nation and national unity. At the same time, detractors and the indifferent are variously depicted and derided as callous, ignorant or seditious, leaving no real space for informed dissent. Some

forms of affect are validated and naturalized, and others marginalized. An emphasis on affective practice has allowed us to explore these processes (Wetherell et al. 2015; McConville et al. 2016), in contrast the naturalization of affect becomes invisible when affect is understood as a non-representational excess.

Waitangi Day is treated very differently in the media, befitting its status as a contested national commemoration (McConville et al. 2014). Instead, there is a seamless construction of potential and anticipated trouble as the media revivify a powerful narrative about conflict, and remind audiences of Pākehā grievances about the threat to celebrations by Māori protest. The spectre of potential protest is personified by the demonizing of various Māori who have been critical of the Crown and the celebrations. Some do note the unjust legacy of colonization that has left the indigenous people, who make up 15% or the population, with less than 1% of the land and resources in a complete reversal of Māori and Pākehā fortunes since the signing of Te Tiriti. At the same time, a clear contrast is wrought between the anticipated negativity of events at Waitangi and the community events (usually sports carnivals or 'family fun days') organized at regional and local levels. The latter, preferred version of Waitangi Day, plays out as a humanized foil for the conflict-oriented coverage that (nowadays) infrequently occurs at the official events.

Choreographing Affect

These accounts of the preparations that build symbolic spaces, and the social narratives that construct events, emphasize their non-spontaneous, thoroughly social and practiced constitutions. This social work is mirrored in the running of the events themselves priming and grounding the affective reactions of those who gather to participate.

Waitangi Day at the Treaty Grounds begins at dawn with prayers, a service of commemoration, speeches and song. Anzac Day at the Wellington Cenotaph on 25th April commences at 5.30 am with a commemoration service, speeches and military displays. The timing is significant because daybreak is powerfully associated with new

beginnings, taking stock of what lies ahead and clarity emerging from darkness; these shared meanings are often evoked as speakers welcome and guide participants through the ceremonies. This understanding is paralleled in Māori conceptualization as coming from a state of *P*ō (nothingness, darkness), to *te Ao* (a state of lightness and resolution). This transition could also be reflected through senses of *wairua* (Valentine 2009). From this perspective, attending a dawn ceremony can be a rite of passage into 'knowing how to be' which makes sense in the choreography of the events and the social practices these entail (Sumartojo 2015). For Māori, this can be problematized when there is an absence of representation, acknowledgement and/or inclusion in what constitutes the events at Anzac.

Organized programmes for the main days use designated actors and agreed orders; coordinated timing and dramatic elements provide members of the public with platforms, prompts and positionings around which to feel, emote and identify. Established norms and practices mean that crowds of strangers of great diversity can work the cues of space, time and talk to 'perform' these ceremonies with appropriate gravitas, engagement and collectivity that are easily characterized as the reflecting the spirit of the days, seemingly welling up from the emotional depths.

A striking example of the mundane maintenance of such affective choreography is available through one of the signal activities of Anzac services; the bugle rendition of the military call, 'the Last Post'. The centenary commemoration of WW1 in Aotearoa, New Zealand is a four-year event running from 2015 to 2018 and one of the announcements at the inaugural event at Pukeahu on 25 April 2015 was the intention to have the call repeated every evening for the duration (Cooke et al. 2015). The effect is both to extend the reach of the annual event and to entrench it in the everyday lives of local citizens who, when in the vicinity will hear and potentially see the daily ritual. Engagement of citizens will embed knowledge of the action via their networks, mass media coverage will remind national audiences (Skey 2014; Wetherell et al. 2015), and updates on Ministry of Culture and Heritage and other websites will enable the continuity of remembrance.

Affective Positioning, Canonical Feeling

In addition to the building and choreographing of commemorative activities, we have been exploring the affecting and affected positions set up for participants. What kinds of feeling subjectivities are proposed, modelled, valorized and what is absent, sanctioned or avoided? The exploration of positioning here follows similar work in discourse studies (e.g. Wetherell and Edley 1998). The assumption is not of a kind of affective–discursive determinism and compulsory interpellation into feeling positions. Rather positioning is understood as active negotiation, a flexible and often inconsistent process. People typically emote differently in relation to the same issue as the positioning process shifts and changes. Our focus is on the range of positions available and what amongst these become canonical in particular contexts.

We offer a brief summary based mainly on media materials for Anzac Day, before shifting our analytic energies more specifically to Waitangi Day and drawing on participant data. For Anzac Day, the affective positions on offer include *the true Kiwi, the galvanized community citizen, the pilgrim on a spiritual journey, the disrespectful menace* and *the despicable deviant* (McConville et al. 2016). Anzac Day is a context in which settler cultural identity is deeply entrenched. These positions elaborate degrees of engagement that enable emotional identification to be managed around hegemonic forms. What is clear from these positions is that there is little scope for Māori assertions of Anzac roles to be validated.

For Waitangi Day, our account of affective positioning is anchored in go-along and focus group data, and from media representations where such activities are manifest.

We begin with the latter and instantiate some of the insights to show the ways in which such affective–discursive positions are set up in media discourse. This excerpt is taken from an Opinion piece in a major weekend newspaper shortly after Waitangi Day 2013.

> Waitangi Day isn't presented as a day for all of us. It's presented as a special day for Māori. In particular, it appears a day for special Māori to complain to Government. There doesn't seem to be much about the day for the rest of us, including most Māori. Indeed, if anything, it appears

that most of us should wander about for the day being very, very sorry for our failure to honour and respect the Treaty.

But we don't. That's because we don't feel sorry at all. So the day doesn't really work.

Besides, why should we be apologising and feeling sorry on what is supposed to be our national day? We should be out and about celebrating and counting our many blessings. That's what national days are meant to be about."

[Herald on Sunday, 10.02.13, A43]

The commentator here rehearses a number of familiar affective positions, troubling some of these and affirming others. The reader (seemingly positioned as Pākehā) is reminded that they could feel excluded (not a day for all of us), that they could rebel against feeling sorry for failing to respect the Treaty (we don't feel sorry at all), that they could feel frustrated at the day not being more celebratory. A possible positive affective position is offered (counting our blessings). For Māori readers, the positioning is further reduced. Either you can be one of those 'special Māori' who complain and protest, or you can join 'the rest of us' and be indifferent to the history. The silence here on reasons why Māori may not be counting their blessings, means they remain abstract, alienating and represented by 'the Treaty' which ensures that Māori are negatively loaded as pursuing incomprehensive grievances that prevent appropriate celebration. These positionings are integral to the colonizing discourse (McCreanor 2012) that explains Pākehā pre-eminence and superiority while preserving the feel of objectivity and common sense. Commonplace affective practices of expressive disappointment at enjoyment thwarted, resentment and being wronged are at work modelling affective positions that readers are implicitly enjoined to take up through appeals to national identity carried by the use of pronouns and other elements of construction.

The affective positions constructed in such media discourse begin to suggest the shape of the canonical (see McConville et al. 2014;

Moewaka Barnes et al. 2013; Wetherell et al. 2015) and indeed many of these positions can also be seen at work in less-polished more-experiential participant accounts gathered through our project. A first excerpt comes from a go-along interview recorded on the morning of Waitangi Day 2014 as we left the venue in an urban centre near the capital Wellington. We had watched *kapa haka* (action songs), listened to speeches and wandered through the cluster of stalls in the city park, the participant—a Pākehā male in his 40 s—expressing some criticism of the event but generally supportive. As we walked through an adjacent shopping mall en route to our car, he offered these reflections.

> [Rob] … I mean the thing is that you've gotta realise that there's only 10% of the population is actually Māori. They're the minority. They're not the majority. And as much as you can have your voice and you can have your say, and you can absolutely do your culture, don't expect anyone else to follow it, you know?
>
> [TM] Mmmm
>
> [Rob] What they were saying before [in the speechmaking] you know "welcome to our country". The problem is that 174 years ago they signed the Treaty to say we will work together, so why is it still [Māori] country and not 'ours', you know? People quite often say what was changed and what was done to the culture, you know, this has stopped and this has stopped, you know? What about the positives? They never get mentioned you know?

These arguments, which are part of what we have referred to elsewhere as a standard story of Māori/Pākehā relations in Aotearoa (McCreanor 2008), are supported by elements of the affective positioning. Māori are clearly located as having transgressed through having expectations about their culture and more importantly for having a negative take on society and making provocations over ownership of the country. The use of pronouns and the construction around 'voice' and 'say' create an accusatory tone that creates the impression of Māori wrongs and failures, while the repeated use of the rising interrogative at the ends of sentences works to recruit non-Māori listeners to the argument. The effect of this work is therefore a double positioning of Māori as inferior and Pākehā

as doubly wronged by their actions. There is a conviction and intensity of voice that accompanies the seemingly unassailable tenets of majoritarian democratics and resonates with the understandings of the media representations referred to above.

Focus group data extend and collectivize the kinds of understandings evident through the go-along data. A focus group of farmers produced this emotive turn about Waitangi Day.

> Mike: It's when 10% of the fucking population hang a big stick over us on Waitangi Day, I mean, we don't need Waitangi Day what we should do is change it to New Zealand Day. [FG5]

The swearing, metaphor of threat and the proposal for change position the commemoration and Māori who are implied to have agency in it, as the source of the problem. Repositioning the day by changing its name to mask its history and appeal to the nation instead, becomes the solution.

In another instance, within a focus group with librarians, Patricia works to position Māori as failing to understand the root cause of their discontent and thereby failing to empathize with Pākehā who are also suffering under economic inequalities.

> Patricia: …that's what annoys me about Waitangi Day is that, that divide. But it's not real, [Māori] don't understand it, there's just as many Pākehā people who are not as well educated, or as rich as they are, that's what the divide is – it's all about money. That's what annoys me, that's what actually makes me really angry… there was no, there was no respect there, whether you agree with the Treaty or not… yeah, which is no respect for the Pākehā people [FG 3]

What is striking here is the freely expressed rage that bubbles up from her account of Māori misunderstanding and disrespect. Irritation is repeatedly signalled and escalated to 'anger' in this short passage as an affective practice of righteous indignation in response to a perceived grievance unfolds.

Along with self-positioning, individuals and groups can also be targets, with attributed positions in affective–discursive orientations

that render them more or less included. In our broader investigations (Wetherell et al. 2015) of media materials concerning Waitangi Day, representations of Māori who raise criticisms include violence, hostility and lack of control, contrasting sharply with depictions of Pākehā as rational, honourable and even courageous.

Our analyses support the observation that affect and discourse are irrevocably intertwined in national days as the myriad mundane social practices of preparation and performance flow together to constitute collective feeling and identity through the events. In such practice, a patterned, familiar canon of affective–discursive resources is produced and reproduced, both in the key events but crucially in everyday experience and understanding.

The emotions that we may experience on a national day are conditioned by the narratives of nationhood we accept; stories that emphasize justice and equality are more likely to support emotions around pride and identity than those that stress colonization and discrimination. Several decades of empirical work (McCreanor 2005; Wetherell and Potter 1992) suggest that, for most people, a preferred narrative by which they orient their identity and behaviour is entrenched as an everyday common sense that is immediately available, needs no explanation or justification and is widely understood as rational and appropriate.

The empirical findings draw attention to entrenched orthodoxies by which positioning (identity work), sense-making and emoting proceed around national days in ways that reinforce the banal, normative, historical common sense of the imagined national community. The affective–discursive labour entailed marks out the canonical, taken-for-granted patterns of the 'long conversation' of the nation, as they inform, explain and interpret the events of daily life. In doing so, they implicitly and explicitly shape and frame the affective–discursive possibilities available to citizens, in the lead up to and aftermath of events of national commemoration. While expressions of the canon vary across individual, situated accountings, they must relate to such understandings or risk failing as communicative journalism. Here we review three central elements of the canon for Waitangi Day (McConville et al. 2014).

Counter-Hegemonic Practices

In addition to describing an affective–discursive patterning for national commemoration and the modes of positioning set up as a kind of psychosocial field for participants to traverse, our project also tries to elucidate some of the more marginal and resistant practices appearing as the status quo is maintained, contested and changed. Like the everyday ideological habits of nations, described as an 'endemic condition' by Billig (1995), everyday nationhood is creatively and perpetually reworked by people to construct new emotional possibilities. Such changes challenge researchers to observe the dynamic social practices that inform and reinform mundane and everyday nationalism.

A significant contribution of this project is the bivocal emphasis drawing attention to both Māori and Pākehālived experiences of national days. In this way, we hope to legitimate Māori sense making and narratives that often lie counter to mainstream representations of nationhood. As well as turning academic focus to affective–discursive practice, as noted above, the project also centrally investigates the conceptual framework of *wairua*; a Māori concept extending beyond its English equivalent of 'spirituality'. *Wairua* itself resists explicit translation, making it a powerful and adaptive analytic resource. *Wairua* can weave through emotional landscapes connecting the physical, political, 'spiritual' embodiment of Māori realities.

Billig's assertion that 'gaps in political language are rarely innocent' (Billig 1995, p. 6) maps well with the project's focus on Māori-led social practices that resist and reconstruct the emotional tenets of nationalism. An absence of Māori voices is clear through our analyses of the mediascape surrounding Anzac Day and Waitangi Day (McConville et al. 2016, 2014). However, wider reflection reveals that Māori are utilizing shifting social practices as they traverse these days, including contributions to narratives of nationhood. They are upholding/advancing Māori experiences (Walker 1990; Durie 1998), contesting Pākehā orthodoxies (Moewaka Barnes et al. 2009; Smith 1999) and challenging banal and everyday national narratives.

A major player in these emerging practices is Aotearoa, New Zealand's indigenous broadcaster Māori Television whose efforts to

establish Māori television content works in tandem with efforts to 'decolonise the coloniser' (Abel 2013a, b). Whilst under considerable political strain, Māori Television is currently positioned to produce Māori accounts of national days that have previously been limited, misrepresented or poorly understood. This has been particularly salient with regard to Māori Television's Anzac Day successes (Abel 2013b) and is most recently articulated in *The Blood We Share*, a documentary following one Māori and one Pākehāfamily descended from different First World War soldiers (Maori Television 2016). Through exercising these innovative practices in a challenging and constraining context, Māori illustrate how to resist and diversify what is felt and understood as nationalism.

Our data point to parallels between the concept of affect as social practice and *wairua*, the latter being tied to meaning making and positioning, rather than being solely pre-eminent and beyond the analytical frame. This approach can provide ways of examining Billig's areas of interest in shedding light on the apparently mysterious and unexplored as well as our concerns with the everyday identity practices of Māori. The go-along video interviews are revealing different modes of being affected that challenge the dominant canon and offer exciting potential for more inclusive modes of embodied responses.

Conclusions

Our empirical study points to the need to understand how affect and *wairua*, usually neglected or discounted, are critically important drivers in everyday nationalism. How we position ourselves and others in national life, demonstrated by responses to the days and critiques of others, particularly Māori, to Waitangi Day, both reflects and drives everyday nationalism, demarcating what it should mean to belong to a nation and what nation should mean to its citizens.

In identifying and articulating aspects of an affective–discursive canon at work in cultural relations around both our high days of national commemoration, we uncover heightened expressions of everyday transactions about identity and nation in similar ways to that

achieved through the 'turn to language' (Potter and Wetherell 1987) of the late twentieth century. By studying ways in which specific forms and resources of language produce particular material and social effects and outcomes, the shift added greatly to critical understandings of society and honed analytic approaches and skills in a significant paradigm change in the social sciences. We are convinced that the enterprise of focusing on the articulation of affective practice and on neglected non-western concepts such as *wairua*, will add a step-change to the understandings developed though the discursive turn.

We hope our ongoing project will demonstrate the value of reintegrating affect with its discursive components and broaden out what is considered within these frames by challenging researchers to also consider spirit alongside feeling and emotions, while building on the methodological developments of discursive analysis. We intend to build on Billig's work through the attention and focus on affect, adding to his key insights in ways that strengthen our understandings of the dynamics and tensions of Māori Pākehā relations in Aotearoa. It seems likely that our research will be of immediate relevance to other studies of colonial settings internationally. There may also be parallels and synergies with wider understandings of the role of affect in intergroup relations, and in efforts to legitimate and include indigenous concepts in these approaches.

Notes

1. Wairua is somewhat narrowly interpreted as spirit or soul as well as mood and feelings
2. There were two versions of the document, one in te Reo Maori and one in English, with significant differences in meaning. The former has legal and political force and so we use the Maori name from here on.
3. Customary Maori meeting place usually including a carved ancestral house, ceremonial space and hospitality facilities.
4. Memorial post often carved/painted with Maori motifs

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Part IV

The Transnational and the Global

Narratives of Legitimacy: Making Nationalism Banal

Melissa Aronczyk

In this chapter, I address some of the critiques of Michael Billig's (1995) concept of banal nationalism. I focus on the communicative power of banal nationalism: the strategic narratives by which national interests and values are successfully maintained among various populations amid shifting scales of membership, rights, and obligations. By directing attention to the "narratives of legitimacy" (Price 2015) by which infrastructures of national power are reinforced, I examine the futures of banal nationalism as a political and cultural resource in the globalizing environment of the twenty-first century.

One entry point into the discussion is the meaning of "banality" in Billig's formulation. Adherents of the banal nationalism thesis tend to rely on an interpretation of "banal" as semiconscious, ordinary, or everyday, and of banal nationalism itself as a latent condition rather than (indeed in opposition to) an eventful or "hot" explosion of fervor. This obscures the extent to which extreme manifestations of nationalism also

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rely on the reproduction of banality. Hannah Arendt uses the term in this latter sense in her searing report on the post-World War II trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961:

> If a crime against humanity had become in some sense "banal" it was precisely because it was committed in a daily way, systematically, without being adequately named and opposed. In a sense, by calling a crime against humanity "banal," [Arendt] was trying to point to the way in which the crime had become for the criminals accepted, routinised, and implemented without moral revulsion and political indignation and resistance (Butler 2011).

In this understanding, it is not simply the routinization or systematicity that renders the abhorrence of the Nazi regime banal, it is equally a conscious and reflexive desire *not to name* that legitimizes such acts and deflates resistance to them. It is the dissimulation of unconscionable behavior under a pretense of conscience; of what Arendt calls "thoughtlessness": the diffusion of moral responsibility through a structural determinism in which "nobody" rules and "nobody" is to blame (Arendt 1963, p. 288).

The point is not only that banal nationalism has its malign as well as its benign versions, it is also that narratives of national legitimacy can derive their power by deliberately suppressing or dissimulating their ultimate objective. In this light, the researcher's task becomes not only to surface evidence of collective national orientations submerged in ordinary habits, but also to identify strategic national narratives that actively refuse the label of national origin as part of the legitimation strategy. Turning our attention from the mundane and passive forms of national knowledge to the active, strategic enforcement of the national order via deliberate dissimulation can reveal both the power and the problems that banality brings.

Strategic Banality

In a response to criticism of his work, Billig (2009) reminds us of a key feature of banal nationalism that has been largely overlooked by both critics and adherents of the concept. Scholarly attention to the

mundane and everyday manifestations of nationalism around the world has obscured one of the primary arguments Billig sought to make: that "the world's most powerful nationalism," that of the United States, continues to be ignored by social science research.

This is a consequential observation. It means that in the decades since the publication of *Banal Nationalism,* the interpretations, extensions and revisions of Billig's thesis have at least partly missed the point, which is that the insidious power of banality, the ultimate psychological impact of the unnoticed, is to leave intact the notion that some places have *no* nationalism (cf. Skey 2009, p. 332). The USA is a "special place of placelessness" (Billig 1995, p. 145) and for this reason deserves special attention. This is true in two contexts: when the USA is the case under investigation and when the scholarly "investigators" are themselves American (or based at American institutions). A proof of this thesis in the American case is found in the multiple scholarly works by American authors that, since the World War II, have examined the conditions of American identity through the lens of patriotism rather than nationalism (e.g., Bodnar 1992, 1999; Curti 1946; Hansen 2003; Nathanson 1993; Rorty 1998). The choice of terms is not merely semantic. These texts appear to hold up Maurizio Viroli's (1995) distinction between the "organic" nationalism of Germanic romanticism and the "civic" patriotism of liberal citizenship: "While nationalism is an attachment to the ethnic, cultural and spiritual homogeneity of a nation, patriotism refers to the love of the republic and the political institutions that sustain it."

This kind of banal nationalism has not been given its due. What many social scientists have done with Billig's thesis is to excavate manifestations of the national lurking in the crevices of everyday life, mainly in places that are already coded as "hotly" national (e.g., First and Sheffi 2015; Militz and Schurr 2016; Nieswand 2012; Penrose 2011; Szulc 2015; White 2015). The primary objective of that work seems to be to show how nationalism persists in the face of incursions at conceptual, infrastructural, or other spatial scales (global, cosmopolitan, regional, metropolitan). By looking at the small but symbolic features of nationalism's face and the ways it is sustained and transformed over time, they have sought to bring tangible evidence to the surface and make it available for analysis.

But this is not exactly what Billig meant; or at least, it is only one dimension of what Billig meant. As Craig Calhoun (2014) has pointed out, banal nationalism is less relevant as an observable phenomenon than as a resource for the broader concept. "Billig is less simply interested in explaining nationalism than in saying that we fail to see a lot of it." Along these lines of reflection lie resources for expanding our conception. Can we undertake a study of banal nationalism that does not only bring ordinary practices to the surface, but examines instances where nationalism is subsumed under other names? What if our methodological aim were not to make taken-for-granted ideologies obvious but to investigate the normative power of these ideologies to systematically limit alternative forms of expression (Habermas 1975)?

In the following two sections, I offer two ways that nationalism can be subsumed into discourses at other spatial scales: "from above," in discourses of the global; and "from below," in local interactions. I then describe the role of strategic narratives in the maintenance of legitimacy. Finally, I turn to the curious case of Cuban "Twitter" to illustrate my claims.

Justificatory Logics

It has been said that a paradox of the globalization process is that it gives rise to claims for national difference (Rodrik 2011; Tomlinson 2003). This retains an understanding of the global and the national as opposing forces. I think it is more accurate to say that discourses of globalization are often used to justify decisions that reinforce the national order of things. It is not just that national institutions and laws steer the articulation of the global, though this is clearly part of the story (Sassen 2006). It is also that we tend to see globalization as progressive and necessary improvement over a putatively "older," less rational state of national adherence. Social science research unwittingly reproduces this banal nationalism through its justificatory logics. Despite considerable evidence that nation states and nationalism coexist with processes of globalization, for instance, many researchers persist in the tendency to frame their research in terms of a logic of substitution (e.g., banal cosmopolitanism

replaces or "hollows out" banal nationalism) rather than a logic of accumulation (e.g., banal cosmopolitanism contributes to or expands the forms and content of banal nationalism) (see Krause and Guggenheim 2012). Part of the problem is surely the academic paradigm itself, which requires that social scientists justify their work through the identification of a research "gap" they intend to bridge or fill. Identifying a research gap often involves pointing to the shortcomings of prior research, blind spots, unexamined perspectives, and/or neglect.

A second reason for the persistence of a logic of substitution is the misrecognition of transnational phenomena such as border-crossing information and financial flows, issue-centered social movements, and global health pandemics (to name only a few examples) as evidence of the overcoming of national space. There is no question that twenty-first century national jurisdictions share powers and problems with authorities at sub-, supra-, and transnational levels. Yet, there remain important ways in which nations "matter" in both domestic and international affairs, and crucial contexts in which national states work to reinforce this (Calhoun 2007). In many cases, regional, transnational, or international institutions and organizations are initiated and enabled by the regulatory mechanisms of the nation state (e.g., Flew and Waisbord 2015; Sassen 2003).

Such regulatory mechanisms are sometimes accompanied by mythic narratives that also quash the appearance of national interests. In discourses of Internet governance, for instance, the popular conception of the Internet as borderless, placeless, and apolitical forms a mythical backdrop to international negotiations over who ought to be in charge of its policies. Yet, the technical infrastructures and institutions of the so-called global Internet belie its fundamentally national orientations (Aronczyk and Budnitsky 2017; DeNardis 2014).

The framing of global processes as endemic, inevitable, and ameliorating gives rise to a form of banal nationalism. Global discourse can cause national motivations to descend beneath the surface of our consciousness. This has lasting effects precisely because these motivations appear no longer to exist despite evidence to the contrary. The mythology of the Internet as a post-national realm, for instance, persists despite the realities of ongoing Internet governance debates.

One effect of this rationalization is to reproduce a distorted picture of the real world. Conceptual transformations at the level of entire societies (national or not) are colored by inconsistencies, unevenness, and both synchronic and diachronic variations that a logic of substitution does not capture (see Chernilo 2006). Our failure to incorporate the possibility of variation hampers our ability to recognize that globalizing processes are not necessarily automatic or progressive improvements over those of nationalization. It also leads us to ignore the ways that national and global practices coexist and mutually reinforce one another. Recognizing this might lead us to look at global discourses for evidence of banal nationalism rather than an exclusive focus on national forms of conversation or habit.

Categorical Treachery

Another way to consider how national narratives are rendered banal is through what Arjun Appadurai (1996) calls categorical treachery. Appadurai uses the phrase to refer to "the distorted relationship between daily, face-to-face relations and the large-scale identities produced by modern nation states" (p. 154) as well as by other modern institutions such as media systems, political parties, and religious groups. Appadurai searches for an explanation of internecine conflict, particularly ethnic violence in close communities, places such as Rwanda and Bosnia. He suggests that one motivation for the otherwise inexplicable levels of violence in these conflicts is the official sanctioning of a large-scale identity (i.e., the national identity), which casts a shadow on the legitimacy of other forms of identification or allegiance. Face-to-face, everyday interactions with neighbors, colleagues, or friends thought of as co-nationals can turn ugly if these peers reveal ethnic, racial, or religious allegiances that complicate their adherence to their national identity:

> When the neighborhood merchant is revealed to be, in his heart, a Croat, when the schoolteacher turns out to be sympathetic to the Hutu, when your best friend turns out to be a Muslim rather than a Serb, when your uncle's neighbor turns out to be a hated landlord – what seems to follow is a sense of deep categorical treachery… (Appadurai 1996, p. 154)

Appadurai's argument is that violence breaks out because these people appear as impostors: pretending to be national kin while under the surface they are beholden to a different group. The treachery lies not only in the sense of betrayal Appadurai's characters feel; it is in the way that banal nationalism is reproduced in these instances. I thought my neighbor shared my common identity; now that I realize he does not, this justifies my anger and violence toward him. "When these [large-scale] identities are convincingly portrayed as primary (indeed as primordial) loyalties by politicians, religious leaders, and the media, then ordinary people self-fulfillingly seem to act as if only this kind of identity mattered and as if they were surrounded by a world of pretenders" (p. 155).

Charles Taylor (2015) has recently offered a valuable perspective on the idea of categorical treachery. Taylor explains that the nature of our modern Western democracies is to uphold certain principles, or requirements, of legitimacy: human rights, equality or non-discrimination, and the rule of democracy itself. Upholding these principles is the basis of our membership in a common society and contributes to a shared sense of purpose. These principles contribute to what Taylor calls a political identity. To make this political identity meaningful, people tend to understand it in terms of the specific achievement of our own particular historical project. We want to understand democratic principles as they are enacted within our own society and its particular path of evolution.

The problem that arises, Taylor says, is that the way we define this political identity can lead us to use large-scale identities, such as national identity, to turn against certain members of society. Nationalism is predicated on a strong notion of what is common to its members. The allegiance to a common identity involves boundary work to draw up what ethics, values, behaviors, etc. should be included in this identity, and what in turn should be excluded. While this boundary work is inherent to identity formation, it can take a bad turn, such as when we judge individuals or groups based on their perceived fit with these inclusive ethics, and in turn justify our exclusion of them based on their perceived lack of fit with those ethics; as Taylor (2015) puts it, "the definitions of this common identity can mark others as not living up to this identity." In some cases, we may use moral arguments about upholding democracy to deny ethnic or religious or other types of groups their membership in the nation.

What is common to Appadurai's and Billig's and Taylor's insights is the injunction to be mindful of the ways that nationalism is made to seem invisible. In the making invisible lies a wide range of motives and justifications, of deeds done that are never labeled nationalist but that are in fact inspired by a particular interpretation of the role of national boundaries. While, in some cases, banal nationalism may be relatively innocuous, in others, it may lead to the most serious and shocking forms of control. This is the treachery of which Appadurai and the others speak.

Narratives and Networks of Legitimacy

Monroe Price's (2015) interpretation of "narratives of legitimacy" offers a conceptual and methodological agenda for banal nationalism. His approach is one among many related works that place communications, technology, and media at the center of the creation and circulation of group legitimacy (e.g., Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1966; Gellner 1983; Innis 2007). I rely on Price to align my argument with his efforts to link technological change, strategic communication, speech regulation, and information control with the ongoing power of the nation state in the twenty-first century.

I also rely on this concept because it seems to me that focusing on narrative, as opposed to category, can help to overcome the inevitable dualisms, oppositions, and progressivist substitutions that seem to characterize categorical assessments. While categories are rational efforts to create boundaries around what are essentially messy, contradictory, and ever-changing processes, narratives are recognized for their subjective, audience-oriented, and deliberately structured yet contingent characteristics. Narratives can produce multiple versions of the same set of events; the analytical task is not to establish which one is more "true" than any other, but rather which is more credible at a given moment and place, and why this should be.[1]

Put simply, narratives of legitimacy are "the collection of ideas and narratives employed by a dominant group or coalition to maintain power" (Price 2015, p. 13). Price's primary focus is on the national

narratives wielded by the state. Re-interpreting Weber's classic formulation of the state as a group that holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a territory, Price suggests that in the twenty-first century, state legitimacy is asserted by a monopoly over information. Since contemporary information infrastructures (among other factors) admit constant challenges to dominance, giving rise to multiple competing narratives, the "winner" of the right to legitimacy is not the militarily strongest or most autocratic state but the one whose narrative is most compelling. As such, the strategic crafting of narratives—and of material supports to circulate these narratives—becomes a central aspect of contests for power by large-scale institutions.

While the *content* of the narrative may interest researchers as a means of assessing articulations of the nation across space or time [e.g., "narratives of divine right, narratives of electoral or democratic affirmation, narratives of conquest, narratives of historical entitlement" (Price 2015, p. 42)], the fundamental value to researchers of a focus on strategic narratives lies in assessing the *networks* of legitimacy that narratives produce and reproduce over time. Which actors, which publics, which sites, which communications platforms, are engaged; and which narratives, actors, publics, sites, or platforms are denied legitimacy in the process (Price 2015, chaps. 3 and 6)? A network of legitimacy is better understood as process than as structure: dynamic and continuously contested, the architecture of power must include attention to the reactions (in support and in opposition), responses, and unintended consequences elicited by the narrative.

Conceptualizing a network of legitimacy reminds us that soft power is wielded not only by the state. This is partly because "the context in which contemporary international relations takes place…is not characterized by the interaction among states only" (Price 2015, p. 46), but it is also because corporations, non-governmental organizations, social movements, and insurgent groups all vie for legitimacy amid multiple markets for loyalties, and use strategic narratives—sometimes invoking the nation, sometimes not—to achieve their objectives (Manheim 2011).

A second advantage of a networks-of-legitimacy approach is that varied intensities of legitimacy can be assessed. Mark Suchman (1995) formulates three types of legitimacy that are interconnected insofar as

they indicate a progressive deepening from surface to embeddedness. The first type is *pragmatic*, and this is the one most closely connected to both Price's and Manheim's formulations. Pragmatic legitimacy, or what Suchman calls "influence" or "exchange" legitimacy, involves the exercise of self-interested communicative action to get what you want.

The second type of legitimacy Suchman describes is *moral*. Moral legitimacy moves us from interests to evaluation, and is therefore more centered on prosocial benefits. Such legitimacy can be procedural, consequential, structural/categorical, or personal. The third, most deeply embedded type of legitimacy is *cognitive*, or taken for granted. In order for cognitive legitimacy to obtain, there must be ways to make "the meaning of the act…part of the intersubjective common sense world" (Suchman 1995, p. 592).

Although Suchman places these three types of legitimacy along a sort of continuum from surface to embeddedness, this does not mean that they cannot operate simultaneously. Different tactics might be deployed by a single actor or group of actors, either deliberately or unconsciously, to activate different types of legitimacy. As Suchman explains, there are tactics that involve working with existing audiences, and others that involve seeking new environments in which audiences will be supportive.

In addition to seeking evidence of banal nationalism as the "endemic condition" (Billig 1995, p. 6) of everyday life, the task is to examine how and by what means nationalism is rendered banal in the first place. Approaching this task via "stages" of legitimacy might allow us to see how repertoires of national power are made to appear banal through time and space. We need resources for seeing *how* cultural congruence is achieved, among *which* audiences, and in *which* settings. Looking at the narrative rather than the category of nation, and seeing how a network of legitimacy is created and maintained, offers an entry point.

"Cuban Twitter" and Banal Nationalism

We can observe one instance of networks of legitimacy in a recent initiative by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to foster civil society activities in Cuba.

In 2008, USAID initiated a text message service (SMS) in Cuba. The ostensible aim was to forge a social network of (mainly young, politically open) Cuban citizens who could send and receive uncensored information via the service. In an environment where the Internet is highly regulated by the authoritarian Castro government and basic access is prohibitively expensive, the service, known as ZunZuneo ("hummingbird's song" in Spanish, an obvious allusion to Twitter), was immediately popular.

Initially, after signing up for free, ZunZuneo subscribers received messages from the service, mainly sports scores, trivia, and news about the tech industry. Over time, the communications platform expanded to allow Cubans to communicate with one another and to form interest groups. Forty thousand Cubans eventually signed onto the service, thrilled at the ability to connect with friends and gain followers.

As part of USAID's Cuban Civil Society Support Program, ZunZuneo was understood by its American instigators to promote initiatives "that expand the reach and impact of independent civil society in Cuba" (Review 2015, p. 1). US policy on Cuba explicitly advocates the promotion of democracy in the country, including "foreign assistance… to generate a sustainable means by which Cuban civil society can call attention to the human rights situation in Cuba; break the information blockade by disseminating information; and coordinate strategies to plan, organize and implement peaceful civil society initiatives, including democratic reforms" (Review 2015, p. 55).

The success of the project was contingent, USAID officials believed, on suppressing all evidence of ZunZuneo's American origins. Using a complex network of shell companies, offshore bank accounts, and employee aliases, USAID's contractors sought to mask the traces of US funding and ownership from the Cuban government and from ZunZuneo's users.

When an investigation by the Associated Press (Arce et al. 2014) brought the origins of ZunZuneo to light in 2014, it was discovered that the SMS service was being used for more than the promotion of uncensored communication among Cuban citizens. Contractors working with USAID monitored ZunZuneo messages sent and received, collected data on users' political tendencies, and hoped eventually

to use the critical mass of subscribers to foment a "Cuban Spring" in the country. It would be an uprising led by young, dissatisfied Cubans empowered to bring about social and political change. But the change would have been underwritten and orchestrated by the US Government; and the style of change would bear all the hallmarks of American values and interests. Media reports likened USAID to the CIA in its covert attempts at surveillance, regime change, and data mining (Kornbluh 2013; Democracy Now 2014).

To fully understand the role of the "Cuban Twitter" project in perpetuating the banal nationalism of the USA, it is necessary to situate it within broader social and historical contexts. At one level, ZunZuneo is merely the latest instantiation of a series of initiatives since the 1940s by the US Government to develop media and communications infrastructures abroad. Voice of America, founded in 1942, is the most extensive, broadcast in dozens of languages worldwide. The American broadcaster Radio y Televisión Martí has supplied news and programming to Cuba since 1985. The difference between these broadcasting efforts and the Web 2.0 version is the (attempted) dissimulation of American involvement and the notion that Cubans can empower *themselves* via the technological capacity of multicast media. In this way, the nationalist intentions of the USA are rendered banal by the capacities of the medium, and by the apparent displacement of the authors of the narrative of national legitimacy from Americans to Cubans.

This initiative in Cuba should also be set against the background of the USAID organization and US foreign policy goals since World War II. Built on the notion of creating markets abroad for American products and production, USAID has for decades seen its mission in terms of a national moral obligation. American self-understanding, especially in the context of foreign affairs, follows John F. Kennedy's assertion of the nation as a "wise leader and good neighbor in the interdependent community of free nations" (USAID n.d.).

In the contemporary context, ZunZuneo can be seen as part of what former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called "our national brand": the principles of Internet freedom. In a programmatic speech in Washington, D.C. in 2010, Clinton laid out the tenets of this national mission:

> We are…supporting the development of new tools that enable citizens to exercise their rights of free expression by circumventing politically motivated censorship. We are providing funds to groups around the world to make sure that those tools get to the people who need them in local languages, and with the training they need to access the internet safely. The United States has been assisting in these efforts for some time, with a focus on implementing these programs as efficiently and effectively as possible. Both the American people and nations that censor the internet should understand that our government is committed to helping promote internet freedom.
>
> We want to put these tools in the hands of people who will use them to advance democracy and human rights, to fight climate change and epidemics, to build global support for President Obama's goal of a world without nuclear weapons, to encourage sustainable economic development that lifts the people at the bottom up (Clinton 2010).

By focusing on online technology as "tools," and by advocating the use of such tools to "circumvent politically motivated censorship," US leaders use pragmatic legitimacy to couch Internet freedom in an apolitical, antinationalist cloak. By "put[ting] these tools in the hands of people" outside the United States, US leaders use moral legitimacy to further mask the imposition of their national values and interests. Efforts such as ZunZuneo thus reinforce in no uncertain terms the banal nationalism of the USA.

At the same time, such narratives of legitimacy reinforce the logic of a world of nations. American nationalism of this sort is never understood as a regression to an outmoded modernity, but rather as recognition of the continued power of the national form in the twenty-first century. This is the achievement of the stage of cognitive legitimacy that allows such power to be part of our common-sense world.

Nationalism's Character

In light of the efforts at normalization between the USA and Cuba since 2014, the "Cuban Twitter" project appears less as a subversive act than as a clever early effort by the USA to foster a network of legitimacy for its future actions. As embassies reopen in Havana and

Washington, D.C.; as leaders from each country meet for the first time in 50 years, and as airlines restore direct commercial flights between the countries, Americans can justify ZunZuneo as a reasonable preparation of the terrain. By fostering participation, introducing Cubans to cheap text messaging, conveying lighthearted messages about sports and trivia, American leaders encouraged the benefits of twenty-first-century public engagement.

But this engagement is of a particularly American style; and ZunZuneo has a distinctly American character. More importantly, the kind of regime change seeded by ZunZuneo is one that corresponds directly to American notions of a just, liberal society. Although the notion of democratization resounds globally, the American "aesthetic of interpretation" (Price 2015, p. 51)—that is, the country's ability to promote democracy abroad in its own image—is one way the USA preserves its ongoing national cohesion.

Another dimension of inquiry is opened up here. Nationalism is not only a homegrown phenomenon, made effective for a national population on its home territory. Applying the concept of networks of legitimacy allows us to turn our lens to the ways that so-called globalizing processes, and their reverberating mediations and cultural meanings, serve to reinforce the social imaginary of a world of nations. Observing the reproduction of nationalism as a social form requires a focus not only on the form but also on the reproductions: the ways that "national" versions of nationalism are reproduced outside their home territory, and function to narrow or altogether suppress alternative visions.

We have other names for this type of phenomenon: cultural imperialism, soft power, and protectionism. At their core, these terms participate in reinforcing the banality of nationalism in our time, allowing the national imaginary to be reproduced by those who never invoke it by name.

Note

1. To be clear, I do not mean to privilege the content over the form of nationalist rhetoric, nor do I advocate a turn toward content analysis as a methodology. I am thinking rather of Calhoun's (1997) discussion

of the three 'dimensions' of nationalism, as discourse, project, and evaluation (p. 5); and of the ways that national narratives, that is, claims made in the name of the nation, can be deliberately structured by powerful actors to fit one or the other of these dimensions. These dimensions operate whether the nation is explicitly named or not, as in the reproduction of the USA in both domestic and international spheres.

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Banal Nationalism and UNESCO's Intangible Cultural Heritage List: Cases of *Washoku* and the Gastronomic Meal of the French

Atsuko Ichijo

Introduction

Proposed by Michael Billig in 1995, the concept of banal nationalism has made significant contribution to the study of nationalism, in particular in highlighting the need for examining 'our'—western or 'cold'—version of nationalism and nationhood (Billig 1995; Skey 2009). From a broader viewpoint of social theory, *Banal Nationalism* represents a scholarly exercise of self-reflexivity by questioning the often implicit western-centric nature of social scientific enquiries. Billig has successfully challenged the unquestioned normative assumption behind a popular saying 'mine is patriotism and yours is nationalism'. In other words, Billig has shown the assumption that nationalism only belongs to the underdeveloped parts of the world, i.e. the non-West, is behind

Washoku is transliteration of 和食, Japanese food/cuisine.

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many scholarly works and has openly questioned its validity. This is surely a welcomed intervention for the enhancement of our understanding of the world.

In relation to nationalism studies, Billig's major achievement lies with expanding the scope of investigation of nationalism to the banal and everyday levels. Nationalism is no longer restricted by the state's or elite's manipulation of masses, but something that is reproduced in everyday life seemingly away from the nation state's control. The ground-breaking nature of this insight—the focus on the *banal*—is testified by a large body of research into workings of nationalism at the everyday level that has followed the publication of *Banal Nationalism*. In the more theoretical domain, Tim Edensor (2002, 2006) traces how national identity is presented, performed and materialised in everyday culture and argues that in contemporary UK society, national identity is routinised—something to be performed without thinking. Recognising the importance of the *banal* and *everyday*, Jonathan Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss have engaged with Anthony Smith in defining 'everyday nationhood' (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a, b; Smith 2008). Fox and Miller-Idriss have proposed a new research agenda into everyday nationhood to provide insight as to how the nation is produced and reproduced by ordinary people and so that nationalism 'from below' can be addressed. Smith has, on the other hand, raised concern over a possible neglect of the socio-historical context in a research agenda that is focused on 'here and now'. In a somewhat ironic twist, given that Billig's achievement is to show that nationalism exists in the developed West, Smith is concerned that the research agenda proposed by Fox and Miller-Idriss might confine the study of nationalism to developed western democracies.

In terms of more empirical work, while Billig's 1995 thesis mainly drew from the analysis of political and media discourse (political speeches and newspaper reporting), the idea of banal nationalism has been applied to a number of items and practices including banknotes and coinage (Penrose 2011; First and Sheffi 2015), road signs (Jones and Merriman 2009; Merriman and Jones 2009), gardening (Tilley 2008) and food (Warde 2009; Palmer 1998; Ichijo and Ranta 2016),

and it can be argued that 'banal nationalism' has established itself as a particular angle to the investigation of nationalism through various objects and practices.

In reviewing the influence of Billig's work in the field, it is worth elaborating on the distinction with banal nationalism as proposed by Billig and the concept of everyday nationhood as explored by Fox and Miller-Idriss. While both perspectives attach importance to the *banal* in the construction and maintenance of the idea of nation, in the perspective of banal nationalism, the focus is more on the ways in which the elite, if not the state, makes the most of what is taken for granted in 'normalising' their idea of what the nation is. That a particular nation (say, Americans) exists is repeatedly transmitted by the elite by making the presence of a national flag (say, the Stars and Stripes) taken for granted. The point here is the maintenance of the idea of the nation is carried out through non-violent (cold) means on a daily basis. When the idea of nation thus propagated no longer attracts attention, then, the project has achieved its aim: to make the nation taken for granted and unreflectively accepted. Following this, it can be argued that banal nationalism is a version of analysis of power relationship in reference to nationalism; how a particular idea of nationhood becomes taken for granted. In research into everyday nationhood, on the other hand, the focus is clearly on how ordinary people engage with the creation and maintenance of nationhood through their everyday act. What they create and maintain may not be congruent with what the elite is trying to propagate but this is not the primary focus of research; it is on the ways in which ordinary people subjectively create and attach meaning to a 'nation' in their everyday life. It can therefore be argued that the perspective of banal nationalism is a more appropriate tool for investigating the *political* and the idea of everyday nationhood is more useful in helping us to understand how the social worlds is constructed, experienced and understood by actors called ordinary people.

While there is no doubt that Billig's banal nationalism has opened up a new horizon for the study of nationalism, there are inevitably some shortcomings. Michael Skey (2009: 338–340) points out that Billig's treatment of the international system in *Banal Nationalism* is limited.

He also draws attention to Billig's tendency to equate globalisation with Americanisation. This is what the current chapter aims to address. It explores the analytical potential of the concept of banal nationalism through an investigation of UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list which allows us to examine the ways in which banal nationalism works to maintain the nation state framework at the international level. Billig's original analysis was focused on the national level for a good reason: to demonstrate that nationalism was at work even in the 'advanced' West (Billig 1995). The chapter expands the scope of analysis based on banal nationalism to the international level by examining the ways in which UNESCO, an international organisation, exercises influence in creating an environment in which nationalism is promoted. By looking at UNESCO, it will demonstrate the current international governance regime works, advertently or inadvertently, to entrench nationalism institutionally. This is one of the underexplored points in the study of nationalism at the international/global level and the chapter provides some empirical evidence to develop the analysis further. The choice of food as a focus of analysis allows the chapter to show the wide and deep permeation of nationalism in the forms of banal nationalism practised and experienced at the everyday level. In short, the chapter shows the utility of the concept of banal nationalism at the international level using one of the most banal objects: food.

Food, Banal and Everyday Nationalism

It is a truism that food is essential to life; no life can be sustained without food (and water). The centrality of food in life has been examined in social sciences in a number of ways. The role of food in identity construction and maintenance is well studied in anthropology, as seen, for instance, in Lévi–Strauss's seminal work, *The Raw and Cooked* (1964). In this book, Lévi–Strauss argued that binary oppositions such as raw and cooked constituted the basis of pre-scientific, abstract thinking (Lévi-Strauss 1983). Food culture is an established concept and Food Studies has emerged as a branch of specialised investigation. Food

constitutes an important aspect of the study of political economy as well as security, as seen in the field of 'food security' (see, for instance, FAO 2003).

Given the centrality of food in sustaining life both materially and symbolically, food also attracts the attention of scholars studying nationalism. While there are very few systematic examinations of food and nationalism (see Ichijo and Ranta 2016), the role of food in national identity construction and maintenance in the form of defining national cuisine (Appadurai 1988; Cusack 2000, 2004), national branding (Aronczyk 2008) and gastrodiplomacy (Booth 2010; Rockower 2012) have been explored. What characterises these studies is the tendency to adopt a 'top-down' approach in analysing banal nationalism: the role of the state or the elite in defining what is *national* in terms of food is at the centre of the focus reflecting the conventional approach to studying nationalism. For example, Appadurai (1988) focuses on the role of middle-class women and the publishing industry in shaping the idea of national cuisine in India. National branding and gastrodiplomacy are by definition state-led initiatives with a variety of industries involved including tourism.

However, the distinct analytical strength of banal nationalism is to shed light on the ways in which the taken for granted is shaped and maintained. In this regard, the top-down approach is not fully sufficient and there is need for more emphasis on the 'everyday nationhood' perspective. Anthropological studies are better at examining how food is experienced at the everyday level confirming their strength in providing micro-level analysis. For example, works by Nir Avieli examine different meanings assigned to new year rice cake in reference to Vietnameseness (2005) and the ways in which dog meat consumption can work as a boundary marker in Vietnam (2011), highlighting how the *everyday* interact to shape and maintain national identities at the micro-level. The flip side of this is that attention hardly extends to the interplay between the *everyday* and *national/international* governance in these analyses. In this regard, UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list provides a unique opportunity to investigate this interplay with international governance.

UNESCO's Intangible Cultural Heritage List: Where International Governance Meets the Banal[1]

As far as nationalism is concerned, UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, appears to occupy a contradictory position.[2] On the one hand, UNESCO is working towards the *universal*, to pursue peace through 'humanity's moral and intellectual solidarity',[3] which could be seen as a constraining factor on the pursuit of the *particular* by the nation state and other groups; on the other hand, UNESCO is the most authoritative guardian of a variety of forms of culture on the planet because the diversity of culture in itself is seen as a common good, an idea which various nation states and other groups mobilise in pursuit of their own nationalist agenda.

This interesting position of UNESCO in between universalism and nationalism is exemplified in the idea and practice of world heritage. Since the adoption of the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,[4] widely known as the World Heritage Convention, to which 190 countries adhere, UNESCO has been playing a dual role of the promoter of universal values (peace, mutual understanding and solidarity among other things) and the protector of the *particular* by championing the preservation of culture and cultural artefacts in general. UNESCO has been at the forefront of producing and shaping 'globality' or cosmopolitanism through its World Heritage Convention since the idea of world heritage 'rests on the assumption that the world's most prized natural and cultural sites belong to all of us, entailing a shared responsibility for their care' (Brumann 2014: 2177). From the nation state's perspective, world heritage is seen mainly as an opportunity to project a positive image of itself to promote tourism and possibly trade (nation branding) and/or to increase its influence on the world stage ('soft power'). For instance, Sarina Wakefield (2012) traces how the United Arab Emirates (UAE) uses the idea of and tools associated with UNESCO's world heritage in order to establish falconry to represent the UAE's uniqueness and its contribution to world culture. Long and Sweet (2006: 468) also observe

in the case of Luang Prabang, the former royal capital of Laos, which was designated as a World Heritage site in 1995 that 'rather than there necessarily being a tension or contradiction between the ideals and practices of international heritage agencies such as UNESCO and the needs of the Lao government, there is indeed a convergence of interests, expressed through their shared commitment to the preservation of certain aspects of the Lao past'. UNESCO's custodianship of world heritage therefore has, wittingly or unwittingly, contributed to the strengthening of the position of those promoting nationalism in these cases, thereby making a case of UNESCO as a site of the creation of nationalist representations.

Where UNESCO meets the *banal* is not the World Heritage Convention as such but the idea of 'intangible cultural heritage', otherwise known as 'living heritage', which has been formalised by UNESCO's 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage.[5] Just as songs and dances, food culture or cuisine does not have tangible shape and therefore cannot be included in the World Heritage list. This implies, under current heritage regime, there is a certain hierarchy of culture in that tangible ones are deemed to be more important than intangible ones. With the formalisation of the concept of 'intangible cultural heritage', food culture or cuisine has achieved a status of 'proper culture': something banal has entered the realm of culture. Starting with the inscription of the 'gastronomic meal of the French' and 'traditional Mexican cuisine' in 2010, there are at least 12 elements related to food culture or cuisine in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity out of a total of 336 elements as of the end of 2015 (see Table 1).[6] Additionally, a number of UNESCO member states have either applied for or are thinking of putting forward an official application to be included in the list. For instance, an application has been made to inscribe beer culture in Belgium, which is as of August 2016, an ongoing nomination (UNESCO 2016; EUCAM 2014). Food culture, arguably the most banal version of culture, has now been confirmed to be something worthy of preservation by the world's utmost authority on the authenticity of culture and its value.

Table 1 The list of elements related to food culture/cuisine in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity

2010	Gastronomic meal of the French
	Traditional Mexican cuisine—ancestral, ongoing community culture, the Michoacán paradigm
2011	Ceremonial Keşkek tradition (Turkey)
2013	Ancient Georgian traditional Qvevri wine-making method
	Kimjang, making and sharing kimchi in the Republic of Korea
	Mediterranean diet
	Turkish coffee culture and tradition
	Washoku, traditional dietary cultures of the Japanese, notably for the celebration of New Year
2014	Lavash, the preparation, meaning and appearance of traditional bread as an expression of culture in Armenia
2015	Arabic coffee, a symbol of generosity
	Oshituthi shomagongo, marula fruit festival
	Tradition of kimchi-making in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Compiled by the author based on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity accessible at: http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/en/lists?multinational=3&display1=inscriptionID#tabs, accessed on 26 April 2016

The idea of 'intangible cultural heritage' itself has received much scholarly attention, but on the whole, the experts in cultural conservation and heritage seem to have a positive view of the 2003 treaty as a corrective to the World Heritage List which tends to exclude the states from Global South because of the lack of monuments and sites deemed to be suitable (Kurin 2004; Leimgruber 2010). Furthermore, Richard Kurin points out other positive aspects associated with the idea of intangible cultural heritage:

> The Convention does some very good things. It reinforces the idea that the practice of one's culture is a human right. It seeks government recognition and respect for the varied cultural traditions practised by people within its jurisdiction. It seeks to bolster the idea that all cultures give purpose and meaning to lives and thus deserve to be safeguarded. It privileges the culture bearers over the state. It suggests that forms of safeguarding be integrated with legal, educational, and economic development efforts where appropriate so that culture retains its vitality and dynamism.

> Now, with this Convention, a mechanism will be put into place at the international level where those efforts may be energized and improved to take on the task (Kurin 2004: 76).

What is suggested here is that the idea of intangible cultural heritage would enhance the universalistic aspect of UNESCO's work by establishing cultural rights as part of human rights and empowering culture bearers to the extent the World Heritage list has not managed to do. We can observe interesting interaction between the *banal* and international governance in this instance. First, UNESCO, the international authority on culture, defines culture as something that is made up with the *banal* by establishing the idea of 'intangible cultural heritage'; culture is not confined to high culture or elite culture but how 'ordinary' people live their everyday lives. With this, everyday culture ceases to be banal, to be dismissed as unimportant; it is something to be celebrated and preserved, something that is to be dealt with in reference to human rights. Since UNESCO is an intergovernmental organisation whose membership is made up of nation states, the task of safeguarding banal or everyday culture as world heritage falls on the shoulders of nation states. The nation state then finds itself in a very peculiar position: in order to play to the discourse of world heritage which could bring a range of benefits, it first has to identify which cultural features are worthy of protection, thus making it 'special' but then to present it as something banal to the international authority. This peculiar situation is seen in the case of the inscription of *washoku* as well as the gastronomic meal of the French as we will now see. What is also worth noting is that the human rights regime which places emphasis on authenticity of culture as a fundamental right reinforces the nationalist framework in which the current international order operates.

The Inscription of *Washoku*

The inscription of *washoku* in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity on 4 December 2013 was greeted with much enthusiasm in Japan, which has added further impetus

to a variety of projects to promote food culture and 'food education (*shokuiku*)'[7] pursued by the government, private sector and civil society groups (for a nutritionist's view see Shiratori 2014). In particular, the government intensified its efforts to promote Japanese cuisine abroad as a way of increasing export of Japanese agricultural produce and attracting more tourists.

The description of *washoku* on the list starts with the following sentences: '*Washoku* is a social practice based on a set of skills, knowledge, practice and traditions related to the production, processing, preparation and consumption of food. It is associated with an essential spirit of respect for nature that is closely related to the sustainable use of natural resources'.[8] In other words, it is not a particular food item or cuisine itself but the 'traditional food culture of the Japanese' that has been officially deemed suitable for recognition as part of common human heritage (Imoo 2014: 102; Ehara 2014). The application for the inscription in the list can only be made by a UNESCO member state, and in this case, the Japanese government, in particular, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF), was in the driving seat. MAFF has a web page dedicated to dietary culture[9] which includes a number of documents compiled by the government in order to make this application. This reinforces the impression that the inscription of *washoku* in the UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list is an outcome of yet another state-sponsored nationalist project of nation branding or exercise of 'soft power' as seen, for instance, in the case of falconry of the UAE. In other words, the case of the inscription of *washoku* suggests, at the first glance, not much interaction between the *banal* and international governance, but a conventional, top-down view of nationalism at work.

However, an investigation into the background of the application to UNESCO has highlighted a different aspect of the role of international organisations in the workings of nationalism. Despite the state-led nature of the application (which is an inevitable consequence of the intergovernmental nature of UNESCO as an organisation—only the State Parties, i.e. member states, can put forward nominations), sources show that the idea to apply for the inscription of Japanese cuisine in the intangible cultural heritage list originally came from cooking

professionals who were deeply concerned with the possible extinction of traditional Japanese cuisine, not from the government to use it as a means of nation branding (Hashimoto 2015). Mitsuru Suda, from the secretariat of Washoku Association of Japan (Washoku Japan),[10] a private-sector-run successor (formally set up in February 2015) of the government-sponsored National Council for the Protection and Transmission of Washoku Culture, which was set up in 2013 in the run-up to the application to UNESCO, identified a heightened sense of crisis over the future of Japanese traditional cuisine shared by mainly Kyoto-based chefs of Japanese traditional cuisine as the main driving force.[11] According to Suda, these chefs were concerned with the low social status of chefs ('no *washoku* chef has received the Order of Culture') and that the shortage of young chefs entering the profession; the largest proportion of students of cooking schools across Japan is learning to be pâtissiers (pastry chefs) followed by those learning Italian, French and Chinese cooking, and those who are learning Japanese traditional cooking are in a minority.[12] One of those concerned chefs, Yoshioka Murata, the owner and the chief chef of *Kikunoi*, a traditional Japanese restaurant (*ryōtei*) in Kyoto with three Michelin stars, set up the Japanese Culinary Academy in 2004 for the purpose of 'promoting global understanding of Japanese cuisine' and 'contributing to the next generation of Japanese food chefs'.[13] According to Suda, it was the Japanese Culinary Academy with strong support from Murata that contacted MAFF regarding the idea of applying for the inscription of *washoku*. When Murata learned that the South Korean government was planning to make an application for Korean court cuisine at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, he mobilised the Academy to petition the Kyoto Prefectural government regarding a possible application to UNESCO as a way of ensuring the future of Japanese traditional cuisine (Murata 2014).

These sources show that what appeared to be a state-led initiative was originally triggered by concern held by a particular section of the private sector due to their worry over their industry and job security. The movement to have *washoku* inscribed in UNESCO's intangible cultural list was not an expression of state-led nationalism, but rather it originated in the private sector. Furthermore, UNESCO's list was instrumental in

presenting the government's concern over promoting Japan in a variety of manners and the industry's concern over the future of Japanese traditional cuisine sector as a concern over the decline in national identity as seen in one of MAFF's leaflets (MAFF 2015). In other words, UNESCO, an international organisation working for the promotion of the *universal*, has provided an environment in which actors are nudged to present their concerns as national ones in their efforts to find solutions and countermeasures to their concerns. The key to this dynamic is the explicit linking of cultural rights, particularist rights, as it were, to the universal conception of human rights by instituting the concept of 'intangible cultural heritage' by UNESCO which is an intergovernmental organisation based on the nation state system.

The *washoku* chefs' concern was quickly taken up by the government. In July 2011, the Working Group to Prepare for the Inscription of Japanese Food Culture in the Intangible Cultural Heritage List was set up by MAFF drawing participants from other ministries (Agency for Cultural Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry), universities, cooking profession and catering industry. The government's response was quick, mainly due to the Great East Japan Earthquake that took place several months earlier in March. Working towards the inscription of *washoku* was probably seen as conducive to the overall efforts of the government at that time: to rebuild and rejuvenate Japan and its national image (see the minutes of the first meeting of the Working Group, MAFF 2011a). Also it appeared that the *washoku* chefs' concern chimed with the government's concern about food in general. As seen in the law on food and nutrition education in 2005, the Japanese government had been concerned with the state of diet and nutrition in Japan in relation to a range of issues: the general health of the Japanese population in the context of rapid ageing, food safety, the decline in food self-sufficiency and weakening of national identity (Cabinet Office 2006). For example, the Cabinet Office spells out its concern in detail:

> … With the rapid increase in the elderly population in our country, it is important for the aged to lead vibrant and healthy lives. It is necessary for

> people to continue to engage in physical activity and to practice healthy dietary habits.
>
> …
>
> Issues related to both domestic and international food safety have evoked citizens' interest in food safety. It is necessary to ensure food safety and enhance citizens' understanding about food safety.
>
> Our country's rate of food self-sufficiency is the lowest among developed countries, and the food supply is largely derived from abroad. …
>
> Improvement in living standards enables many citizens to enjoy a wide variety of diets. However, local regionally-specific food cultures are now disappearing. In order to revitalize local regional communities, and in order to promote the traditional healthy "Japanese dietary pattern" which includes rice as a staple food, suited to the Japanese climate, accompanied by various side dishes, it is important to transmit the significance of traditional food culture to younger generations (Cabinet Office 2006: 1–2).

From the government's perspective, therefore, the UNESCO application presented an opportunity to address these concerns in the form of promotion of *washoku*, which could also be accompanied by other policies such as the promotion of export of Japanese agricultural produce.[14]

The minutes of the Working Group's meetings provide interesting insight into the ways in which the *banal* interacts with international governance. A good example is the definition of Japanese cuisine and the adoption of the term '*washoku*' in the process of preparing the application. The definition of Japanese cuisine was right from the beginning a contested issue among the Working Group members. Initially, the idea of defining Japanese cuisine in reference to *kaiseki*, the top end of Japanese cuisine which is normally served at a top-end traditional Japanese restaurant, was proposed. What was to be submitted to UNESCO in this plan was the sophisticated and elegant form of Japanese cuisine, which was almost reaching the realm of 'art'. However, after conducting an Internet-based questionnaire to gauge the level of public support for the application and a fact-finding trip to France to learn about the experience of having the gastronomic meal of the

French inscribed in the list, in the third meeting, doubts about the suitability of representing Japanese cuisine mainly through reference to *kaiseki* were raised because it may look elitist (MAFF 2011c). Attention was drawn to UNESCO's interest to protect everyday culture: '[…] the nature of UNESCO […] is based on anthropological views that culture does not exclusively belong to a minority elite but is open to all people in society' (MAFF 2011c: 8). This point was supported by the majority of the group; in other words, what to be proposed should be popularly supported culture if not popular culture, and certainly not what was perceived as elite culture. The strategic importance of presenting the application as a means of preserving a cultural tradition which was being threatened due to the decrease in consumption of Japanese food stuff and the number of Japanese cuisine chefs was also emphasised (ibid.). The shift from the definition of Japanese cuisine as *kaiseki* to *washoku* as a wide concept covering many ways the Japanese engaged with food including home cooking, representing the banal and everyday practice and the top-end cuisine was completed in the fourth meeting when the Working Group members learned that the South Korean government's application to have Korean court cuisine inscribed was in the status of information reference, presumably, according to the Working Group members, because it was judged to be elitist by UNESCO (MAFF 2011d).

Another interesting trend in other MAFF publications on *washoku* published following the application is the Japanese government's positioning as asking for help from the international community. The application for *washoku* to be inscribed in the intangible cultural list is framed as the Japanese government's seeking help from the international community to preserve, protect and promote what is deemed to be invaluable common heritage for the future, a rather humble attitude. *Washoku: Traditional Food Culture of the Japanese* (2013), a booklet drafted by MAFF is peppered with concern over the fate of *washoku*; that it is 'disappearing from our tables' (2013: 1) and that *washoku* is 'in crisis' (2013: 31–32). Another, shorter booklet compiling the findings from a project 'Research into Protection and Transmission of "Washoku"' (November 2014–March 2015) also highlights the decline

of *washoku* in contemporary Japan, and the government's and industry's concern over it (MAFF 2015). These publications clearly reflects the Working Group's attitude that the inscription of *washoku* has very little to do with nation branding, though some derivative effects were expected by various ministries and industries, and fundamentally it is about reviving an aspect of national culture with help from an international authority. This may be seen as a strategic decision to adopt a non-threatening attitude towards the international community in order to maximise the chance for *washoku* to be inscribed.

When *washoku* was inscribed in the intangible cultural heritage lists, it was celebrated on a national scale with a variety of media drawing the public's attention to this. Many commentators drew attention to the fact that *washoku* was different from *kaiseki* and emphasised the significance of the fact that it was a concept that embraced everyday practice. *Washoku*, they pointed out, included food items which had been Japanised such as curry rice and ramen, so it is a 'truer' representation of part of Japanese cultural heritage which belongs to people, not to the elite. They then emphasised why it was important for Japanese people to preserve this heritage: because it was now recognised as part of heritage shared by humanity. But the public were also reminded that they should carry on what they have been doing rather than doing something special because that is what UNESCO, the international authority, considers important. In the process which led to the inscription of *washoku* to the intangible cultural heritage list, the *banal* changed its status a few times. Identification of *washoku* (the *banal*) instead of *kaiseki* (high culture) as the element to be submitted was framed by the intangible cultural heritage list regime which is set up to protect the *banal*. In order to receive protection, the *banal* needs to be identified and presented something special that is worthy of protection. At this stage, the banal loses its taken-for-granted-ness. However, because the whole purpose of the intangible cultural heritage regime is to protect the *banal*, once the banal element is inscribed in the list, it needs to be sold back to the public as something to be practiced as usual—unconsciously and unreflexively—regaining its taken-for-granted-ness. This banality is granted only because its special nature has been recognised

officially and globally. The banality of *washoku* after the inscription has therefore transformed; the banality that is deemed to represent the *national* and is protected by the human rights regime.

This curious transformation of the banal is also observed in the French case, to which the Japanese working group paid keen interest in the preparation of their application.

The Gastronomic Meal of the French

The 'gastronomic meal of the French' was the first amongst a variety of food cultures of the world that was inscribed in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2010. As such it was closely studied by those who were behind the Japanese bid, and the development of the French bid also sheds light on how the banal interacts with international governance.

The gastronomic meal of the French is described as: '… a customary social practice for celebrating important moments in the lives of individuals and groups, such as births, weddings, birthdays, anniversaries, achievements and reunions. It is a festive meal bringing people together for an occasion to enjoy the art of good eating and drinking. The gastronomic meal emphasizes togetherness, the pleasure of taste, and the balance between human beings and the products of nature. …'.[15]

The emphasis on the social aspect of the practice as something widely enjoyed in all corners of France was quickly noted by those behind the Japanese bid, which eventually led to the redefinition of Japanese cuisine as *washoku* to represent a variety of food items and styles enjoyed by the Japanese on a daily basis away from a more elitist conception with strong link to *kaiseki*. Upon receiving the report from the fact-finding trip to France, the Working Group also took special note of the fact that the name of the element changed from the originally proposed 'French cuisine' to 'French gastronomy' to settle on 'the gastronomic meal of the French' with qualification that 'in French, the term "gastronomic" refers to the popular culture of enjoying good food and drink' as in the nomination file (UNESCO 2010). For it was interpreted as a strong indication of what UNESCO gives priority to: protection and

preservation of what is widely shared in on a daily basis, i.e. what constitutes the everyday, not selective elitist culture (MAFF 2011c).

The above points to the curious effect UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list has. While one of the stated aims of UNESCO is to preserve the diversity of cultures on the planet, since the application to the list has to be seen as representing the whole group on behalf of which the application is made, be it a national, ethnic or regional group,[16] it in effect encourages the homogenisation of what is presented as cultural heritage, which in turn creates a degree of tension with respect to diversity in culture in general. This is clearly seen in the nomination file of the gastronomic meal of the French. In identifying 'the communities, groups or, if applicable, individuals concerned' (C. 1.), the nomination files states:

> The French. The community concerned by the element is the entire French nation people. The community is large, diverse and unified. Its collective experience has been built over several centuries. The product of social and cultural mixes, regional plurality and contributions by immigrants, the community is united by shared practices like the gastronomic meal. Important moments in the lives of individuals and groups are celebrated in a ritualistic way through this festive meal (UNESCO 2010).

Here the inherent diversity of the French nation is emphasised in a politically correct manner. However, a few pages on, the nomination file places more emphasis on the homogenising aspect of the gastronomic meal. In response to '1. Identification and Definition of the Element (cf. Criterion R.1)', the file states the 'gastronomic meal is a homogeneous social practice in the whole community' and lists 'its meaning and social function' and 'its rites necessitating knowledge and know-how' as the source of this homogenising power. The file attempts to find a solution to the tension between diversity and homogeneity by highlighting the ritualistic aspect of the gastronomic meal: the content of the meal might vary but it always follows a strict order to bring about unifying, if not homogenising, effects on the diverse French (UNESCO 2010). The requirement to be inscribed in the list appears to have led to certain redefinition of national particularity; it has to be expressed through

something common and universal, which is worthy of being shared by all humanity.

The French example not only adds to the material to investigate banal nationalism at work at the international level but also points to another of Billig's concern: globalisation as Americanisation (Billig 1995). In contrast to the Japanese application which is largely framed by generalised concern over the nation's health and food security and directly triggered by a traumatic event (the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011), the French application was made as a response to a shared concern between related industries and the government over increasing Americanisation in the form of the spread of fast food and erosion of 'traditional' French food culture. While this fits Billig's treatment of globalisation in *Banal Nationalism*, it is curious within the framework of World Heritage. As briefly reviewed, the idea of intangible cultural heritage has been introduced partially in order to correct the western centricity in the World Heritage regime; the distribution of UNESCO's World Heritage sites is heavily skewered towards Global North (Kurin 2004; Leimgruber 2010). According to UNESCO, Europe and North America host 47% World Heritage Properties in the world as of 2016 and France hosts 42 properties (4% of the total) after Italy (51 Properties), China (50) and Spain (45).[17] The USA host 23 properties and French superiority over the USA in regard to the World Heritage sites is clear.

This leads us to an interesting train of thought about culture, banal nationalism, human rights and international governance. French concern over the future of French cuisine cannot be captured by the World Heritage site regime which is about architecture, monuments and landscapes. French cooking professionals and the French government fear the French way of eating would be undermined and overtaken by something else, most likely the American way of life. Culture is therefore perceived, in this instance, as a way of life, something intangible unlike in the case of the World Heritage site regime. Because culture is a way of life, it is necessarily rooted in people, the ordinary kind in particular, which arguably reflects the concern over authenticity legitimised by Romanticism (Taylor 1989). If culture is necessarily rooted in people, what is most authentic and therefore worth preserving for the

good of the nation is more likely to be banal. At this point, the *banal* ceases to be banal because it is a subject of special attention; it no longer remains in the realm of the unconscious or the taken for granted. Why it is important is now explicitly discussed. At the same time, the emerging human rights discourse emphasises the importance of culture for human well-being; human rights are protected by a set of international, even supranational, arrangements. The international/supranational framework dictates that the *banal* is precious because it is banal—fundamental to people's life—and what to be protected by UNESCO, an international organisation, has to include the *banal*. In a way, international governance creates an environment in which the *banal* is reified for the benefit of the nation state. Universalism that is supposed to be embodied in the international organisation in fact entrenches the importance of particularism in the name of human rights—the ultimate common good.

Concluding Remarks

The chapter has explored the concept of banal nationalism in relation to international governance in reference to UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list. It has highlighted that everyday forms of taken-for-granted cultural practice are central to the intangible cultural heritage regime. However, it has also provided further insights into the environment in which banal nationalism operates. What Billig has pointed out in *Banal Nationalism* is that the state is the key actor in normalising discourses of nationhood and legitimating national frameworks. It is not only the state in exerting influence in this process: the media contribute to the maintenance of a particular view of nationhood and its borders by classifying news into 'home news' and 'international news' or the presentation of the weather forecast (Billig 1995). The case studies presented in the chapter show that banal forms of nationalism can also be seen at the level of international governance including institutions dealing with the protection of human and cultural rights. At the first stage in both Japanese and French examples, what is identified to be in need of preservation is something special—elite or sophisticated forms of

cuisine—but given the prevailing norm in UNESCO, the private sector and the government are forced to identify something banal rather than selective to nominate. They then engage with creating narratives emphasising the banality of *washoku* or the gastronomic meal of the French and propagate it to the public as well as pitch it to UNESCO. The value of the *banal* is justified in reference to cultural rights and proposed for protection to an international organisation. When the nomination is successfully inscribed into the list, the government needs to engage with a complex task: first, they need to explain to the public that the banal nature of *washoku* or the gastronomic meals of the French is now so important that it is now deemed to be seen as part of heritage shared by all humanity; but then they encourage the public to preserve the banality of their practice because that is what it means to be inscribed into the list. However, the banality of their everyday practice is necessarily transformed because of the application process. The banal food culture was made special in order for the nation state to gain some prestige at the international level but once it is recognised as part of the heritage of the world, the nation state need to engage with the 're-balalisation'; food culture needs to regain its former status of being taken for granted; it needs to retreat to the realm of the unconscious and unreflexive so as to make the view of the nationhood as represented in the inscribed elements natural and beyond questioning.

There are a few interesting observations that emerge from the case studies. First, the influence of emerging human rights norms cannot be neglected. The development of the intangible cultural heritage list is rooted in a global development of the human rights discourse which emphasise the importance of self-determination of the individual. Cultural rights assume importance because it is linked to the right to be authentic. As the conception of culture adopted by UNESCO becomes more anthropological in including intangible elements, the human rights regime which places human well-being at the top of universal values in turn works to reify the *banal*. This suggests the working of banal nationalism needs to be examined in a globalised context of human rights norms. Secondly, as the literature on World Heritage has already suggested, UNESCO, an international organisation working for universal values, works to reinforce the nation state framework in its efforts to

safeguard common heritage of humanity. This is because UNESCO is an intergovernmental organisation whose membership is based on the nation state system, and it can only work with consent and cooperation from its members. Since there is no purely supranational organisation at the moment (the European Union is a hybrid of supranational and intergovernmental elements with the latter privileged), it is difficult to assess what alternative effects of international governance would be possible. The point here is because the current international governance, at least institutionally, is bound up with the nation state system, banal nationalism can be observed at the international level working to reinforce the nation state framework in the world we live in.

Notes

1. The rest of the chapter draws from Chap. 7 of *Food, National Identity and Nationalism* by Ichijo and Ranta (2016).
2. The fact that the world's foremost global institution is called the United *Nations* also suggests the entrenchment of nationalism in the contemporary political system.
3. UNESCO, http://en.unesco.org/about-us/introducing-unesco.
4. http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/.
5. http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00006.
6. http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/en/lists?multinational=3&display1=inscriptionID#tabs.
7. *Shokuiku* (食育) is an idea that children should be educated to be able to live on a healthy diet by acquiring knowledge about food and ability to choose food items through a variety of experiences. What is particular in Japan is that the idea was legislated in 2005 in the form of Basic Law on Shokuiku (food and nutrition education). Perhaps conscious of the law's peculiarity, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery has published a leaflet in English entitled *What is 'Shokuiku (Food Education)'* which is available from their web site (http://www.maff.go.jp/e/pdf/shokuiku.pdf).
8. http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&RL=00869.
9. http://www.maff.go.jp/j/keikaku/syokubunka/index.html.

10. http://washokujapan.jp/.
11. Interview on 9 April 2015.
12. This is also confirmed by Murata in the second meeting of the Working Group to Prepare for the Inscription of Japanese Food Culture in the Intangible Cultural Heritage List (MAFF 2011b).
13. http://culinary-academy.jp/english.
14. Needless to say, due to the nuclear incident that followed the earthquake, export of Japanese agricultural produce came to a halt in 2011. The impact of the Earthquake and the nuclear incident in the preparation of the UNESCO application can be seen in the minutes of the second meeting of the Working Group (MAFF 2011b). The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, on the other hand, clearly understood the inscription of *washoku* in the intangible cultural heritage list as part of its 'Cool Japan' strategy (MAFF 2011a, b, c, d).
15. http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&RL=00437.
16. While the application can only be made by the State Party, regional or ethnic culture can be nominated for the inscription.
17. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/stat/.

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Banal Nationalism and Consumer Activism: The Case of #BoycottGermany

Eleftheria J. Lekakis

Introduction

#ThisIsACoup became a globally trending hashtag in July 2015, after the 17-h-long Eurogroup meeting in which the Greek Prime minister agreed to a third round of austerity measures, despite that not being his position at the start of the meeting. The hashtag referred to the betrayal of the 61% strong public mandate of Greeks who had rejected this proposal in the referendum that had preceded the meeting. This spread like wildfire on Twitter, giving rise to more hashtags, the most popular of which was #BoycottGermany. This episode can be used to examine an important intersection between banal nationalism and the everyday politics of transnational consumer activism. This chapter explores the

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relationship between the nation and discourses of resistance to austerity through (consumer) activism in the hashtag #BoycottGermany. The analysis illuminates different scales of identity at play: transnational solidarity, supranational institutions such as the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund), as well as the often taken-for-granted use of national categories and symbols.

The focus of this chapter moves between these levels to illustrate the negotiations between the macro-level (decisions about austerity by major political and economic institutions) and the micro-level (discourses against austerity by individuals). These materials provide fruitful ground for interrogating how everyday political struggles can illuminate broader processes and struggles over the significance and meaning of the nation in a global world. This chapter aims to problematise the relevance of nationalism during the Eurozone crisis and to examine the ways in which anti-austerity initiatives were tied to particular practices of (nationally-defined) activism and consumption. The global financial crisis has propelled an ongoing crisis in the Eurozone, which has shaken the socio-political landscape of the European Union and, in some cases, reinforced the importance of the 'national'. Through an analysis of the #BoycottGermany hashtag, this chapter also illustrates how responses to the crisis by transnational activists often employed national frames to make sense of key issues and individual actors. In this way, they reproduced banal forms of nationalism, through the taken-for-granted use and discussion of symbols, people and place defined in national terms. Such a multi-level examination allows for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between nationalism, politics and consumer activism in times of crisis and a re-examination of the relevance of Michael Billig's thesis of banal nationalism.

In this chapter, I first review themes from the literature on banal nationalism and everyday nationhood in the context of the Eurozone crisis, I outline the role of consumption in recreating forms of everyday nationhood and connect it to its politics and anti-austerity activism before I move on to analyse the digital discourses of anti-austerity through the uses of hashtags.

Banal Nationalism, Everyday Nationhood and the Eurozone Crisis

Over the last 20 years, the study of nationalism has benefitted from the discussion offered by Michael Billig (1995) in *Banal Nationalism*, a thesis which foregrounded methodological nationalism. The latter concept refers to the epistemological approach to the study of nations which presupposes their natural existence within the world of nations, and regards them as units of analysis which are uniform and can be studied in terms of their exhibition of similarities or differences with other nations (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Chernilo 2011). The key thesis in his influential book concerned the latent reproduction of the nation through symbols unremarkably existing in the everyday. Furthermore, Billig (1995, p. 86) observed, nationalist ideology is an international ideology, as 'international consciousness is integral to the modern consciousness of nationalism'. A nation exists only because other nations also exist, and thus the international ideology of nationalism is reproduced.

Banal nationalism made Western-based forms of nationalisms more transparent than ever before. As Skey (2009, p. 334) points out, banal nationalism's major contribution has been 'to identify the problem—a tendency to treat the nation as a given both in everyday life and social theory—and point towards its possible contours'. These contours include the processes through which the nation is continuously, unconsciously and multiply encoded in physical and mediated spaces; from the flags waving outside public administration buildings, but more recently also outside commercial spaces, to consumer products (Volcic and Andrejevic 2011), newspapers, TV news and current affairs programs (Slavtcheva-Petkova 2014).

In addition, Billig's thesis challenged the myopic view of nationalism as an extreme phenomenon occurring only during times of state-building and extreme right-wing politics. Because of the tradition that followed this scholarship, we have come to understand nationalism as a phenomenon involving both hot and banal articulations. Hot nationalism refers to extremist violence and civil conflict, while

banal nationalism refers to implicit modes of generation of nationalism which, in Billig's work, are primarily influenced by the state and other institutions, such as the media. Jones and Merriman (2009) take this work further and suggest that the concept of 'everyday nationalism' helps illuminate the interlinked relationship between hot and banal nationalisms. By exploring the everyday politics of road signs in Wales, they argue that nationalism is not just enforced by the state, but also by groups or citizens interested in challenging the state. In their case, the bilingual road signs became spaces of contestation of British governance over Wales.

In line with this argument, this piece suggests that the boundaries between hot and banal nationalism appeared to be blurry in the digital discourses of the nation in #BoycottGermany. An understanding of the 'everyday' can help illustrate this

> the fluid interrelationship between hot and banal nationalism since it explicitly transcends the distinction between the more mundane and the more extreme circumstances that affect individuals' lives. To talk about the everyday reproduction of nationalism, therefore, necessarily highlights the multiplicity of nationalist discourses and practices affecting, and affected by, individuals and groups within particular places at specific times. (Jones and Merriman 2009, p. 172)

This is the contention which this chapter makes with regard to the ways in which anti-austerity activism through digital media can both reproduce and challenge dominant frames of the nation.

The importance of expanding the banal nationalism thesis to acknowledge how individuals reproduce national frameworks has also been foregrounded by many significant works (Thompson 2001; Brubaker et al. 2006; Fox and Miller-Indriss 2008a; Jones and Merriman 2009; Skey 2009, 2014; Antonsich 2015). These studies are often closely tied to the perspective of everyday nationhood, which interrogates how citizens negotiate the nation in the everyday life. Such studies challenge the idea of a singular, homogeneous nation and attend to both its macro- and micro-level expressions: 'the nation … is not simply the product of macro-structural forces; it is simultaneously the practical

accomplishment of ordinary people engaging in routine activities' (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a, p. 537). In a seminal work on the topic, Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a) focus on four ways of analysing the reproduction of nationhood in everyday life: through *discourse* (how the nation is constructed and legitimated as discursive construct), *choice* (how nationhood frames the choices people make), *performance* (how the everyday meanings of national symbols are negotiated) and *consumption* (how 'ordinary people' engage with the nation through consumption). The latter dimension is of particular relevance to the everyday politics of consumption as anti-austerity.

The tradition of cultural studies has outlined conditions through which we can view consumption as a field of empowerment and expression (Nava 1991; Lury 1996; MacKay 1997; Nelson 2000; Paterson 2006). In their discussion of everyday nationhood, Fox and Miller-Indriss suggest that 'routine consumption practices thus become important modalities for the production of national sensibilities' (2008a, p. 553). Consumption is a means through which identities are communicated, including national identities. Examples include cases where the British flag is reified in various forms of clothing, such as t-shirts, accessories, such as bags, and even cosmetics, such as nail polish. The embeddedness of the flag in routine activities of consumption supports both the thesis of banal nationalism, as the reproduction of nationalism through banal activities, and everyday nationhood, as the co-production of nationalism in the context of everyday life. Yet, national material culture does not explicitly depend on an industrial understanding of national production (e.g. popular myths around Guinness beer being distilled in Ireland or Bacardi in Puerto Rico), but also on national retail geographies organising nationhood through consumption (e.g. malls in the USA or kiosks in Greece) or through commodity domestication (e.g. Coca-Cola in Trinidad, see Miller 1998).

Consumer activism is also a means through which (national) politics can be articulated. For instance, in the case of #BoycottGermany, resistance to austerity politics in Europe was expressed as consumer activism that sought to encourage boycotts as selective abstinence from purchases and boycotts as selective preference of purchases, often focusing on the products of particular countries. These forms of anti-austerity

activism might be labelled as examples of 'political consumerism' which uses the space of the market for political contestation (Micheletti 2003; Micheletti et al. 2004; Stolle and Micheletti 2013; Lekakis 2013).

I have elsewhere argued that, in the context of austerity, everyday cultures of consumption become reconfigured into cultures of resilience, resistance and reinforcement (Lekakis 2015). Cultures of resilience refer to the grassroots and solidarity economy initiatives that have been flourishing in Greece (Graham-Harrison 2015). This includes time banks (an alternative way of exchanging skills and services based on the currency of time), alternative currencies (symbolic or local currencies), social spaces (communal spaces organised as self-managed spaces or cooperatives), social clinics (volunteer groups offering free medical care) and collective kitchens (communal events where people pay what they can). Cultures of resistance include boycotts against the violation of human rights, such as the Manolada strawberry farm boycott.[1] Finally, cultures of reinforcement include the revival of ethnocentric consumption campaigns such as 'We Consume What We Produce' (or 'I Prefer Greek'[2]). Ethnocentric campaigns, while often presented as citizens' movements, are part and parcel of economic nationalism, a long-standing element in the constitution of states which belongs to the toolkit of capitalist nations (Greenfeld 2001). Economic nationalism is evident in campaigns organised by state or market actors to best serve their interests through a commercial adaptation of nationalism and nationhood. Examples here include historical studies such as those exploring the Boston Tea party, the boycott of British goods and the subsequent establishment of the USA (Frank 1999), the construction of Chinese nationalism through consumer culture (Gerth 2003), as well as the role of advertising and commercial culture in Nazi Germany (Swett 2013).

Cultures of resistance and reinforcement are sometimes divergent and sometimes intersecting, demonstrating the interchange between hot and banal nationalism. If cultures of resistance are concerned with negotiations of everyday nationhood that challenge the hegemony of the European Union and austerity policies, then cultures of reinforcement are working towards the banal reproduction of the nation through the reinvigoration of economic nationalism. In a related argument, Edensor (2002, p. 103) writes that 'things can sustain identity by constituting

part of a matrix of relational cultural elements including practices, representations, and spaces which gather around objects and minimise the potential for interrogation'. Yet, the 'systematic, habitual procedures' (ibid, p. 105) through which things are organised are not fixed. Instead, everyday nationhood depends on the historical context through which relationships between things, people and the nation have been articulated.

It is worth noting, however, that this approach has been subject to critique. For instance, Smith (2008, p. 567) finds everyday nationhood to be 'restricted to the micro-analytical and descriptive rather than the causal and sociohistorical'. Yet, the study of everyday nationhood can illustrate the move between the macro-level of economic policies at the behest of supranational institutions (Troika) and the micro-level with regard to the impact of and responses to these policies. There is, then, a consideration of the need for 'context-sensitive approach to the study of nationhood where context is understood in multiple temporal and spatial dimensions' (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008b, p. 574). For instance, globalisation, a macro-level process, reshapes our understanding of self, place and community, issues which have often been discussed in relation to the movement and meaning of commodities. As Billig (1995, p. 132) acknowledges, 'patterns of consumption are not strictly national. Consumers can no longer imagine themselves as part of a national community, all purchasing the same type of article, which is marketed within the nation's borders and which represents a distinctive national culture'.

The mobility of such consumer goods and the new activities and forms of community and solidarity they may generate has also been discussed in relation to the concept of cosmopolitanism. This is the idea that increasing numbers around the world are looking to engage with other cultures, customs, products and peoples. Unsurprisingly, food and consumption has been seen as central to the emergence of such cosmopolitan experiences and values (Beck 2006; Lekakis 2013). Similarly, in this piece, there is a broader outlook towards the reconfiguration of the politics of consumer activism in relation to wider macro-level processes (Lekakis 2015). Through the analysis of popular responses to the #BoycottGermany hashtag, one can see the emergence

of more cosmopolitan attitudes alongside everyday forms of nationhood. The following section outlines how digital discourses in the #BoycottGermany hashtag were identified, collected and analysed. Of particular interest are the ways in which national frames were employed and repudiated by actors in Europe and beyond.

Method

#ThisIsACoup has had broad social impact. Originating in Barcelona, the hashtag engaged over 140,000 Twitter users and was viewed by over one billion people in July 2015 (Ahmed 2016). While the majority of tweets came from users in Greece, most other tweets originated from the USA, Germany and Spain and, to a lesser degree, countries such as France, Ireland, Canada, Italy, and the UK (Trending.gr 2015). The #BoycottGermany hashtag often accompanied #ThisIsACoup, in an attempt to attribute specific responsibility to the German state. For the purpose of this chapter, the analysis of the hashtag content concerns the relationship between discourses of consumer activism and everyday nationhood in #BoycottGermany.

Tweets that were posted in the week following the Eurogroup meeting (13–20 July 2015) were collected. This period was chosen because it was the peak of the struggle against the acceptance of a third memorandum of austerity measures.[3] In this period, I followed the hashtag on a daily basis. During the time of the writing, tweets for the hashtag #BoycottGermany were initially collected manually through the 'advanced search' of Twitter where results were categorised according to 'top' comments.[4] There are shortcomings in this method, as the 'top' comments were different in December 2015 and April 2016 when I revisited the data through the same approach. The reason for this is likely to be the changing interactions between Twitter users and this body of tweets which can rearrange of the basis of popularity. Hence, at that stage I acquired a database of all (1670) tweets featuring the #BoycottGermany hashtag.[5] The sampling process included a selection of original tweets (not retweets) that were posted by the most active users of the hashtag. I worked closely with a sample of 200 tweets

which were produced by 113 Twitter 'top' users. Out of these, three have deleted their profiles since. Of 110 active users, the location for 86 can be inferred (the time zone for 74 is known, while an additional 15 declare their location). Most users (a quarter of the sample) were tweeting from Greece, then followed by users from Germany (15 of 86), the USA (10 of 86) and Spain (7 of 86). These numbers roughly correspond with the overall origin of the tweets, as mentioned above.

The analysis was informed by predominantly an inquiry around deixis and visual communication of the nation as a site of contestation. Deixis, 'a form of rhetorical pointing' (Billig 1995, p. 106), is mobilised to critically appraise the theory of banal nationalism as the process through which 'little worlds can flag the homeland, and, in flagging it, make the homeland homely' (ibid.). Out of 200 tweets, 31 featured images, and there is also a primary interest in analysing these elements as markers of nationhood, notably in how particular people, products or brand are used to stand in for or represent the nation, what linguists call a synecdoche.

The Transnational 'We' and Everyday Resistance Through the Politics of Consumption

While #ThisIsACoup is a case of consumer activism against austerity policies promoted by the Troika, #BoycottGermany (as well as #StopBuyingGerman, #boycottgermangoods, #BoycottAllemagne, #BoycottAlemania, #BoycottFascism) is directed against the German state. Many tweets suggest a scrutiny of the German Chancellor's political power: 20 tweets out of the 200 analysed explicitly mention Angela Merkel, while 16 tweets refer to Wolfgang Schäuble. The German Chancellor also appears three times in images attached to the hashtag, twice alongside Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and once as edited into the front cover of *Der Spiegel* where Nazi officials are standing in front of the Parthenon. The caption in the latter reads '*How Europeans View Germans: The German Superpower*'. Tweets attached to the #BoycottGermany hashtag overwhelmingly demonstrated belief towards the idea of consumer power over political power.

In this case, the politics of consumer activism mainly manifests as resistance. The call to boycott Germany is about the refusal of economic exchanges. The boycott uses a national framework to make sense of an issue with international implications. The target is the German nation state whose political figures have pushed for austerity measures, as well as a range of commodities associated with the country. Twitter users spread information on which products and companies to avoid. An unidentifiable user[6] started a campaign on Buycott, a site aggregating political consumerism campaigns, to boycott 195 named companies in Germany 'until it decides to abolish austerity and then promote efficient economic growth plans!'[7] The target of this type of consumer politics is the German state, as well as the companies owned by German stakeholders and the brands that are associated with German companies. Moreover, the @BoycottGermany account had been active since February 2015 and became involved in hashtag activism a few months later. It sought to articulate the politics of consumer activism, as well as to unite transnational publics in the struggle against austerity.

The transnational 'we' is evident in expressions of solidarity. The terms 'we' and 'our' here rhetorically point to global publics who subscribe to T-Mobile's services (T-Mobile is a German holding company for Deutsche Telekom). There is a dual call to transnational solidarity and a case for cancelling (or restructuring) the Greek debt in light of the historic cancellation of the Nazi debt. This is a call to the transnational 'we' and as such challenges the thesis of banal nationalism. Deixis is not used here to reproduce national ideology, but to transgress national boundaries and activate transnational publics. Alternatively, this call also reproduces the idea of a world consisting of nations who have responsibilities across time, as Germany here appears to be addressed as a unified actor moving 'through' time (Anderson 2006, p. 24).

Deixis also operates routinely, within the bounds of the nation, but is used to challenge the Troika's and specifically Germany's power in the Eurozone crisis. Several tweets referred to 'we' as Greek citizens and 'our' responsibility to resist through the politics of consumption. Several statements embrace the loosely articulated boycott as a form of resistance to oppression. Their deixis is also open to interpretation. Who is the 'we' that didn't listen? How is 'our' responsibility to be heard

mediated through the politics of consumption? These terms are used here vaguely, denoting a cosmopolitan perspective and discursively constructing solidarity which transcends national borders. Yet, a specific address towards Germany is evoked: Germany is regarded as a unified actor that can be boycotted and despite the announcement of transnational responsibility, a national framework for practising it is evoked through boycotting. The most popular image among the selected tweets (appearing in six among 31 tweets with an image) was one of an A4 sheet of paper taped on a glass window (or door) which bore the writing 'from this day 15 July 2015 we do not sell German products in our shop' signed 'the management'. This is a direct boycott, instead of a call to boycott. Hence, the politics of selling can manifest as resistance at the micro-level against supranational institutions. However, it occurs within the frame of German business. Banal nationalism is, hence, not challenged, but reproduced as products associated with Germany are regarded as legitimate targets for individuals and businesses to voice their resistance towards the role of the German state in the Eurogroup negotiations. Here again we can see the intersections between the nation and Europe, and the degree to which they are intricately interlinked.

The sample of tweets from #BoycottGermany, however, did not feature absolute consensus in terms of the efficacy or approach of the hashtag. For example, a few tweets pushed towards positive action. Instead of a German boycott, they suggested a Greek buycott (selective purchasing of 'Greek' commodities). Another tweet promoting positive action through the politics of consumption resists the idea that Germany is a uniform entity and instead draws a distinction between people and institutions. Here, the spirit of political consumerism as political participation in a globalised world is interlinked with a common-sense understanding of a national framework as defined by people and products, whereby buying the latter will support the former. There are also critical issues that arise. The idea of promoting support towards a national economy goes back to the notion of economic nationalism and the mobilisation of patriotic tendencies by the marketplace. As Billig (1995, p. 114) has written, 'certainly patriotic themes provide the value-added selling points for many a product's marketing campaigns'. This is exacerbated in times of austerity, as commercial constructions of

the nation are forged by political and economic elites and promoted as panacea for an economy and state in crisis (Lekakis 2015).

This perspective can also be theorised with reference to the concept of 'entitativity'. For instance, Skey (2014, p. 9), in his analysis of the mediation of the nation, argues that during periods of crisis people 'also respond to, or involve themselves in, acts—displaying flags, taking part in public ceremonies, volunteering, *patterns of consumption*—designed to generate entitativity, which will themselves be mediated' (emphasis mine). Similarly, the Greek buycott is presented as a positive form of resistance through the politics of consumption, but the underscoring of the nation as a positive choice still underpins forms of banal nationalism. Debates around a nation rarely undermine the international ideology of nations even when examining issues that cross the borders of nations. Furthermore, Golden Dawn, the fascist party which has been elected to Parliament, has been maintaining an anti-austerity line and (ab)using the situation of the crisis and desire for dignity by setting up exclusive and discriminatory solidarity initiatives such as food kitchens and social groceries for Greeks only. Austerity can, thus, encourage symbolic and physical aggression, signifying also the fine line between consumer cultures of resistance and of reinforcement of (national) ideology.

Waving Digital Flags: Between Resistance and Reinforcement

Another aspect of these debates that is worth examining concerns the use of national symbols. Although these symbols did not feature in the majority of tweets, those that were used demonstrate once again the ways in which transnational solidarity is often articulated in relation to national frameworks of meaning and understanding. In the case of #BoycottGermany, the hashtag demonstrates a broad rejection of the role of the German state in the Eurozone crisis negotiations. Yet, this is not a total rejection of the ideology of nationalism itself, but rather a rejection of one country (#BoycottGermany) and reinforcement of another (#BuyGreek). A third of the tweets (originating from France,

Spain, Italy and Greece) featuring an image were concerned with 'German' brands. The second most popular image (appearing in three among 31 tweets with an image) is a collage of consumer brands (such as *Braun*, *Siemens*, *Puma*, *Boss*, *Wella*, *Adidas*) which are considered to be 'German'.

The mainstream acceptance of certain brands as 'German' attests to the commercial indexicality of the nation; most tweets pronounce these to be the brands that one can boycott in order to resist austerity and the oppression of the German state. These examples of synecdoche, where particular products, symbols, people or places stand in for the whole (the nation, in this case), again demonstrate the extent to which national frameworks are an easily accessible resource for making sense of wider political and social processes, a key insight from wider research on everyday nationhood.

The German flag, although a focus for much critique, also features in #BoycottGermany. Similarly to the attack on brands above, a tweet (originating in France) featured tanks with 'German' brands (*Siemens*, *Adidas*, *Puma*, *Lidl*, *Volkswagen*, *Miele* and *Bayer*) on a black, red and yellow background (colours of the German flag) with the words 'BOYCOTT Produzieren in Deutschland' (boycott made in Germany). This demonstrates the importance of war memories to the popular image of Germany and a reproduction of the German nation as dominant and threatening can be understood as a powerful intertextual chain where the same argument or viewpoint is consistently repeated so that it comes to be seen as 'normal' or natural. This contestation through a German boycott does not necessarily question the extent to which brands are symbols which perpetuate the ideology of nations. While there appears to be a rejection of the activities of the German state, there is also a taken-for-granted understanding of a German nation with its own flag, as well as products. This might seem rather obvious, but, as Billig has pointed out, such common-sense views need to be understood as an accomplishment and studied accordingly.

Another popular image also featured a German flag and was circulated in several languages. In this image, the flag appears to be waved and designed to show particular products as German. There was also

basic information on identifying 'made in Germany' commodities through their barcode. This focus on the barcode to determine the country of origin is part of a common misconception as the barcode refers to location of the parent company, but not the place of manufacture. However, in these cases, the barcode is regarded as a part and parcel of the toolkit of the nation—a feature that each nation must possess in order to be recognised as a legitimate actor on the international stage. Again, these forms of recognition contribute, in some way, to 'the universal grammar of nationhood' (Mihelj 2011, p. 4), as other European actors understand the barcode as a means for identifying and resisting Germany and its insistence on policies of austerity. This also supports Billig's view of nationalism as an international ideology. As actors seek to express transnational support, they still mobilise the international ideology of nationalism to do so.

Only one of 31 tweets with an image challenged this link between product/barcode and nation. One tweet posted an image of 'Greek' yoghourt *Total* which had been edited to highlight the tensions in the relationship between global consumer capitalism and national consumption. The edited image featured the familiar packaging of the yoghourt brand with two overlaid speech bubbles; one which translated to 'propagate!!! Do they take us for fools?' and was in response to the other one which highlighted that the 'Greek' yoghurt is made by 85% German and 35% French milk.

This highlights the disjuncture between *Total* being promoted as a 'Greek' brand and the ingredients being 'German' and 'French'. This challenges the entitativity of the 'Greek' brand and nation. A similar tweet pronounced that #BoycottGermany is 'as if capital has a homeland'. This statement focuses on the mobility of capital in a critical manner. It interrupts the idea that the consumption of national products can be used as platform to attack or defend a national people. Thus, it challenges the uniformity of nations and the universality of commercial symbols in voicing anti-austerity activism or expressing solidarity.

Additionally, a small sample of tweets reproduced national stereotypes. A tweet was posted featuring the cover *Der Spiegel* on 11 July 2015 which depicts caricatures of a German tourist and a Greek bon

viveur with the title *Unsere Griechen* (trans. *Our Greeks*). National stereotypes appear to be exacerbated by the Eurozone crisis and by the media, while Greeks have also been stigmatised across European media (Chalániová 2013; Bickes et al. 2014). Here, Twitter users from Greece appear to be resisting their stereotypical representation as lazy and carefree in the German press, while at the same time reproducing stereotypical representations of Germans as uptight and humourless. Such representations which are reproducing the mediated address of the nation are signifying the fine line between resistance towards and reproduction of banal nationalism.

Conclusion

Banal nationalism is an invaluable contribution to the study of nationalism, its ideology and its reproduction. Michael Billig's thesis inspired a new wave of research on the nation. This has broadened significantly through the examination of bottom-up articulations and negotiations of nationalism, notably through the study of everyday nationhood which highlighted the role of ordinary people in reproducing the nation. In line with such scholarship, this chapter has examined the role of the nation within the everyday politics of consumer activism as discursive resistance to austerity. The study has engaged in a multi-level approach, looking at the supranational level of the Troika institutions, the transnational level of activist networks and the national level of the boycott. Digital discourses of anti-austerity both challenge and reproduce national frames of operation and action.

The #BoycottGermany hashtag called for a loosely articulated international boycott of German commodities and companies, and evoked responses from actors operating across national borders and sometimes offering more cosmopolitan sensibilities. Yet, this resistance often tended to reproduce rather than resist banal nationalism. Thus, digital media—while crossing national borders—do not always challenge 'the national'. Hence, political consumerism has become a widespread phenomenon which indicates the extent to which political participation is articulated through the marketplace. There appears to be a unanimous

belief that consumer power can be a solution to the problems of austerity politics. Importantly, everyday resistance through the politics of consumer activism allows for the manifestation of a transnational 'we' which expresses solidarity beyond the borders of the nation. Yet, this still relies on an understanding of the world defined in national terms. This presents a challenge to the latent processes of banal nationalism which would promote a more specific 'we' to indicate belonging and responsibility. However, those who challenged the German boycott promoted the Greek buycott, thus replicating economic nationalism (as the commercial construction of the nation) and entitativity (as the assumption of the nation as a 'thing').

However, #BoycottGermany encourages banal nationalism through the prominence of the German flag on different images which call for a boycott of 'German' products. Therefore, the banality of German nationalism is accepted at the same time as the German state is rejected. There is a fine line between resistance and reinforcement in the #BoycottGermany hashtag. While the sphere of consumer activism has offered opportunities for citizens to voice their resistance to austerity at a transnational level, the articulation of that resistance is still dependent on tropes of banal nationalism. In the European Union, the financial crisis has configured everyday life and highlighted the relationship between banal and hot nationalisms.

Notes

1. The Manolada strawberry farm boycott has been an online campaign to boycott 'blood strawberries'. The story behind 'blood strawberries' is a story of violation of both labour and human rights, as migrant workers at the strawberry farm in question were attacked by gunmen after they requested their unpaid wages. For more information, see: http://bloodstrawberries.tumblr.com/post/49020386910/online-campaign-to-boycott-greeces-blood [Accessed: 12th January 2016].
2. http://protimoellinika.gr/ [Accessed: 10th May 2016].
3. The #BoycottGermany hashtag moved to a slightly different direction in September 2015, when the Environmental Protection Agency

discovered that the German corporation Volkswagen had been selling cars with a 'defeat device' in North America. The German boycott deserves further examination in a historical context, but also in light of the multiple narratives that emerge. This chapter focuses specifically on #BoycottGermany and #BuyGreek as anti-austerity activism.

4. These are 'popular Tweets that many other Twitter users have engaged with and thought were useful' https://support.twitter.com/articles/131209?lang=en#.
5. I am grateful to Dr. Georgios Giasemidis for providing me with a database of tweets he gathered via Twitter API through self-authored Python code.
6. http://www.buycott.com/SunIsBright [Accessed: 1st July 2016].
7. There is a Buycott campaign which has 199 members to date. Available from: http://www.buycott.com/campaign/1227/boycottgermany-products [Accessed: 11th May 2016].

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Part V

Conclusion

Banal Nationalism and the Imagining of Politics

Michael Billig

It would be absurd to pretend that all the arguments of *Banal Nationalism* have been confirmed by the events that have occurred globally since the book was first published over 20 years ago. As I will suggest in this chapter, some of the book's weaknesses and its over-simplifications have, in fact, become clearer over time. Nonetheless, one central theme has been reinforced and this is shown in all the chapters of the present volume. The authors take for granted that the issue of nationalism remains important. It was different when *Banal Nationalism* first appeared. The fashion then was for social scientists to claim that the world was moving inexorably towards a global, post-national age. Foremost among the theorists of globalisation was the sociologist Ulrich Beck. He criticised *Banal Nationalism* because it concentrated on nationalism and ignored 'banal cosmopolitanism', thereby being, in his words, 'selective to the point of distortion'.

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At the start of the twenty-first century, any signs of banal nationalism were, according to Beck, 'only islands in an overwhelming river of banal cosmopolitanism' (Beck and Willms 2003, p. 37).

Nationalism and the world of nation states have not withered away. In the past 20 years, there have been massive shifts in populations across national borders, but this has not meant that those borders have been trampled down. Quite the contrary, within the countries to which the migrants have been fleeing, there has been pressure to strengthen borders. Generally, boundaries continue to be policed, as well as to be contested both politically and militarily. The boundaries within the European Union might have been relaxed but those around the Union have been strengthened to exclude migrants. According to a recent book, the number of border walls in the world has increased. In 1989, there were 15 border walls but by 2016 there were 70. The number of deaths at borders has been rising, reaching record figures in 2015 (Jones 2016). The new president of the United States campaigned for a wall to be built along his nation's border with Mexico. All this building of border walls and the heightened concern for boundaries is happening at a time when global trade and international travel are increasing.

Beck and others were mistaken when they assumed that global forces were antithetical to the particularity of nations and that as the former increased so inevitably the latter would decline. None of the contributors to this book have found it difficult to identify the existence of nationalism in the modern world. Their examples are to hand; they have not had to search for increasingly rare islets that have not yet been submerged by the rising waters of cosmopolitanism, nor have they needed to start their chapters by justifying that they are taking the topic of nationalism seriously. As was suggested in *Banal Nationalism*, the world of nation states has historically been an international world, for internationalism rests upon nationalism and vice versa. In this spirit, Craig Calhoun writes that 'forgetting the international character of nationalism is conducive to illusory notions of how globalization will affect nationalism'. He is rightly baffled by 'how many people have imagined that globalization will simply replace nationalism with a universal, cosmopolitan consciousness'.

A number of the chapters highlight the links between nationalism and internationalism. Atsuko Ichijo provides an excellent empirical

example when he examines how UNESCO included cooking as a protected cultural heritage. Ichijo notes the contradiction between UNESCO's position as an organisation promoting universal values and its desire to promote the value of particular cultures. UNESCO operates within a national context; it encouraged official bids from the nation states of Japan and France that parts of their respective culinary cultures be granted the status of protected cultural heritage. The contradictory position of UNESCO is hardly surprising. Its parent organisation, the United Nations, is an international organisation devoted to universal aims, while being composed of individual nation states. In consequence, the UN's internationalism is inextricably connected with the nationalism of established, recognised nation states.

One of the main themes of *Banal Nationalism* was that signs of nationalism can be too familiar to be noticed. Whereas ordinary citizens may fail to observe the national symbols on the stamps that they are affixing to their letters or on the banknotes that they are spending in shops, it is less forgivable that social theorists should routinely be so unobservant. Social scientists have concealed the nationalism of Western nations by labelling it positively as 'patriotism', which they contrast favourably, but unjustifiably, with the 'nationalism' of others. As Calhoun comments, *Banal Nationalism* argued that ordinary people and social theorists have shared common blind spots and that the book drew attention to signs of nationalism that often pass unrecognised. However, if such signs are 'often' unnoticed that does not mean that they are always so. Shanti Sumartojo makes the very reasonable point that from time to time individuals can notice the signs that they generally overlook—becoming, for instance, suddenly aware of the nationalist meaning of a road name on a well-travelled, familiar route. She notes that *Banal Nationalism* did not attempt to say how such episodes of sudden, individual recognition might occur. The book, of course, had its own blind spots.

Before proceeding to discuss some of *Banal Nationalism's* other simplifications, it might be helpful to discuss what I believe to be a misunderstanding. This comes in the chapter by Ivana Spasić. She writes about Serbia and she claims that the concept of 'banal nationalism' is, at the very minimum, inappropriate for understanding the Serbian

situation. This is because the notion of 'banal nationalism', at least as outlined in my book, contains ethnocentric presuppositions, which express a Western bias against the non-Western world and against countries such as Serbia. This is an important charge that deserves to be examined.

Spasić claims that in *Banal Nationalism* I was arguing that there were two distinct types of nationalism—banal nationalism and hot nationalism. According to Spasić, I equated banal nationalism with the nations of the West and hot nationalism with the non-Western world or with nations like Serbia that are situated on the 'semi-periphery'. She suggests that *Banal Nationalism* unequivocally condemned Serbian nationalism as non-banal nationalism and thereby sharply distinguished it from the banal nationalism of established nations. The result was that the book expressed pro-Western assumptions that are tantamount to 'orientalism'. Spasić suggests that my preface to the Serbian edition of *Banal Nationalism* represents a change of thinking, for there I contemplated the possibility of Serbian banal nationalism (Billig 2009).

I do not wish to dispute Spasić's observations about Serbian politics about which she knows far more than I do. However, I would wish to dispute her interpretation of *Banal Nationalism*. I was arguing that the established nations of the West are deeply nationalist although their citizenry and sociological theorists often overlook this nationalism. Unfortunately, Spasić, in offering quotations to suggest that I was biased in favour of Western nations, sometimes quotes from the views that I was criticising in *Banal Nationalism* rather than those that I was upholding. Certainly, I was not suggesting that the nations of the West were only nationalist in a banal sort of way. When I was writing *Banal Nationalism*, the British government was engaged militarily in Northern Ireland with Irish nationalists, who wanted the province to secede from the United Kingdom. In the book, I criticised the ideological and theoretical bias which led only to the secessionists being labelled as 'nationalist'. The British government typically was not called 'nationalist', although it used force 'in the interest of maintaining, rather than challenging, present national boundaries' (Billig 1995, p. 48). I was seeking to expose the ideological blindness which routinely calls politics aimed at altering nationalist boundaries 'nationalist', but which equally

routinely withholds the same label from politics aimed at maintaining those same boundaries.

Banal Nationalism aimed to apply the word ‘nationalism’ to the processes, often unnoticed, by which established nation states are reproduced day by day. Spasić is correct to suggest that the processes of reproducing a nation state differ from those involved in producing or creating the nation state in the first place. The book assumes that the original formation of most nation states, which have become established over time, was violent and backed by imaginative and highly conscious declarations about the nature of the state, its people and its claimed territory. This is certainly true of the United States of America, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and so on. When *Banal Nationalism* was originally written, Serbia was in the process of being produced, rather than being reproduced. If there is a difference between the first edition *Banal Nationalism* and the preface for the Serbian edition, it is that Serbian history has moved on. From being a nation, which was in the violent process of being produced, Serbia by 2009 was becoming a nation state which will be banally reproduced.

I believe that Spasić oversimplifies *Banal Nationalism* when she presents it as suggesting that the processes of banal nationalism are typically confined to the West and that the nationalism of the rest of the world is non-banal. It was a major theme of *Banal Nationalism* that the ideology of nationalism is international—indeed, global. In this respect, ‘ideology’ denotes the sorts of beliefs which seem so obvious—so natural—to those who live in a particular age that they require, to use Melissa Aronczyk’s phrase, few narratives of justification. For the last hundred years, it has been taken for granted, or treated as common sense, that ‘nations’ exist and that a world divided into independent nation states is ‘natural’. We imagine that the world was always like this, although historically nation states belong to the modern era. Particular nations, especially those that have not established their separate independence, might produce their own particular narratives of justification to support their claims for statehood, but nationhood per se today does not require justification. Moreover, as argued in *Banal Nationalism*, the belief in the ‘naturalness’ of nations and in the world of nations is itself global: it is not confined to specific continents.

That being so, banal nationalism, as one of the means by which established nations are reproduced, will not be confined to the nation states of the West. It is likely to be found in any established or establishing state wherever it might be situated. Subsequent researchers have been able to find instances of banal nationalism across different continents. Crawford Young (2004) writes of the dozens of banal ways in which the new nations of Africa subliminally communicate nationhood through their flags, currency, postage stamps, identity cards and so on (see also Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011; Fuller 2008, for further African examples). Banal nationalism has been observed in Iran (Elhan 2016), Syria and Jordan (Phillips 2011) and Argentina (Benwell and Dodds 2011; Benwell 2014). If Serbia is part of the 'semi-periphery', then Turkey, straddling Europe and Asia, might be thought to be semi-peripheral. Nevertheless, researchers have found in the Turkish press analogous forms of banal nationalism as can be seen in the British press (Yumul and Özkırımlı 2000; Kös and Yılmaz 2012).

Of course, it might be argued in defence of Spasić that such investigations have expanded the concept of 'banal nationalism' beyond what I had intended in *Banal Nationalism*. Significantly, the researchers, who have found African, Asian and South American forms of banal nationalism, do not present their findings as if they are contradicting what had been argued in that book. Phillips claims to show that 'the everyday reproduction of nationalism which Billig identified in the West can be successfully adapted and transposed onto Syria and Jordan' (2011, p. 3). According to Phillips, *Banal Nationalism* argued that 'the reproduction of nations in the West takes two forms: the conscious, overt flag-waving, such as 4th July parades in the USA, and the banal, un-waved flags that hang unnoticed on public buildings and outside houses' (p. 11). This I believe takes us to the centre of Spasić's dissatisfaction with, and possible misunderstanding of my 1995 book.

According to Spasić, I suggested in *Banal Nationalism* not only that banal nationalism is principally confined to the nations of the West, but also that this is the principal form of nationalism to be found in the West and that very different forms of nationalism exist outside of the West. She writes that in my book 'the dichotomy banal/non-banal is basically framed as Us/Them' and that 'some people have one, others

have the other; "We" have this one, "They" (and some stray members of "Us") have the other'. However, as Phillips' quotation suggests, *Banal Nationalism* did not assert that the Western nations have a single form of nationalism, but that nationalism in established states, whether of the West or elsewhere, takes two forms—the banal and the non-banal. Indeed, the book argued that banal nationalism is the backdrop for more overtly nationalist episodes in the West.

That is why *Banal Nationalism* connected unwaved US flags with the highly nationalist passions of the first Gulf War; and British banal nationalism with the speedy mobilisation of the British public in support of the Falklands/Malvinas war. As such, banal nationalism, far from being innocently peaceful, is the precondition for nationalist violence committed by established nations. Since 1995, the world has seen the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention interventions by the USA and Russia in Syria. All these campaigns have been accompanied by outpourings of nationalism within the established nations that are doing the intervening and the invading. The argument of *Banal Nationalism* was that the populations of such countries could not be mobilised so quickly and so successfully for sudden military campaigns without the steady existence of banal nationalism in between the episodes of hot nationalism.

There are, nevertheless, a number of oversimplifications in *Banal Nationalism* which later researchers, including those in the present volume, have commented upon. As can often happen, social scientists, who aim to draw attention to phenomena that have previously been overlooked, can emphasise their case rhetorically by presenting clear exemplars. In consequence, they can end up with illustrations that resemble 'ideal types', rather than examining the complexities of actual cases as they messily unfold in real life. *Banal Nationalism* was a comparatively short book of less than 200 pages. So, simplifications can be expected, although that does not excuse them. It is the task of subsequent investigators to fill in the complex details. I now think that the one chapter, which aimed to provide an empirical investigation to support the theoretical ideas of the book, considerably oversimplified matters. As critics have noted, the one-day study of newspapers failed to emphasise sufficiently the English dimension of the papers that were

analysed. It did not distinguish adequately between the banal reproduction of England as compared with that of Britain, let alone the United Kingdom. In addition, I ignored the newspapers of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, failing to discuss how such newspapers might portray, both banally and non-banally, the complex national contexts in which they were published. Such points have been made by subsequent critics, whose observations contribute to understanding the complex forms that banal nationalism can take in nations within nations (for example, Law 2001; Rosie et al. 2004; MacInnes et al. 2007; Skey 2009).

Today, I would concede that the day study of newspapers contained obvious gaps and also that the analysis itself often failed to probe the rhetorical complexities of the phenomenon that it aimed to demonstrate. The book argues that there is a contrast between hot nationalism and banal nationalism—metaphorically illustrated as the contrast between the waved and the unwaved flag. But this contrast, which may have made the basic theme more understandable, is too stark. It implies that at one moment there are no waved flags and at the next all is a blur of waving flags. As Skey (2009) has noted, there are gradations between hot and cold nationalism, and that the gradations of temperature are better represented by talking about heating and cooling nationalist temperatures. Generally, the social sciences benefit by using verb phrases ('heating and cooling nationalist temperatures') rather than noun phrases ('hot and cold nationalism') to describe processes brought about by human actions (Billig 2013). Using the phrases of heating and cooling nationalist temperatures emphasises the gradations in between the extremes. Hopefully, such phrases will encourage investigators to point to the ways that actors might be heating up or cooling down moments of nationalism.

The inadequacy of just using the concepts of 'hot' and 'cold' nationalism does not stop there. It is a mistake—and a mistake to be found in *Banal Nationalism*—to suppose that each moment in the history of nationalism can be summarised by a single temperature. The heating and cooling of nationalism can occur at the same time in the same place. If I had looked more carefully at my single-day survey of the English press, I would have found this. I presented the survey as representing a moment of banal nationalism. The day's papers also described

the successes and failures of the nation's sportsmen and women. The items were encouraging little cheers or feelings of minor disappointment. The nationalist temperature was warming on some pages of the press as it was cooling on others: indeed, it might be moving in both directions on the same page and even within the same paragraph.

In this volume, Lukasz Szulc takes this idea further. He notes how lesbians and gays using LGBTQ websites in Poland and Turkey employ the language of banal nationalism in order to 'domesticate' such sites. In illustrating this, Szulc connects the complexity of nationalism's temperature with the emphasis in *Banal Nationalism* on top-down signs of nationhood. By contrast, Szulc looks at the way that ordinary people can challenge and reinterpret official signs and then use their reinterpretations banally. It should be added that since the publication of *Banal Nationalism,* there has been a growth of research examining episodes of such bottom-up nationalism. This volume contains a number of such studies besides Szulc's. Those who study nationalism in this way sometimes wish to distinguish what they call 'everyday nationalism' from 'banal nationalism'. In my view, analysts of nationalism do not need to choose between taking the one approach or the other, as if there is a theoretical zero-sum game at work. As Szulc's chapter illustrates, it is possible to combine creatively the study of everyday actions that reproduce and reimagine the nation, with an awareness of how that reimagined nation can also be reproduced banally. Investigators, therefore, should try to avoid assuming that the reality of 'banal nationalism' must reflect the sorts of simplifications to be found in the book of the same name and that anything more complex should be taken as evidence for the non-existence of banal nationalism. As Szulc comments there is still work to be done on banal nationalism. In particular, as he comments, there remains amazingly little interest in researching the banal nationalism of the United States.

There is a simplification of emotions in *Banal Nationalism*, relating to the contrast between banal and hot nationalism. Calhoun, in his chapter, rightly claims that there is a certain 'flatness' in my characterisation of banal nationalism. Partly this comes from concentrating on the unnoticed, banal aspects of nationalism—the weather maps, the nationally deictic use of the definite article (***le** président*, **the** prime minister,

***el** país*, ***ha**-aretz* and so on) and all the other barely noticed but ever-present signs of nationhood. These are not matters to stir the heart but that is precisely the point. However, nationalism, as Calhoun points out, cannot rest solely upon such pallid factors. It requires to use Calhoun's phrase, 'an imaginary', so that each nation imagines itself to be unique. And in imagining itself to be unique, the particular nation is just like all other nations, imagining themselves to be unique.

Nor is hot nationalism circumscribed by the waving of the flag—as if there is only absence of emotion or feelings of intense enthusiasm with no points in-between. There are other uses of the flag beyond being waved or not waved. I regret that I did not comment upon the common, international trope of the flag draped over the coffin. Here the emotions can be complex: sadness, respect, solemnity and so on. In the context in which the image of the coffin-draped flag is often displayed, the image can also be interpreted as expressing 'necessary' sacrifice and the 'just' desire for revenge. The familiarity of the visual trope means that its emotional semantics do not need to be specified each time the image is presented. Distant observers within the nation, seeing the image by means of television, internet or newspapers, can respond with appropriate emotion—not that all will do so.

Banal Nationalism did not discuss in detail how the banally reproduced signs might be received—who will fail to notice them, who will register approval and who will react with disapproval (even outrage). The work did not aim to detail individual differences, or even communal differences. If the book expressed a tendency to suppose that officially produced images, phrases and signs will always be accepted unthinkingly then this is regrettable. The present volume contains two studies which dramatically show how an official governmental policy on citizenship—the official imagining of the nation—can be rejected by many members of the nation. Manolis Pratsinakis and Gesine Wallem discuss how citizens can dissent in their everyday actions from the official definitions of nationhood. These citizens are not 'nationalists' in the traditional sense of the term because they do not wish to secede from their nation, or to re-draw its boundaries or to base politics around the idea of the nation. Instead, they wish to exclude from the nation some who officially qualify for their nation's citizenship.

Pratsinakis and Wallem present evidence from two populations, living in different countries but sharing similar reactions. Pratsinakis looks at the reactions of native Greeks to incomers from the former Soviet Union whom the Greek government has declared to be ethnically Greek. Wallem examines a similar situation in Germany. In both cases, the incomers are not accepted as fellow citizens by many of the natives who see them primarily as 'Russians'. They criticise the incomers for speaking Russian among themselves, for behaving in so-called typically 'Russian' ways, and generally for being 'really' Russian, rather than 'really' Greek or German. To use a concept that Aronczyk uses in her chapter, these native inhabitants see their governments as committing 'categorical treachery' when they accepted these essentially 'foreign' incomers as if they were 'properly' Greek or German. This nationalist complaint represents what analysts have termed 'everyday nationalism', as compared with the sort of top-down official symbols of nationhood discussed in *Banal Nationalism*.

Nevertheless, in crucial ways, this sort of everyday nationalism rests upon an unexamined, banal assumption: namely that everyone, or virtually everyone, in the world of nations belongs 'properly' to a particular nation. The incomers, according to the complainants, have no place here in 'our' homeland because they are properly 'Russian'. The complainants do not have to spell out their ideological reasoning from first principles. The deep logic that nations can and should exclude those who do not belong is part of a common sense that is accepted from nation to nation. These Greek and German complainants can make their arguments with accusatory stereotypes, using the unexpressed, exclusionary assumptions of nationalism—not just 'our' nationalism but nationalism internationally—to justify their specific complaints about 'them'. It is these deep assumptions about belonging and, most importantly, about not-belonging to nations that, in a time of mass migration, can leave millions in makeshift, exposed camps, unwelcome in the countries to which they have fled and unable to return to their so-called 'proper' countries. The leaders and populations of other nations wring their hands: these unfortunates do not belong 'here' with 'us', they say. To demonstrate 'our' magnanimity and the goodness of 'our' great nation, 'we' will accept a few—a very few—but all the others in their

millions must go elsewhere, preferably back to 'their' own lands where 'they' supposedly belong but where they have suffered so much.

Calhoun is surely correct in claiming that the imagining of nations can be performed imaginatively. He writes that 'the idea of social imaginaries is precisely a bridge between the objectively recurrent and the subjectively enacted'. He also suggests that *Banal Nationalism* was overcritical of nationalism. Far from being uniformly pernicious, nationalism can be integral to positive projects. Democracy, for example, depends upon notions of the nation, or the national people, making its choice. In this regard, it rests today upon national 'imaginaries'. But here is the problem: the assumptions of nationhood and the dominance of the national 'imaginary' have not just produce exclusive communities but they have, in effect, blocked out alternative ways of imagining the political past and present.

Recently I have been examining the annual celebration in the Portuguese parliament commemorating the 1974 overthrow of dictatorship (Billig and Marinho 2017). This is not an example of banal nationalism, for metaphorically the flag is waved on these occasions, as 'we' celebrate 'our' history and 'our' great triumph. Such a ceremony is what the classical rhetoricians called 'epideictic'. Modern rhetorical analysts claim that national epideictic ceremonies affirm a sense of collective belonging (for example, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Condit 1985). In the Portuguese ceremony, the national context dominates the ceremony, and both banal and imaginative rhetoric are to be found intermingled. What Calhoun calls the national 'imaginary' overwhelms any other form of imagining politics—thereby constraining, as well as expanding what can be politically imagined.

The Portuguese deputies, as they celebrate the historic overthrow of the Salazarist dictatorship, typically pursue current partisan politics. Sometimes, in these celebrations, speakers from the right will dispute with those from the left about the term 'the people' (*o povo*). Both, however, will accept the nationalist meaning of the term: in the context of the celebration, 'the people' refers to the people of Portugal. In the 2010 ceremony, a speaker from the right was talking about his party's view on rewriting the formal constitution of Portugal. The speaker explicitly criticised the

left-wing concept of *o povo*, which refers to the unprivileged mass as contrasted with the privileged few. The speaker claimed that all Portuguese belonged to *o povo*, rich and poor, the shareholder as well as the worker. A deputy from the Communist Party then interrupted, calling out: ‘Strike out the shareholder!’ Left-wing deputies responded with laughter.

We can ask why the left-wing deputies laughed. At its minimum, such laughter indicates that the left was not seriously advocating that the constitution should be revised to exclude shareholders from citizenship. If this were the actual policy, then cheers and applause, not laughter, could be expected. The intervention and the accompanying laughter illustrate the extent to which a former dream of universal unity (the dream of workers of the world uniting) has become nationalised in the twenty-first century. Now the thought of removing shareholders from the nation, like a Freudian fantasy, can only be expressed as a joke, rather than as a serious desire.

This illustrative example might seem unimportant but it expresses something that is today so familiar, so banal, as to be hardly worth noticing. The term ‘the people’ has been co-opted nationally within the world of nations, and has been correspondingly emptied of its non-national, even antinational, class-based meaning. An imagined politics, not based around the imagined nation, is virtually unimaginable. Thus, the so-called national ‘imaginary’ also represents a restriction of political imagination. In this respect, nationalism is not a disappearing island about to be overcome by the tidal flow of internationalism. It remains the dominant political ideology of today, determining what politics is to be seriously practised and what can only be non-seriously imagined.

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Conclusion: The Present and Future of Nationalism

Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich

We began writing this conclusion on the day that Donald Trump was declared President of the USA. A populist candidate whose combination of anti-immigrant rhetoric and crude sloganeering ('Making America Great Again') resonated with a majority of white voters across the country. This was the second howl of nativist anger this year after the recent Brexit vote in the UK. They united around a similar rallying cry, 'We want our country back'. To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of the nation seem to have been greatly exaggerated.

Now, of course, one might reasonably ask what these outbursts of rage and frustration on both sides of the Atlantic have got to do with the concept of banal nationalism. Surely, Billig's concept stands in

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diametric opposition to Trumpian posturing, dealing as it does with the often unseen markers of nationhood that provide a backdrop to news reports, supermarket shelves and the built environment. But if this collection has taught us anything, it is that we cannot disentangle the flags being waved by Republicans or Brexiteers from those hanging limply on buildings. They may be analytically distinct, they may provoke very different responses (one is difficult to ignore, the other is generally overlooked), but they both belong to the same discursive formation (to use the overbaked academic language) or—put rather more simply—they both contribute to the idea that the world is (and probably should remain) a world of nations.

To be sure, national narratives, symbols and practices are probably more contested and more dynamic than they have ever been and the growing mobility of people, products, ideas and images is changing the ways we think about identity, culture and community. For example, research into urban youth cultures (Nilan and Feixa 2006; Harris 2009; Leurs and Georgiou 2016) has consistently shown that young people in places like London, New York and Rio de Janeiro exhibit a greater degree of cultural hybridity and openness to diversity, and it may be that in two generations the political pendulum swings back to reflect these shifts. For now, however, promises of a cosmopolitan future seem rather fanciful and as recent events and these chapters have shown, national ways of thinking, doing, saying, representing and organising continue to pattern everyday lives in both mundane and quite arresting ways.

But simply observing this, as Craig Calhoun argues in his chapter, is not enough. We can track markers of nationhood—symbols and signs, language and activities, building styles and consumer goods—until the cows come home but we also need to move beyond this to think critically about what they mean and why they might matter. Therefore, what this collection has sought to do not only deepen our understandings of the ways in which people continue to draw on national frameworks, and for what purposes, but also demonstrate the meaning and value that such frameworks may have, both for individuals, groups and wider institutions. This is a point that sometimes gets overlooked both in the wider academic literature and policy debates.

For instance, Wallem and Pratsinakis' fine-grained ethnographies not only outline the processes by which perceived 'outsiders' are marked as different—a common theme in the literature—but also reference the power that established groups have in defining national belonging. These cases are particularly salient for at least three key reasons. First, those defined as 'other' are not visibly different and therefore their alterity is defined and noted through a complex network of largely routine practices that can only be understood in relation to the micro-level. Far from being insignificant, it is these micro-practices (rather than, or perhaps in combination with, the grand political gestures) that are used to realise, and in some cases, resist, national ways of being and doing on a routine basis. Second, these categorisations are shaped by a common-sense understanding, and use, of national categories, and in defining 'them' as national 'others' dominant groups demonstrate the significance of such categories to their own sense of self and place. Third, this is not a one-way street, those marked as 'different' demonstrate a good deal of agency, in some cases sidestepping potentially damaging situations, in others openly challenging the way they have been labelled. Therefore, studying such interactions is best achieved by drawing on insights from both everyday and banal approaches. Put simply, what it means to be Greek or German may be challenged, rejected and contested, but it is still national frameworks that are being used to make sense of people, processes and issues, a view that Paul Goode also confirms in his work with 'ordinary' Russians.

But we do not only see these processes happening at the local level of the street, the bar or the school as important as they may be. Ichijo's research on UNESCO's cultural heritage list is obviously operating on a very different scale but again shows how largely taken-for-granted ideas around the nation come to inform decision-making at the intergovernmental level. Here it is worth noting that a stated interest in preserving 'humanity's moral and intellectual solidarity' becomes tied up with specific national concerns as governments and other commercial groups seek to promote their own interests through the recognition and acclaim of a supranational body. Once again, we can not only see how national frameworks inform these activities in a relatively 'common sense' manner, but also the advantages that employing such frameworks

may offer. In this case, status, prestige and economic opportunities that come from having a particular cultural practice (now firmly identified in national terms) are recognised and validated on a global level.

Another good example, again from a very different setting, comes from Lekakis' study of online resistance to anti-austerity measures. Many of those involved are individuals from across Europe attempting to show solidarity with ordinary Greek people and as such these discussions might be seen as a challenge to the primacy of the nation state as transnational actors look to build European or even global network through their use of digital technologies. And, yet, even in these instances, the purported enemy is generally defined in national terms (Germany) and, more to the point, is criticised with reference to a whole host of firmly-established national tropes and caricatures, many relating to the Second World War. In this example, the German nation (or even *the* nation) may be viewed as a problem, but it is difficult even for these groups (progressive, European, educated) to escape its hold on our ideas and attitudes. Likewise, it makes sense to reiterate German dominance as both a rhetorical strategy and as a possible salve to wider frustrations with the European project.

Indeed, the taken-for-granted use, *and value*, of such frameworks is an aspect of Billig's work that deserves more attention and should provide one of the most important avenues for future research. This is why we were particularly keen to capture the recent turn to affect, notably in geography, where a number of scholars have looked to push our understanding of nationhood in new directions. For while we remain sceptical about some of the broader claims and approaches to this rather nebulous concept—an emphasis on mystical, magical 'forces' being a notable problem—we do think that more work is required to understand the meaningfulness of national talk, representations, symbols and practices to particular individuals and groups (Antonsich and Skey 2016). In other words, there is a need to move the study of nationhood beyond the cognitive and the representational. In the first place, nations are not, or at least not primarily, imagined communities, distinguished by the style in which they are imagined. This is an argument made some time ago by the late Anthony Smith (1998) and this seems like an opportune moment to raise his important critique of Anderson's landmark

(and now largely axiomatic) claim. Smith's argument was that nations, as a particular form of community, are lived, embodied, heard, viewed, represented, 'deeply felt and acted out' (1998: 137), rather than simply imagined. It is worth noting that Anderson's almost acknowledges as much when he discusses the importance of the daily ritual of reading the newspaper. He writes, 'the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday day' (Anderson 1991: 35–6). What this example actually seems to demonstrate is the importance of 'shared' practices that recreate a particular view of the world in often *unimaginative* ways. In other words, a sense of community is primarily generated by actions rather than thoughts and that to place an undue emphasis on the latter is rather problematic.

Moreover, this focus on processes of imagination fails to capture the manner in which any community worthy of the name moves people, in laughter, in anger, for better or worse. And the nation, of course, is no different. For example, Militz's chapter points to the ways in which a birthday celebration can not only bring together as families, but also generate feelings of discomfort and exclusion that are then explicated in national terms. Why do not I feel comfortable in this place amongst all this joy and laughter? It is because I am not familiar with this music, this way of dancing, these activities; it is because I am not Azerbaijani. Here again, the fact that a national framework is used to make sense of this issue is crucial, but so are the connections that Militz makes between the birthday party and other routine examples of dancing she has witnessed, in the kitchen of her host family, on television, in the street. These features are a constant reminder of what is different, part of a wider symbolic order that generates some degree of discomfort for those who are used to other places and traditions.

Alternatively, we should be aware that for those who are familiar with this environment and these practices, they are likely to be associated with a range of enjoyable occasions—and feelings—from smaller scale parties, involving friends and family, to larger events at the street and the city level and, perhaps, even national celebrations or anniversaries. These feelings of dis/comfort are also addressed in the chapters

by Sumartojo and McCreanor et al., although from rather different perspectives. Sumartojo again emphasises a move away from cognition to focus on the ways in which the nation may be felt both at the level of the everyday and the eventful. In the first place, by moving through quotidian places that are either 'flagged' in some way as national or offer a backdrop that is recognisable across the country, individuals come to feel at ease in particular surroundings. Similarly, there is a good deal of evidence to show that when such environments change over a relatively short space of time, this can generate acute feelings of discomfort and anger for some (Wise 2010).

In the second, 'as people participate in choreographies of commemoration' at specially arranged events commemorating the nation, they are provided with opportunities to share carefully defined symbolic spaces and take part in activities that are often saturated with emotion. In this way, connections are built between bodies, symbols and places that may generate feelings of awe, respect, sadness or joy depending on the event in question, but are surely crucial in making the nation seem resonant and meaningful for substantial numbers. McCreanor et al. are also interested in the impact of major events, but emphasise the manner in which different groups within the nation are positioned and the relations of power that are confirmed, and contested, in the process of organising, promoting, participating in and evaluating such events. Their focus on practices rather than atmospheres also ensures that we address the fact that people from very different backgrounds will be moved, angered, bored and dismayed by the same event. It is our contention, then, that any understanding of the nation must pay attention to this emotional or felt dimension, as otherwise we risk missing out on two key issues. First, the ways in which everyday national forms contribute to the ways in which some people make themselves at home in the world and help secure an ongoing sense of place and belonging. Second, how passions, feelings and emotions drive people's involvement in political campaigns and public celebrations tied to the nation. We may not, of course, particularly like the fact that these processes often involve pretty base, and sometimes brutal, forms of exclusion, but explaining is not the same thing as condoning. Moreover, given contemporary political shifts, it is imperative that we are able to

understand why people continue to be moved by ideologues bearing national flags as well as overpaid football players kissing national badges. Otherwise, we will simply be reduced to carping from the side lines about the 'unfortunate' choices other people make rather than engaging with them and offering possible alternatives.

The final point that we would like to make in this section refers to a theoretical and methodological challenge. Sometimes, there has been a tendency in research on the banal features of nationhood to examine them as isolated features of a wider phenomenon, without actually paying (enough) attention to the phenomenon itself and how it might be theorised. In other words, to move beyond the noting of this or that feature to try and understand how they combine to form more or less embedded frameworks in the lives of substantial numbers of people. Edensor's work (2002) is perhaps the best example of this as he notes the importance of a range of features, from material objects to representations to the built environment and even driving habits (2004), in forming a wider national–cultural matrix. This argument finds an echo in Bonikowski's (this collection) claims about the ongoing salience of cultural repertoires. He notes that in 'all their historical and institutional uniqueness, France and Germany are characterized by strikingly similar repertoires of nationhood, which correlate in similar ways with other political preferences, especially attitudes toward immigration and economic protectionism'. Such an approach points to the relatively consistent ways in which larger scale populations may coalesce around particular attitudes and experiences that provide shared points of reference, even in an increasingly complex social and political environment. As Ann Swidler (1986) notes many of these shared reference points may come from the fact that otherwise dissimilar people have to deal with the same institutional settings, education system, media, political and legal frameworks. Nonetheless, their potential value in orientating people to each other also needs to be acknowledged.

In other work, Karner (2007) and Hage (1998) have also made some interesting attempts to use Bourdieu's concept of habitus in relation to ethnicity and nationality, respectively, with the latter paying particular attention to the hierarchies that shape national belonging as well as their significance to more dominant groups. But we believe that more

effort should be made in trying to bring in wider social scientific theorising on the everyday, the habitual, the routine and the quotidian as a means of really trying to get to grips with the significance of national formations, the processes by which they 'heat' and 'cool' and the value that different groups ascribe to them over time. Where are the connections with ethnomethodology, for example, where Garfinkel on background expectation and Pollner on mundane reason can surely tell us something worthwhile about the force of everyday (national) practices and habits? There is also very little on the phenomenology of nationhood, where a focus on say people's orientations to particular physical and virtual spaces (see Lavi 2012 for a rare example) or aspects of embodied experience might be productively developed. Elsewhere, what of Goffman's interest in everyday (re)presentation, the ongoing performance of identity and, in particular, the challenges of dealing with stigma in everyday settings (see Wallem's chapter in this edition)? Might DuBois classic accounts of double consciousness be applied to contemporary settings both as a means of tracking the psychological strain of being, say, an ethnic minority in a resurgent populist environment and the value of being part of the dominant group? Or in a more progressive sense, could Butler's seminal work on *Gender Trouble* (2011) be applied to the nation as a means of unpicking dominant narratives and challenging the essentialism of so much national talk and work? These are a few snapshots, no doubt reflecting our own biases, but in general terms there seems to be so much unchartered work dealing with theories of the everyday, the social construction of reality or identity work in relation to other social formations (gender, class, race, sexuality) that could be usefully applied to studies of nationhood. Some of them, of course, will be more relevant than others but even if an approach is found wanting, it will at least tell us something interesting about nations vis a vis these other forms or, perhaps, how nations intersect with them.

Last but not least comes the question of method. As we noted in the introduction, one of the primary shifts in the literature has been away from more top-down investigations into the role of powerful institutions in inculcating banal nationalism (the media, political institutions, the education system) to address the everyday performance of the nation by ordinary people. This has been a welcome corrective, but

at times an undue emphasis on interview talk (of which we also stand guilty as charged) tends to lead us down analytical cul-de-sacs. Often quite interesting cul-de-sacs admittedly, but none-the-less this research is not always able (or willing) to make connections with larger, more representative datasets or, in particular, say much about comparisons across populations. This is why Bonikowski's approach is so important. As he writes:

> It is imperative that social scientists gain analytical purchase on the varieties of popular nationalism prevalent among national populations. This chapter demonstrates that survey research, when carried out in a manner that takes seriously the relationality of meaning, offers a useful complement to qualitative studies of everyday nationhood by enabling the identification and systematic comparison of cultural repertoires across social groups.

Now, we're not trying to make the rather tiresome argument that surveys matter more than interviews because they are more representative. There are manifold problems with the collection and administration of survey data when it comes to research on identity and belonging, not least the problem in trying to map variability or the disjuncture between what people say and what they do. This is merely an observation that the fine-grained ethnographic work needs to be bolstered by other approaches that offer us fresh ways of thinking about the subject. For example, studies that use experimental investigations have offered some provocative insights into the 'implicit activation of national cues' (Butz 2009, Hassin et al. 2009), how nationalism is used to justify political projects and systems (Carter et al. 2011, van der Toorn et al. 2014) and hierarchies of national belonging (Devos and Banaji 2005). Yet, there have been few attempts made to connect research into what psychologists now broadly label 'implicit nationalism' (Carter et al. 2011) with everyday approaches. Similar arguments might be made about the growing interest in visual methods, part of a broader attempt to map and theorise visual and material environments and their significance, where systematic and comparative studies are pretty thin on the ground (Although see Edensor 2002; Skey 2015).

Finally, it is our contention that digital data, notably that dealing with the output of ordinary people across countless media platforms, need to be harnessed in a much more systematic manner. After all, this is naturally occurring data that can be analysed from a whole range of different perspectives, whether it be individuals commenting on a particular issue, the use of deixis across broader populations or the application of sentiment analysis to posts during moments of collective effervescence. We need to be wary, as Szulc suggests, of simply trying to categorise particular places or platforms as national, but the online sphere offers us a wealth of opportunities that can be used to study when people identify as national and the ways in which they draw boundaries or distinctions between themselves and others.

The aim of this collection was to present the reader with the variety of ways, both theoretical and empirical, in which nationalism operates in the everyday whether mindfully or through more banal forms. We are particularly grateful that Michael Billig joined us in this editorial project, offering an insightful retrospective look at his original work and equally reflecting on where the banal nation stands today. As a new wave of nationalism emerges, it is imperative that we begin to construct new models for understanding its appeal and significance in a world of increasing complexity and uncertainty.

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